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Abstract
This thesis proposes and analyzes micro-theoretic models of the strategic
interaction between heterogeneous workers and a union, and that between
a rm and a union. We assume union membership increases the bargaining
power of the workers, but decreases their productivity. The workers and
the rm produce a surplus. The union bargains on behalf of all workers,
trying to maximize their surplus, which is a share of the total surplus. This
thesis focuses on studying equilibria in which the least productive workers
join the union, but the most productive workers do not. For each model, we
show that such an equilibrium exists, is unique, and is robust to coalitional
deviations. We nd expressions for the equilibrium union size, union density,
the wages of union and non-union workers, the surplus and prot of the
rm, and the respective bargaining powers of the workers and the rm.
The models comparative statics are also studied. Equilibrium variables
are compared across the models to gain insight into the unions preferences
on performance-based pay. We also study how di¤erences in the workers
productive levels a¤ect their incentives to join the union. The most striking
result that holds across the models is that the rms surplus and prot
can sometimes increase with the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient of the union. This
suggests there can exist situations where rms have a perverse incentive
to make union workers less e¢ cient compared to non-union workers. We
also nd that union membership and salaries decrease with the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient of the union. This suggests that unionized workers always prefer
to be as e¢ cient as their non-unionized colleagues. We nd that union wages
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are generally lowest when they are linked to a workers output, suggesting
that unions may have incentives to oppose performance-based pay for their
members.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A common nding of researchers studying labor unions is that unions and
unionization can a¤ect a rms e¢ ciency, both positively and negatively,
and increase the bargaining power of workers. For example, unions can
help workers negotiate better salaries or employment conditions with their
employer by representing them in negotiations for wages or enterprise agree-
ments. The productivity of workers, and hence the protability of the rm,
can be adversely a¤ected by union activities if, for example, they encourage
restrictive work practices or promote ine¢ cient hiring or ring. In contrast,
union activities may improve productivity if they assist in the resolution of
workplace issues.
An important issue in labor economics is therefore how a trade-o¤ be-
tween e¢ ciency and bargaining power a¤ects the strategic interaction be-
tween workers, rms and unions. For example, if joining a labor union can
improve the bargaining power of workers, but makes them less productive,
then:
 How many workers can be expected to join the union?
 To what extent will a workforce be unionized?
 How does this level of unionization a¤ect a rms e¢ ciency?
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 How much e¤ort should a rm make in bargaining with a union?
 How does the magnitude of the union e¢ ciency a¤ect the size of unions,
the relative bargaining power of workers and the salaries of workers
inside and outside unions?
 Who has incentives to join the union? Highly skilled workers might
prefer not to join a union in the hope of obtaining a better job contract
by negotiating individually with the employer.
 Under what conditions would there be full, or almost full, unionization
of workers in a given industry?
 How does the distribution of worker skills and the bargaining power
of the union a¤ect salaries and the size of the union?
 What are the unions preferences on performance-based pay?
These are important questions because the rate of unionization in a work-
force may have implications for economic e¢ ciency, labor productivity, in-
come equality, and labor laws. It may also raise political issues.
This thesis provides insight into the above questions by proposing and
analyzing micro-theoretic models of the strategic interaction between het-
erogeneous workers and a union, and that between a rm and a union. It is
assumed that joining the union can increase the bargaining power of workers,
but a¤ects their productivity. Because unions are essentially a coalition of
workers, the strategic interaction between a union and coalitions of workers
is also considered. Two main models are analyzed. The rst is the Constant
Wage Model of Chapter 3, where the strategic players are the union and
the workers. The second is the Firm Choice Model of Chapter 6, where the
strategic players are the union and the rm. Chapters 4, 5 and 7 examine
variations of these baseline models by changing the assumptions on output
observability and incorporating performance-based pay. They also compare
the equilibrium variables across the models. Appendix B studies a variation
of the baseline model that endogenizes the union e¢ ciency e¤ect.
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The models assume a nite number of heterogeneous workers and each
one decides whether to join the union. The heterogeneity of workers is in
their skill; each worker has a di¤erent skill level. Workers and the rm
produce a surplus and the union bargains on behalf of workers for their
share of the surplus (which we call their wage). The union determines, and
tries to maximize, wages for its members, subject to budget balance. Budget
balance requires that union members share what is left from the workers
surplus after salaries to non-members are paid. Allowing for a large union
decreases the total surplus, but, by assumption, increases the bargaining
power of workers and hence the share of the surplus they receive. Chapters
6 and 7 allow for the rm to make costly e¤ort in bargaining with the union.
This thesis focuses on studying equilibria in which the least productive
workers join the union and the most productive workers do not. This thesis
is concerned with studying the properties of such an equilibrium because,
as described in Chapter 2, labor unions tend to be more popular amongst
lower skilled workers (Blanchower [5]). Across the models, we show that
this equilibrium exists, is unique, and is robust to coalitional deviations. We
nd expressions for the equilibrium union size, union density (the share of
unionized workers in the workforce), the wage of union and non-union work-
ers, the surplus and prot of the rm and the bargaining power of workers
and the rm. Comparative statics are also studied. Equilibrium variables
are compared across the models to gain insight on the unions preferences
on performance-based pay. We also study the incentives of workers with
di¤erent productivity levels to join the union.
The most striking result that holds across all models is that the rms
surplus and prot can sometimes increase with the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient.
This suggests there can exist situations where rms have a perverse incen-
tive to make union workers less e¢ cient compared to non-union workers.
The intuition is that the reduced e¢ ciency causes unionized workers to exit
the union and this increases the bargaining power of the rm and the to-
tal surplus. We nd that union membership and salaries decrease with the
10
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient of the union. In other words, the union and the work-
ers always prefer to be as e¢ cient as their non-unionized colleagues. We
also nd that union wages were generally lowest when they are linked to a
workers output. This suggests that unions may have incentives to oppose
performance-based pay for their members.
This thesis derives results for populations of workers of any nite size, and
computes the limits of all equilibrium variables, as the population of workers
grows large without bound. The qualitative results regarding wages, how
many workers will join a union and what types of workers have incentives
to join, are shown to be consistent with results of empirical studies.
One limitation of models that study the strategic interaction between
workers and a union is that they do not consider the supply and demand for
labor or the action of the rm (Naylor [42]). This limitation also holds for
the models in this thesis that study this strategic interaction (specically,
the Constant Wage Model of Chapter 3 and its variations in Chapters 4
and 5). This limitation is overcome to some degree by the models studied
in Chapters 6 and 7, which focus on the strategic interaction between the
union and the rm.
1.1 Contribution of this Thesis
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, this thesis studies
the strategic interaction between workers and a union when union member-
ship increases the bargaining power of workers, but can a¤ect their produc-
tivity. The novelty is that the strategic interaction is studied in the presence
of union e¢ ciency e¤ects. Union e¢ ciency e¤ects have been described as
an important area for further theoretical research (Addison and Hirsch [2],
Freeman [25] and Manning [34]). As described earlier, many aspects of the
strategic interaction are considered in this thesis, such as the union size,
union density, wages of union and non-union workers, the rms surplus and
the unions preferences on performance-based pay.
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Second, this thesis studies the strategic interaction between a union and
a rm when union membership increases the bargaining power of workers,
but can a¤ect their productivity. Again, the novelty is that the strategic
interaction is studied in the presence of union e¢ ciency e¤ects.
Third, this thesis assumes that workers are heterogeneous with respect
to their skills. It studies how this heterogeneity a¤ects the strategic inter-
action and union membership decisions. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the rst theoretic model, in the context of labor unions, that allows for
union membership decisions and productivity to vary by skill. Most theo-
retic models analyzing labor unions assume that workers are homogenous
or that heterogeneity of workers does not directly (or indirectly) a¤ect their
production (for example, heterogeneity of workers is in terms of their se-
niority or reputational concerns). In the real world, there is heterogeneity
in skill and productivity and this has been shown to be an important factor
in union membership decisions (Blanchower [5]).
Fourth, this thesis, to the best of our knowledge, is the rst to study
equilibria where lower skilled workers join a union and higher skilled workers
do not. This is an important contribution of the thesis because (as the
following subsection explains) union membership tends to be more popular
amongst workers with lower skills or productivity.
1.2 Motivation
A number of ndings from empirical studies motivated this thesis. First,
empirical studies have found associations between unions and productivity.
E¢ ciency e¤ects of unions vary by country, over time, and depend on the
economic, institutional and political conditions under which the unions op-
erate (Doucouliagos [21] and Tzannatos and Aidt [47]). For example, in
Australia and the United Kingdom, most studies nd a negative association
between unions and productivity (Doucouliagos [21] and Miller and Mulvey
[38]). For the United States, Doucouliagos [21] reports there was a positive
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association in the late 1990s, after a negative association was found in the
1980s and early 1990s (Tzannatos and Aidt [47]).
Second, a workers decision to become a union member depends on their
individual characteristics. Workers with low skills or productivity are more
likely to be members of labor unions than those with more favorable traits,
holding other factors constant (Blanchower [5]).
Third, unions that are able to inuence wages typically raise wages for
lower skilled workers more than for higher skilled workers (Blanchower
et al. [6], [7] and Card [19]). For example, a study by Card [19] used
data from the U.S. Current Population Survey 19871988 to report that
workers with unfavorable traits can be made better o¤ by joining a labor
union, while workers with favorable traits can be made worse o¤. The study
of Card [19] reports a unionnon-union wage gap (the di¤erence between
wages of unionized and non-union workers) of 35% for workers with the
lowest quintile of observable skills and  10% for workers with the highest
quintile of observable skills. Similarly, Cai and Lui [17] report that union
wage e¤ects in Australia were signicantly higher at the lower end of the
wage distribution.
Fourth, the distribution of wages tends to be relatively compressed in
industries with a high union density, relative to those with a low union
density (Blanchower [5], Card [18], Freeman and Medo¤ [26] and Kaufman
[31]).
1.3 Outline of Thesis
Chapter 2 contains background information relevant to the thesis, including
a review of the literature. Chapter 3 explores the strategic interaction be-
tween a union and workers using the Constant Wage Model. This chapter
assumes that the output of workers is unobservable. Chapter 4 studies this
strategic interaction when the output of workers is observable and wages
depend on skill level. Chapter 5 examines this interaction when the output
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of workers is unobservable for union members, but observable for non-union
members. This chapter also compares the equilibrium variables across Chap-
ters 3 through 5 and discusses the unions preferences on performance-based
pay. Chapter 6 focuses on the strategic interaction between a union and a
rm using the Firm Choice Model. This chapter assumes that output is un-
observable. Chapter 7 examines this strategic interaction when the output
of workers is observable and wages depend on skill level. Chapter 8 con-
cludes. Appendix A contains all proofs. Appendix B extends the Constant
Wage Model of Chapter 3 by endogenizing the union ine¢ ciency e¤ect.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter contains background information relevant to the thesis. First,
there is an explanation of the relevance of labor unions. Second, there is
a review of the relevant literature. Third, there is an explanation of how
labor unions can a¤ect a rms e¢ ciency (both positively and negatively).
Fourth, there is a summary of relevant empirical research on the issue.
2.1 The Relevance of Labor Unions
Unions remain important players in labor markets despite the level of union
membership having declined in most countries over the past few decades.
Union density in OECD countries averaged 28% in 2010 compared to 41%
in 1990 (Booth [8]). There are a number of reasons why labor unions remain
important despite this decline. These are explained in Booth [8] and are
briey summarized here.
First, for European countries, Australia and New Zealand, the inuence
of labor unions is better indicated by the extent of collective bargaining
coverage of the workforce, rather than by union density (Booth [8]; the
denition of the collective bargaining coverage rate is the number of workers
covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of the workforce).
In France, for example, less than 8% of workers are unionized, but 90% of
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its workforce is covered by union negotiated collective agreements (Booth
[8]).
Second, union membership levels have remained high in a number of
countries (such as Scandinavian countries) and sectors (such as the public
sector). For example, in 2012 six OECD countries had union density exceed-
ing 50%, and four OECD countries had union density exceeding two-thirds
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden) (Booth [8]).
Third, labor union inuence extends beyond the direct measure of union
power suggested by the union density and coverage gures (Booth [8]). For
example, the threat of union organization of a non-union sector may provoke
management to provide wages and working conditions that mimic those
negotiated in union rms (Booth [8]).
2.2 Literature Review
This subsection reviews the theoretical literature on labor unions. There is
a focus on those areas related to this thesis, such as union e¢ ciency e¤ects
and the union membership decisions of workers.
Overview of Main Theory Models
There are three main theoretic models or approaches used to analyze labor
unions: the Monopoly Union Model (including its extensions, such as the
Median Voter Model), the Nash bargaining approach (also known as the ax-
iomatic or cooperative game theory approach) and the non-cooperative game
theoretic approach. Most models are principally concerned with studying
the interaction between the rm and the union, rather than between the
union and workers. These modelling approaches are briey outlined below
to provide context. The next subsection discusses the main theories related
to the union membership decisions of workers.
Monopoly Union Model
In the Monopoly Union Model, there is no bargaining between the two
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parties. Instead, the union acts as a monopolist in the supply of labor and
imposes a wage rate on the rm. The rm chooses the number of workers
to employ at the union wage (Booth [9]).
A key extension of the Monopoly Union Model is the Median Voter
Model. It builds on the Monopoly Union Model by assuming union mem-
bers are heterogeneous in their preferences for a union policy, such as the
wage imposed on the rm. It assumes that union leaders, who want to
be re-elected, will choose the wage preferred by the median union member
(Kaufman [32]). As in the Monopoly Union Model, all employed workers
are also union members because the union is a monopoly provider of labor.
Some researchers argue that the Monopoly Union Model is a reason-
able approximation for particular industries at particular times, however,
observation seems to suggest that wages are bargained over by unions and
rms (Booth [9]). The principal tool used to understand this has been game
theory (Kaufman [32]).
Nash Bargaining Approach
The Nash bargaining approach (see Nash [41]), also known as the ax-
iomatic approach or cooperative game theory approach, assumes that bar-
gaining is a cooperative game. In other words, it assumes that the bargainers
can sign a binding contract once an agreement is reached (Kaufman [32] and
Manzini [35]). This approach involves the bargainers choosing the wage (or
the level of employment, or both) which maximizes the Nash product (the
Nash product refers to the product of the excess payo¤s to the bargain-
ers in case of agreement with respect to what they would obtain in case of
disagreement) (Manzini [35]).
The Nash bargaining approach has not been widely used for modelling
union and rm bargaining because it generally cannot incorporate behav-
ioral foundations or details of the bargaining process (Kaufman [32]). There
is an equivalence between the Nash bargaining outcome and strategic bar-
gaining where two agents make alternating o¤ers. This has been shown by
Rubinstein [47].
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Non-cooperative Game Theoretic Approach
Non-cooperative game theory has been used for modelling of the struc-
ture of wage negotiations. In contrast to the cooperative approach, the key
feature of strategic models of bargaining is the specication of the extensive
form of the game, that is, the explicit modelling of the bargaining protocol
(Manzini [35]). The advantage of this approach is that it explicitly mod-
els the objective functions of the bargainers, species the resources of the
bargainers and the rules structuring the negotiations, and permits inclu-
sion of common negotiating tactics, such as blu¢ ng and recourse to strikes
(Kaufman [32]).
The solution concept widely used in the union literature is the generalized
Nash bargaining solution (Kaufman [32]). According to this, wages are
determined by maximizing the product of each agents gains from reaching
a bargain, weighted by their respective bargaining strengths (Kaufman [32]).
The most common non-cooperative game theory model used in the union
literature is the Right to Manage Model. It assumes that bargaining is over
wages only and the rm retains authority to set the level of employment
(Kaufman [32]). An extension of this model is the E¢ cient Contract Model
which allows the bargainers to set both wages and the level of employment
(Kaufman [32]).
The Union Membership Decision
The key theory model of worker choices to unionize is the Social Custom
Model. The Social Custom Model is primarily concerned with explaining a
workers decision to join a labor union in the presence of free-riding workers
who do not join a union. In the Social Custom Model, the reason that
workers join the union is to receive a good reputation (Checchi and Corneo
[20]). One limitation of the Social Custom Model is that it does not consider
the supply or demand for labor (Naylor [42]).
Another approach is to assume union membership is an asset that workers
can buy to gain benets that accrue from the union, such as in Pencavel
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[44] (Kaufman [31]). The decision to join a union and the level of union
membership can then be modelled as the outcome of a demand and supply
process  workers demand union services and unions supply the services
(Hirsch and Addison [29] and Kaufman [31]).
Union E¢ ciency E¤ects
There is a large empirical literature on the e¢ ciency e¤ects of labor unions.
Section 2.3 summarizes this literature.
In terms of theory, typical theoretic models of labor unions do not include
union e¢ ciency e¤ects, even though this has been agged as an important
area for future research (see, for example, Addison and Hirsch [2], Freeman
[25] and Manning [34]). According to Booth [8], this area of research has
probably not progressed because of a reduction in the number of researchers
focusing on the theory of labor unions over the past few decades.
Worker Heterogeneity
Workers are heterogenous in productivity. In applied theoretical models,
this observation may be important. Conclusions may depend critically on
whether we allow for heterogeneity in the productivity of workers.
Theoretic models studying labor unions vary considerably in their as-
sumptions on workers. Models that study bargaining between the union
and rm often assume workers are homogenous. Models concerned with the
union membership decision itself  such as the Median Voter Model and
Social Custom Model  often assume workers are heterogeneous in some
aspect.
The Median Voter Model assumes there is heterogeneity in worker pref-
erences for a union policy  typically the wage rate bargained for. Other
sources of worker heterogeneity usually relates to seniority (such as in Booth
and Frank [10] and Frank [24]), value for union services (see Booth [11]), or
reputation (see Booth [12]).
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Levy [33] proposes a model where workers are di¤erent with respect to
their suitability for a particular occupation, and studies union formation
across occupations. Kaufman [31] and Kaufman [32] provide more detail on
worker heterogeneity in labor union research.
2.3 Union E¢ ciency E¤ects
This subsection explains the number of ways a union can a¤ect a rms ef-
ciency, both positively and negatively. It is followed by a review of the
empirical research on this issue. A more detailed explanation and review of
the literature is available in Tzannatos and Aidt [47]. First, a union can af-
fect a rms allocative e¢ ciency if it changes the allocation of resources used
to generate output. This may occur, for example, if it changes the relative
unionnon-union wages between sectors and types of workers (Tzannatos
and Aidt [47]).
Second, a union may a¤ect technical e¢ ciency if it impacts a rms level
of output given the inputs it employs. It may negatively a¤ect technical
e¢ ciency if it encourages a restrictive practice that limits the productive
use of workers, promotes ine¢ cient hiring and ring, reduces working hours,
or reduces the pace of work (Hancock et al. [28] and Tzannatos and Aidt
[47]).
As reported in Hancock et al. [28], unions could improve technical ef-
ciency if they can assist in the resolution of workplace issues that might
otherwise cause productivity-diminishing behavior. For example, a union
can provide workers with a means of expressing discontent as an alternative
to exiting, by opening up communication channels between workers and
management, and by inducing managers to alter methods of production and
to adopt more e¢ cient policies (Freeman and Medo¤ [26]).
Third, a union may a¤ect dynamic e¢ ciency if it impacts economic
growth. It may do this, for example, if its activities lead to reduced in-
vestment or a slowdown in employment growth (Tzannatos and Aidt [47]).
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Finally, a union could a¤ect distributional e¢ ciency if it results in an
allocation of incomes that departs from that which would maximize social
welfare (Tzannatos and Aidt [47]). This could happen, for example, if it
secured higher pay for union members than for other workers simply on the
basis of their being insiders or by changing the distribution of incomes
between wages and prots (Tzannatos and Aidt [47]).
Empirical Findings
A number of empirical studies have examined the e¢ ciency e¤ects of unions.
The main results are that e¢ ciency e¤ects of unions vary by country and
over time, and depend on the economic, institutional and political conditions
under which they operate (Tzannatos and Aidt [47]).
For example, Tzannatos and Aidt [47] report that conditions that in-
uence the union e¢ ciency e¤ect include: (a) the nature and enforcement
of regulations governing the right of workers to organize and the way they
can exercise this right, including for collective bargaining; (b) the market
or welfare orientation of the government; and (c) whether the economy is
competitive or not and whether it is protectionist or open to trade.
They also report that more intense product market competition tends to
induce unions and management to move towards industrial relations systems
which enhance the positive e¤ects of unions and reduce the negative ones.
This is conrmed by Metcalf [37] who found that negative union e¤ects in the
United Kingdom were mainly in rms that faced a small degree of product
market competition.
By country, unions have been found to have an overall negative e¤ect on
productivity in the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, New Zealand and
Japan (Brunello [14] and Tzannatos and Aidt [47]). In Japan, Brunello [14]
found that productivity in unionized rms was around 15% lower than in
similar non-unionized rms. This nding was conrmed by Benson [4] who
asked managers to rank the productivity performance of their rm relative
to that of another rm in the same industry. Unions were found to reduce
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the rate of return on equity by 2025% and the ratio of prots to sales
by 40% (Brunello [14]). Union presence in Japan has also been associated
with a higher fraction of prots going to workers (Noda and Tachibanaki
[43]). In Australia, Farmakis-Gamboni and Prentice [23] studied how union
bargaining power a¤ects the productivity of rms. They found that union
bargaining power had greater negative productivity e¤ects in sectors where
unionization was more common.
Positive productivity e¤ects have been reported for Malaysia (Stand-
ing [46]) and mixed e¤ects were found in the United States. The evidence
from the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s suggests that nancial
performance is better in non-unionized than unionized rms, and that the
negative impact tends to be larger in industries or rms that have some
monopoly power in product markets (for a survey of studies on the United
States see Belman [3]). For example, Karier [30] estimated that union shares
of monopoly prots may be as large as between 47% and 77%. While these
gures may not be entirely representative, they do show that under certain
circumstances unions are able to appropriate a substantial share of monopoly
prots (Tzannatos and Aidt [47]). More recent studies of the United States
suggest that the earlier negative inuence of unions on prots is diminishing
over time (Tzannatos and Aidt [47]).
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Chapter 3
Constant Wage Model
3.1 Model Setup
Consider a sequential game involving a labor union and a nite number
of workers. The set of workers, N = f1; 2;    ; N0g, contains consecutive
integer numbers from one to some xed N0  2. The model refers to a large
population, so we think of N0 as a large number. Workers are indexed and
ordered according to their skill; the least skillful worker is j = 1 and the most
skillful is j = N0. No two workers have the same skill level. The union and
the workers have common knowledge of the skill distribution, but the union
cannot observe the skills of any individual worker. A workers skill level is her
private information (this may occur in, for example, advice markets (Fuchs
and Garicano [27]) or in the occupations of nursing or teaching (Brekke
and Nyborg [13])). Chapters 4 and 5 consider the case where the skills of
individual workers are observable.
Each worker maximizes her wage, and the union maximizes the wage
of union members. In terms of the timing of the game, the union rst sets
wages for its members subject to a budget balance condition. Following this,
each worker in N observes her own skill level and the union wage, and then,
decides whether to join the union or not; only these two pure actions are
allowed. All workers move simultaneously. Each worker considers joining
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the union in the following way: given the union wage and my skill level,
should I join the union or not, correctly anticipating the e¤ect of joining on
my wage and assuming that other workers play their part in equilibrium.
The objective of the union is consistent with orthodox models of labor
unions, in which unions are concerned with maximizing the wages of their
members (Booth [9]). While bargaining in reality may take place over a
number of issues, for tractability researchers typically focus on wages (Booth
[9]). Appendix B extends the model to consider bargaining over wages and
working conditions. In this chapter the rm cannot take actions; a restriction
also found in other theory models concerned with worker choices to unionize
(for example, see Naylor [42]). Chapters 6 and 7 incorporate a rm into the
model.
The workers and the rm produce an economic surplus; an assumption
we make because unions can only increase wages above the competitive level
if a surplus exists (Booth [9]). Implicit in this assumption is that the rm
is operating in a market with limited competition. Let K = K(n) be the
workers share of the total surplus when n workers join the union. Sup-
pose that the union negotiates with the rm regarding the share of the total
surplus that all workers will obtain. This is the case in many advanced
economies, where worker remuneration is often set through collective bar-
gaining arrangements (Booth [8]). In this bargaining process, as in Nash
[41], K(n) represents the relative bargaining power of workers when the
union size is exactly n. Indeed, in reality the ability of labor unions to in-
crease the surplus share that goes to workers depends to a large degree on
the unionization of the workforce (Checchi and Corneo [20], Mishel [40] and
Woddoups [48]).
In this thesis, the bargaining process that determines K(n) though n
is exogenous. Intuitively, however, labor unions derive the legitimacy to
represent the interests of the workforce at the bargaining table when they
have a large number of members, either because of social norms, labor laws
or the threat of more destructive industrial action (Checchi and Corneo [20]).
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A benet of using a generic and exogenous bargaining function, rather than
specifying how K(n) is formed through n, is that we are able to derive
qualitative results for any possible K(n) and any possible process for which
K(n) is generated through n. That is, the results obtained are general in
nature in the sense that they are not dependent on the properties of the
bargaining process.
Assume that the bargaining function K : [0; N0]! R is publicly observ-
able. This is not a controversial assumption because, in reality, unions are
aware of the factors inuencing their bargaining position (Woddoups [48]).
Suppose further that K : [0; N0] ! R is a twice di¤erentiable function of n
such that:
K(0)  0, (3.1)
K(N0)  1, (3.2)
dK
dn
(0) >
1
N0(N0 + 1)
, (3.3)
dK
dn
(n0) > 0, for all 0  n0 < N0, (3.4)
d2K
dn2
(n0)  0, for all 0  n0  N0, (3.5)
dK
dn
(N0) = 0. (3.6)
Assumption (3.4) states that function K : [0; N0] ! R is increasing,
that is, workersbargaining power increases as the union size increases. As
described earlier, this is because the size of the union is a key determinant
of its bargaining power (Mishel [40] and Woddoups [48]). Function K :
[0; N0] ! R is weakly concave by assumption (3.5); that is, the marginal
bargaining power is decreasing in the union size. Its maximum is achieved
at n = N0. By assumptions (3.2) and (3.4), K(n)  1, for every n 2 [0; N0].
Because of assumptions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4), then 0 < K(n) < 1, for every
n such that 0 < n < N0.
Assumption (3.3) helps us prove that at least some workers join the
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union. Without this assumption, it would be possible that no worker would
join the union in equilibrium. The intuition is that there would be no union
members if the union could not su¢ ciently improve the bargaining power of
workers, in the sense that the marginal benet from unionization would be
too small, even at the point n = 0, where the marginal bargaining power is
maximized. Assumption (3.3) is remarkably weak; in particular, because we
expect N0 to be large, this assumption is similar to assuming the marginal
bargaining power of the rst unionized worker is non-negative. Assumption
(3.6) guarantees the solution to the unions problem is an interior solution.
It forces the marginal bargaining power of workers to decrease to zero as the
union size increases to 100% of workers. This assumption is only utilized
when we want to restrict our attention to the case where not all workers are
unionized.
Consider an exogenous parameter ", named the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient,
such that 0 < "  1. If a worker joins the union, the surplus she produces
is reduced by a proportion " with respect to how much it would otherwise
be. Workers that join the union lose a fraction " of their production because
they are distracted by or committed to union activities, they have an in-
creased ability to shirk, or they have more restrictive work rules. Because
of this, a workers decision to join the union may a¤ect her payo¤ and also
the payo¤s of all other workers. Indeed, the trade-o¤ faced by workers in
this model is whether to join the union and increase the bargaining power
of workers (that is, the "share of the pie") when unionization adversely af-
fects their productivity (that is, the "size of the pie"). In a real situation,
the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient can be positive or negative (Tzannatos and Aidt
[47]). Remark 1 ahead considers the case where unionized workers are more
productive than non-unionized workers.
The ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient in this chapter is exogenous. However, the
aggregate level of ine¢ ciency in the workforce is endogenously determined
because the union size is endogenously determined. While joining the union
may change the bargaining power of workers and, hence, the wage level, it
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does not a¤ect the utility of union workers in other ways. That is, union
workers do not gain or lose utility from, for example, attending union meet-
ings or more restrictive work rules. Appendix B extends the model to ac-
count for this possibility. It also endogenizes the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient.
The focus will be on an equilibrium where not joining the union is the
choice of the most skillful; workers with skills j > n will not join the union.
On the other hand, workers with skills j  n will join. Variable n will
be determined in equilibrium. This thesis is concerned with studying the
properties of such an equilibrium because, as described in Chapter 1, labor
union membership tends to be more popular amongst lower skilled workers
(Blanchower [5]).
This chapter assumes that a workers output is unveriable or unobserv-
able. As such, union workers receive a deterministic, constant wage; union
worker of skill j earns , for a constant  > 0 to be determined in equi-
librium. Similarly, non-union workers also earn a constant wage; a worker
with skill j earns w  0. In principle, this constant wage may be equal to or
di¤erent from the constant wage received by union members. Because wages
in aggregate cannot exceed workerssurplus (the Budget Balance constraint
described below), the constant wage received by non-union workers will be
equal to the average of workerssurplus after wages to union workers have
been subtracted. As described in the following subsection, in equilibrium
these constant wages turn out to be the same because of the incentives of
workers.
Chapters 4 and 5 consider the case where output is observable or veri-
able and as such the wage function depends on skills. A number of other
researchers consider bargaining over constant wages, for example Booth and
Frank [10]. The constant wage property may also reect situations where
output is observable, but a social norm forces the share of the surplus ob-
tained by workers to be equal.
The workers are employed by the rm before and after their unionization
decision. In other words, the level of the wage (which in our case is a
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surplus) does not impact the level of employment. As with some other
theory models concerned with worker choices to unionize, this model does
not consider the supply and demand for labor (for example, see Naylor [42]).
This assumption may be realistic for labor markets of sectors that have full
employment (for example, in sectors where labor demand is su¢ ciently high
and there are restrictions or barriers to increasing labor supply, such as
through qualication, training or certication requirements).
Let GU and GN denote, respectively, the sum of wages to union and
non-union members. Mathematically:
GU =
X
j2union

GN =
X
j =2union
w.
Assume that the total surplus, denoted Y , is:
Y = (1  ")
X
j2union
j +
X
j =2union
j.
This specication assumes that the total surplus is additively separable
along workers, so that workersinputs are perfect substitutes. Additive sep-
arability of workers is a simplifying assumption that helps with tractability
of the model.
In the proposed equilibrium, where workers with skill up to n join the
union:
GU(n) =
nX
j=1
 = n
GN(n) =
N0X
j=n+1
w = (N0   n)w.
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The total surplus becomes:
Y (n) = (1  ")
nX
j=1
j +
N0X
j=n+1
j =
N0X
j=1
j   "
nX
j=1
j.
Hence:
Y (n) =
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
2
. (3.7)
The rm surplus and workerssurplus are denoted Yf and Yw, respec-
tively, and are dened as Yf (n) = [1 K(n)]Y (n) and Yw(n) = K(n)Y (n).
Hence, the workerssurplus is:
Yw(n) =
K(n)
2
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)] .
The total expenditure on wages for all workers must be equal to the
workerssurplus. This "Budget Balance" constraint is:
Yw(n) = GU(n) +GN(n). (3.8)
Therefore:
GU(n) +GN(n) = Yw(n) = K(n)Y (n) =
K(n)
2
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)] .
Because all workers in the proposed equilibrium earn the same wage, the
amount of the total surplus received by union workers is given by GU(n) =
n; the amount received by non-unionized workers is GN(n) = (N0   n);
and the workerssurplus becomes:
Yw(n) = GU(n) +GN(n) = N0.
Hence, the sum of all wages paid to workers, GU(n) +GN(n), becomes:
N0 = GU(n) +GN(n) =
K(n)
2
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)] . (3.9)
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The wage  is:
 =
K(n)[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]
2N0
. (3.10)
Everything else constant, the wage  increases with the bargaining power
of workers, K, and decreases with the ine¢ ciency of union members, ". As
the number of union members n increases, K(n) also increases, but the other
factor in the numerator, N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1), decreases.
Consider the function  = (n) dened by equation (3.10). This function
is maximized at n, with  = (n). Value  is going to be the equilibrium
wage of workers and n the equilibrium union size. For every  < , the
inverse image of , for any  < , has at most two elements. This is true
because (n) is continuous and strictly concave (by Lemma 1 ahead). Dene
n1() as: (i) the smaller of these two elements, if there exists n < n such
that  = (n); or (ii) n1() = 0, if there does not exists n < n such that
 = (n).
A strategy prole species the strategy of each player. First, it species
the wage,  2 [0;1), which is chosen by the union. The union chooses the
salary of its members,   0, subject to constraint (3.8), anticipating how
each possible wage choice will change the workersdecisions. Second, the
strategy prole species for each worker j, their action, aj, which species
whether they join the union or not, for each announced wage for union
members, as follows.
aj =
8>>>><>>>>:
unionize, if [ <  and j 6 n1()], or [ =  and j 6 n],
or [ > ]
not unionize, if [ <  and j > n1()], or [ =  and j > n]
A strategy prole is an equilibrium if: (a) no worker has a unilateral
protable deviation, assuming all other players are playing their part in
this equilibrium; and (b) the unions choice maximizes the wage of union
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members, under constraint (3.8), when all workers play their prescribed
actions in equilibrium.
In the case where the union cannot honor its wage bill, the union will try
to full its promised wage until it has exhausted the workerssurplus. This
will only occur if a worker plays a non-equilibrium action or the union o¤ers
a wage that is too high (that is, if  > ). In this case, all union workers
receive a wage that is smaller than promised until the workerssurplus is
exhausted, even if it leaves non-union workers with no share of the surplus.
In other words, the union can use all of the workers surplus to pay its
members, such that the Budget Balance constraint holds.
As described earlier, this thesis is concerned with studying the properties
of an equilibrium where the lower skilled workers join the union. There may
exist other equilibria where workers are not the lowest skilled. Identifying
all the possible equilibrium combinations of wages and union member skill
distributions is generally outside the scope of this thesis, but, as an example,
an alternative equilibrium is discussed in Remark 2 ahead.
3.2 Equilibrium
In the proposed equilibrium, all workers earn the same wage regardless of
their unionization status. That is, the constant wage received by non-union
workers, w, is the same as the constant wage of union workers, , even
though they are relatively more productive. Because non-unionized workers
can obtain wage  if they join the union, the rm is paying these workers
their outside option and not a cent more. The rm is unable to distinguish
workers by their output; so more productive workers cannot enforce a wage
schedule that depends on their output or skill. The rm chooses to pay
non-unionized workers the wage  because, if it did not, they would join
the union and the total surplus and the prot of the rm would be reduced.
This is the so-called threat e¤ect (Farber [22]).
The problem of the union is to maximize the wage, , of its members
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subject to condition (3.10). As described in Chapter 2, the assumption that
the union is interested in maximizing the wages of its members is generally
not controversial. The union anticipates the workers union membership
decisions in the spirit of backward induction. In particular, it knows for each
wage the corresponding number of workers that will join. Mathematically,
the unions problem is:
max
0
 subject to condition (3.10).
The next result explains how the wage  depends on the number of
unionized workers.
Lemma 1 The function  = (n) in equation (3.10) is strictly concave.
The wage  is a function of the number of union members n (by equa-
tion 3.10); and this function is strictly concave (by Lemma 1). In order to
maximize , the union chooses a suitable number of members, n. Depend-
ing on parameters, the union chooses the upper corner solution, n = N0, or
the unique n 2 (0; N0) that satises the rst order condition. This unique
interior solution, n, is implicitly dened by:
d(n)
dn
= 0 , dK(n
)
dn
n
K(n)
=
"n(2n + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1) . (3.11)
In particular, n > 0; that is, there are always at least some workers in
the union, regardless of the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient of the union. This is a
consequence of assumption (3.3), which implies that the marginal bargaining
power when n = 0 is su¢ ciently large to provide incentives for at least one
worker to enter the union. This assumption drives the lowest skilled worker
into the union because it ensures the impact on her wage from improved
bargaining power more than o¤sets the negative e¢ ciency impact of joining
the union.
The left-hand side of condition (3.11) is the elasticity of the bargaining
function with respect to the union size, calculated at n. Let (n) denote
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the elasticity of the bargaining function with respect to union size n, math-
ematically:
(n) =
dK(n)
dn
n
K(n)
:
The equation on the right of equivalence (3.11) characterizes the union
size n that maximizes the workers surplus. Indeed, as Yw = N0 and
N0 > 0 is a positive constant, then the value of n that maximizes  must be
the same as the one maximizing Yw.
At the optimal union size, n, the elasticities of K and Y with respect to
n have the same absolute value. As Yw = KY , then dYw=dn = KdY=dn +
Y dK=dn and:
dYw
dn
= 0 , K(n)dY
dn
+ Y (n)
dK
dn
= 0,
d
dn
= 0 , dYw
dn
= 0 , dK
dn
n
K(n)
=  dY
dn
n
Y (n)
.
The right-hand side of the equation on the right of equivalence (3.11) is
equal to the absolute value of the elasticity of the total surplus,(dY=dn)=(Y=n),
while the left-hand side represents the elasticity of the bargaining power of
workers with respect to the union size, (dK=dn)=(K=n). The union size
n = n maximizes the workerssurplus, Yw. In other words, the equation on
the right-hand side of equivalence (3.11) characterizes the union size that
maximizes the workerssurplus.
As union membership increases, the bargaining power of workers, K(n),
increases, but the total output, Y (n), decreases. If the union size, n, is
su¢ ciently small, an increase in the union membership increases the workers
surplus because the positive e¤ect on K(n) is larger than the absolute value
of the negative e¤ect on Y (n). At n = n these two opposing e¤ects have the
exact same strength. If n continues to increase beyond n, then the negative
e¤ect dominates the positive one, and the workerssurplus and wages start
to decrease.
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The proposed strategy prole is an equilibrium. If the union chooses
 > , all workers will join the union and share equally the workerssurplus.
In this case, the union will consume the whole workerssurplus. There is no
protable deviation for a union worker because, if she leaves the union, the
union will redistribute the workers surplus amongst the remaining union
members and she will obtain zero outside of the union.
The union has no incentive to o¤er such a wage,  > . This is because
such a wage cannot be honored and the realized wage of union members,
!(N0) = Yw(N0)=N0, will be smaller than  (because the function Yw(n) is
decreasing for all n > n):
!(N0) =
Yw(N0)
N0
<
Yw(n
)
N0
= :
Similarly, if the union chooses  < , there will be n1() union members.
In this case, no union member has an incentive to leave because it will
decrease their wage; the workers are already short of the wage-maximizing
union membership size n (the wage is increasing in the union size for n <
n). Likewise, non-union workers have no incentive to join because they will
earn the same wage inside and outside of the union. The union clearly does
not have incentives to o¤er this type of wage because the wage of union
members will be smaller than .
When the union chooses , workers not in the union cannot nd a
protable deviation when all other players play their part in the equilibrium;
it does not matter if they stay out of the union or not; they always obtain .
The only non-trivial incentive condition is related to the incentives of union
workers. If a union member deviates and leaves the union, the bargaining
power of workers falls from K(n) to K(n 1), but the total surplus, Y , rises
because the deviating workers production increases by a fraction ". The next
proposition proves that this non-trivial incentive condition is satised. Union
members do not have incentives to deviate, so the proposed strategy prole
is indeed an equilibrium. This result also characterizes this equilibrium. All
proofs are in Appendix A.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that assumptions (3.1) through (3.5) are satised.
Then, there exists an equilibrium where the n workers of lowest skill, 0 
n  N0, join the union, and the N0 n workers of highest skill do not join
the union. The number of union members in this equilibrium, n, is uniquely
determined by the unique solution of the unions problem. The equilibrium
union size is either the upper corner n = N0 (all workers are in the union),
or the unique interior solution implicitly dened by the rst order condition
of the unions problem, the equivalent equations (3.11).
Moreover, all workers are unionized (n = N0) if and only if the ine¢ -
ciency coe¢ cient is su¢ ciently small in the precise sense that:
"  (N0 + 1)(N0)
(N0 + 1)(N0) + 2N0 + 1
, (3.12)
where (N0) represents the elasticity of the workersbargaining power, K,
with respect to the number of union members, n, calculated at n = N0.
Formally:
(N0) =
dK(N0)
dn
N0
K(N0)
.
Remark 1 Suppose the unionized workers are equally or more productive
than non-unionized workers, that is, if "  0. In this case, all workers will
be in the union because it advances all workers. From now on we disregard
this case because it is trivial.
The equilibrium outlined in Proposition 1 shares characteristics with
unionized industries in reality. In particular, there is a high degree of wage
compression because all workers receive the same wage. Also, lower skilled
workers are unionized and higher skilled workers are not, which matches the
mix of skills observed across union and non-union labor described in Chapter
1 (see Blanchower [5]).
The right-hand side of equation (3.11) is increasing in the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient, ", and decreasing in the workforce size, N0. However, as these
variables change, the equilibrium number of unionized workers, n, will also
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change. When not all workers are unionized, inequality (3.11) states that the
optimal number of union members depends on the elasticity of the workers
bargaining power, the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient of the union, and the size of
the workforce.
Proposition 1 also computes a full unionization condition. The right-
hand side of inequality (3.12) is an increasing function of (N0), which is
the elasticity of the workersbargaining power with respect to the number of
unionized workers, calculated atN0. The larger the elasticity, the more likely
full union membership becomes, for any xed ine¢ ciency, ". The right-hand
side of inequality (3.12) grows from zero, when (N0) = 0, to 100% when
(N0) ! +1. Intuitively, if the benet from joining the union is large
relative to the cost, then more workers will join the union. If the bargaining
elasticity (when N0 workers join the union) is su¢ ciently large relative to
the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient, as given in Proposition 1, then all workers decide
to unionize.
The right-hand side of inequality (3.12) is a decreasing function of work-
force size, N0. This implies that, for any xed ine¢ ciency, ", as the popula-
tion of workers increases and (N0) remains xed, it becomes less likely to
nd full union membership. In the limit, as the population of workers grows
large, N0 ! +1, the full union membership condition (3.12) converges to:
"  1
1 + 2
, where 1 = lim
N0!+1
(N0) (3.13)
This inequality illustrates an important result: it is possible for a work-
force to be fully unionized even at high levels of ine¢ ciency, so long as the
union can raise the workersbargaining power su¢ ciently.
Next, we return to the case of a nite, xed number of workers, N0, and
consider the case where assumption (3.6) holds. This assumption requires
the marginal bargaining power of workers to decrease to zero as union mem-
bership grows to 100%. Mathematically, it requires (N0) = 0, or equiva-
lently, dK(N0)=dn = 0. In this case, the unique solution n is interior, or put
another way, assumption (3.6) rules out the possibility of an upper corner
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solution for the unions problem, as the next result explains. The intuition is
that the most productive worker has nothing to gain from joining the union.
She also has the most to lose from joining the union because she is the most
productive of all workers.
Corollary 1 Suppose that assumptions (3.1) through (3.5) hold. In ad-
dition, suppose that assumption (3.6) holds. Then, some workers are not
union members, regardless of the exact value of the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
of the union, ". The number of union members is the implicit solution n of
equation (3.11), with 0 < n < N0.
The equilibrium discussed so far has been robust to unilateral deviations.
However, because unions are essentially a collection or coalition of workers,
the concept of a unilateral deviation may not be the most relevant. Suppose
that workers can form coalitions, , in order to deviate collectively from
the proposed strategy prole to gain a higher salary. The next proposition
proves that the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 1 is robust to coalition
deviations; that is, no coalition of workers has a protable deviation from
this equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Suppose that assumptions (3.1) through (3.5) hold and con-
sider the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 1. In this equilibrium, no coali-
tion of workers has a protable deviation from the proposed strategy prole.
There are three possible types of coalitions: (a) a coalition of entirely non-
union workers, (b) a coalition of entirely union workers, and (c) a coalition
containing both union and non-union workers. In equilibrium, no coalition
that consists entirely of non-union workers has a protable deviation because
each of these workers obtains  outside the union and  inside the union.
Similarly, no coalition that consists entirely of union workers has a prof-
itable deviation. If union workers leave the union, the impact on wages from
lower bargaining power more than o¤sets the benet of increased e¢ ciency.
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No coalition containing both union and non-union workers has a prof-
itable deviation. If a non-union worker and union worker switch their mem-
bership status, the bargaining power remains unchanged, but output falls
by " times the absolute value of the di¤erence in skills between these two
workers.
We also checked the robustness of the equilibrium to a di¤erent mix of
skills across union and non-union labor. The next proposition shows that no
equilibrium exists in which higher skilled workers (those with skills between
n and N0) are unionized, while lower skilled workers (those with skills no
greater than n) are not in the union.
Proposition 3 Suppose assumptions (3.1) through (3.5) are satised. Sup-
pose further that high skilled workers (those with skills between n and N0) are
in the union, while lower skilled workers (those with skills no greater than
n) are not in the union. This proposed strategy prole is not an equilibrium;
there exists protable unilateral and coalitional deviations.
The result of Proposition 3 suggests that, with the current model setup,
lower skilled workers prefer to be union members more than higher skilled
workers; a nding which is consistent with empirical studies discussed in
Chapter 1. The main factor driving the result is that there are protable
deviations for both union and non-union workers. If a union worker and
non-union worker switch their membership status it leads to an increase in
the total surplus and the workerssurplus. This is because the aggregate
e¢ ciency increases (since output is proportional to skill and union workers
are higher skilled than non-union workers), while the bargaining power is
unchanged.
The next corollary is concerned with the comparative statics of the equi-
librium. In particular, it studies how the equilibrium number of union mem-
bers, salary, workers surplus, rm surplus and total surplus respond to
changes in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. Because the corollary expresses some
conditions in terms of elasticities we dene these here. Recall that (n) is
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the elasticity of the bargaining function with respect to n, and let EKn;n be
the elasticity of dK=dn with respect to n. Clearly, the elasticity (n) is pos-
itive and represents the percentage increase in the bargaining function when
the union size increases by 1%. The elasticity EKn;n is negative because
of assumption (3.5) of diminishing marginal returns. Indeed, this elasticity
represents the percentage decrease in dK=dn when the union size increases
by 1%.
Recall from the denition of K(n) that we think of K as a function
of the union size, n, alone. When the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient changes, the
bargaining power of workers may change because n may change. That is,
the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient a¤ects K indirectly, not directly. The proof of the
next result relies on this fact.
Corollary 2 Suppose assumptions (3.1) through (3.6) are satised. In this
case, the equilibrium constant wage, , and the equilibrium number of union
members, n, are decreasing functions of the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient, "; that
is, as the union ine¢ ciency rises, the wage and the number of union members
fall. Mathematically:
d
d"
< 0,
dn
d"
< 0.
The equilibrium workers surplus, Y w , is always decreasing in the inef-
ciency coe¢ cient, evident by d=d" < 0. The extent to which the equi-
librium total surplus, Y , and rm surplus, Y f , respond to changes in the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient depends on the bargaining function, K(n). Mathe-
matically:
dY w
d"
< 0,
dY 
d"
< 0 , (n) > 1 +EKn;n
dK(n)
dn
N0(N0+1)  "n(n+1)
"(2n + 1)K(n)
,
lim
N0!+1
dY f
d"
< 0 ,   (n) > EKn;n +
2K(n)
1 K(n)  
2"n
2
N20   "n2
.
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The rst result of the corollary (that the equilibrium wage and union
size are decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient) may initially seem obvious.
However, this is not quite the case  workers in the model face a trade-o¤as
the ine¢ ciency rises. In particular, as the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient rises, work-
ers can increase their aggregate e¢ ciency by leaving the union (a positive
e¤ect on wages), but doing so will reduce their bargaining power (a negative
e¤ect on wages). In other words, both the size of the surplus and share
of the surplus are a¤ected in opposite directions as the ine¢ ciency rises.
This trade-o¤ makes changes in wages and the level of union membership
ambiguous. The net e¤ect is negative for both wages and union membership.
The proof of dn=d" < 0 in Appendix A showed that this result holds
for any specication of the surplus, Y , so long as it had the following prop-
erties: Y" < 0, Yn < 0; Ynn  0 and Yn"  0. The terms Y" and Yn are
the partial derivatives of the surplus with respect to the ine¢ ciency coe¢ -
cient and union size, respectively. The term Ynn is the second order partial
derivative of the surplus with respect to the union size. The term Yn" is
the cross partial derivative of the surplus with respect to the union size and
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. That is, the result that the union size is decreasing
in the ine¢ cient coe¢ cient is quite general in the sense that it holds for
any specication of the surplus, so long as it decreases in the union size
and ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient and does so at a decreasing rate (i.e. there is a
diminishing marginal e¤ect on the surplus from unionization).
The equilibrium workerssurplus is negatively a¤ected by a higher inef-
ciency, as evident by the result that d=d" < 0 and because Yw = N0.
When the ine¢ ciency rises, it leads to a fall in the workersbargaining power
(that is, the "share of the pie"). Depending on the bargaining function, this
negative e¤ect either more than o¤sets a rise in total surplus or is comple-
mented by a fall in total surplus. In other words, the magnitude of the fall
in workerssurplus may also reect changes in the total surplus (the "size
of the pie").
The equilibrium total surplus may increase or decrease with the ine¢ -
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ciency depending on the bargaining function. This is because there are pos-
itive and negative e¤ects from a higher ine¢ ciency. In particular, a higher
ine¢ ciency makes union members less e¢ cient (a negative direct e¤ect on
the surplus), but at the same time decreases the size of the union (a positive
indirect e¤ect on the surplus). The overall e¤ect depends on the rate at
which workers leave the union when the ine¢ ciency rises, and this depends
on how leaving the union a¤ects their bargaining.
The result shows that if the elasticity (n) is su¢ ciently small, then a
higher ine¢ ciency will increase the equilibrium total surplus. The intuition
is that (when (n) is su¢ ciently small), many workers will leave the union
when the ine¢ ciency rises because it does not adversely a¤ect their bargain-
ing power too much (because the elasticity of the bargaining function is too
small). The sharp fall in union membership increases the total surplus.
Similarly, the equilibrium rm surplus may increase or decrease with the
ine¢ ciency depending on the bargaining function. The higher ine¢ ciency
leads to an increase in the rms bargaining power, which has a positive
e¤ect on its surplus. This may be o¤set by a fall in the total surplus, or
complemented by a rise in the surplus depending on the bargaining function,
K. Indeed, this result suggests there exist situations where the rm has
incentives to increase the ine¢ ciency of union workers. By doing so, workers
leave the union, reducing its bargaining power and increasing the size of
the surplus accrued by the rm. Moreover, the rm only prefers a lower
ine¢ ciency so long as it does not lead to a much larger union size. In
contrast, workers always prefer lower ine¢ ciency, so they can produce more
surplus and join the union to improve their bargaining power.
Because dY=d" = dYf=d"+dYw=d", and because Corollary 2 established
that dY w=d" < 0, it is clear that:
 if the equilibrium total surplus is increasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ -
cient, then the equilibrium rm surplus must also be increasing in the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient (that is, if dY =d" > 0, then dY f =d" > 0).
 if the equilibrium rm surplus is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ -
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cient, then the equilibrium total surplus must also be decreasing in the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient (that is, if dY f =d" < 0, then dY
=d" < 0).
The model so far has assumed that the union bargains with the rm
over the entire surplus. However, the rm may be ine¢ cient in production
(for example, if it is a monopoly) and require part of the surplus to break
even (or, to put another way, the rm may face a xed cost). Let M be
the amount of the surplus that the rm requires to break even. In this
case, suppose that the union bargains with the rm over the excess surplus
Y  M , rather than the entire surplus Y . The workerssurplus would become
Yw = K(n)(Y M). The model studied so far has simply been the case where
M = 0. If M > 0, the equilibrium equation (3.11) that denes the union
size changes. Specically, the denominator of the right-hand side of the
equilibrium equation (3.11) needs to be subtracted by M . Mathematically,
equation (3.11) becomes:
dK(n)
dn
n
K(n)
=
"n(2n + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1) M :
Bymaking this subtraction, the denominator of the right-hand side decreases
(by M), and then, the right-hand side increases. The equation on the left-
hand side of this equality (the elasticity of the bargaining function) does not
depend on M . Consequently, when M increases, the equilibrium union size
n decreases. This is expected  if there is less for the workers to gain from
bargaining and the cost of bargaining remains unchanged, then the optimal
decision of the union is to choose a smaller union size n. In other words,
the equilibrium surplus, union size and union density are decreasing in the
amount of the surplus that the rm requires to break even.
As described earlier, there may exist other equilibria where workers are
not the lowest skilled. Identifying all the possible equilibrium strategy pro-
les is generally outside the scope of this thesis, but, as an example, an
alternative equilibrium is discussed in the following remark.
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Remark 2 Consider the following strategy prole, which is almost identical
to the one described earlier; the only di¤erence is that worker n 1 does not
join the union when the union o¤ers the equilibrium wage b. The strategy
prole denes the wage,  2 [0;1), chosen by the union. It also denes, for
each worker j, their action, aj, which species whether they join the union
or not for each announced wage for union members, as follows.
aj =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
unionize, if [ < b and j 2 f1; 2; :::; n1()  2; n1()g],
or [ = b and j 2 f1; 2; :::; n   2; ng], or [ > b]
not unionize, if [ < b and j 2 fn1()  1; n1() + 1; :::; N0g],
or [ = b and j 2 fn   1; n + 1; :::; N0g]
This strategy prole is an equilibrium. If the union chooses b, no union
worker has an incentive to deviate because the union is already one member
short of the wage-maximizing union membership level (as described earlier,
the wage is increasing in union membership for n < n). Non-unionized
workers do not have a protable deviation because they earn the same wage
as inside the union.
If the union chooses  > b, all workers will join the union and share
equally the workers surplus. In this case, there is no protable deviation
for a union worker; the union will consume the whole workerssurplus. The
union has no incentive to o¤er such a wage,  > b, because it cannot be
honored and the realized wage of union members will be smaller than b (as
described in the text above Proposition 1).
Similarly, if the union chooses  < b, there will be n1()   1 union
members. In this case, no union member has an incentive to deviate because
it will decrease their wage; the union is already short of the wage-maximizing
union membership size (the wage is increasing in the union size for n < n).
Likewise, non-union workers have no incentive to join because they earn the
same wage inside and outside of the union. The union clearly does not have
incentives to o¤er this type of wage because the wage of union members will
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be smaller than b.
Hence, fajg for j 2 N , and b form a subgame perfect equilibrium, where
workers with skills j = n   2 and j = n belong to the union, but worker
with skill j = n   1 does not.
The model so far has considered a general bargaining function, K(n).
As a result, some of the equilibrium variables have been di¢ cult to solve as
functions of exogenous parameters only (for example, the equilibrium union
size, n). For these variables, we instead dened conditions which they must
satisfy in equilibrium (for example, condition 3.11 which denes n). The
next two subsections overcome this limitation by restricting the bargaining
function. This allows us to solve explicitly for the equilibrium variables as
functions of exogenous parameters only. It also allows us to gain insight
compared to the case where the bargaining function is generic.
3.3 Bargaining with Constant Elasticity
This subsection studies the Constant Wage Model under an assumption
that the elasticity of the bargaining function, with respect to union size,
is constant. The restriction may be realistic if there are labor laws, social
norms or political reasons that force the bargaining power of workers to
change with the union density in a constant way. Fix constants 0 <  < 1
and 0 <   1. Suppose that the bargaining function isK(n) = n=N0 , for
all n 2 [0; N0]. As before, the bargaining function is increasing and concave.
For every n 2 [0; N0], the elasticity of the bargaining function with respect
to the union size is always equal to:
 =
dK(n)
dn
n
K(n)
.
BecauseK(n) is an increasing function, the parameter  is the maximum
share of the surplus that the union can obtain. Name this parameter as the
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maximum union share. The next proposition denes the equilibrium size of
the union.
Proposition 4 Suppose that K(n) = n=N0 , for all n 2 [0; N0]. In this
case, the optimal number of workers for the union is:
n =
 + 1
2 + 4
 
 1 +
s
1 +
4N0(N0 + 1)( + 2)
"( + 1)2
!
. (3.14)
In particular, n does not depend on the maximum union share, .
A straightforward computation reveals that dn=d > 0. The number of
union members, n, is an increasing function of the elasticity of the workers
bargaining power with respect to the number of union members, . This
is because, when the bargaining function is more elastic, raising the union
size leads to greater gains in bargaining power (compared to when it is less
elastic). As that elasticity decreases to zero,  ! 0, then the equilibrium
union size decreases to zero, n ! 0. At the other extreme, as the elasticity
grows and  ! 1, then:
lim
!1
n =
1
3
 
 1 +
r
1 +
3N0(N0 + 1)
"
!
.
In particular, as the elasticity approaches one,  ! 1, and the workforce size
grows large, N0 ! +1, the equilibrium union density, n=N0, converges to
1=
p
3". This result illustrates that even with a large ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
the union density can still be quite large so long as the elasticity is large. In
the most extreme case, union workers may produce no surplus, " = 1, and
the union density is 58%.
Corollary 3 Suppose that K(n) = n=N0 , for all n 2 [0; N0]. All workers
are unionized (n = N0) if and only if the ine¢ ciency is su¢ ciently small
in the sense that:
"   (N0 + 1)
( + 1)
h
N0

+2
+1

+ 1
i .
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A straightforward computation reveals that this level of ine¢ ciency is
the same as in equation (3.12) when  = (N0). In other words, this result
matches the result in the previous section where the bargaining function
was generic, as expected. The next result is concerned with the comparative
statics.
Corollary 4 Suppose that the bargaining function has constant elasticity
 with regard to the union size. In equilibrium, the workers surplus, Y w ,
is always decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient, the total surplus, Y ,
does not change with the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient, and the rm surplus, Y f ,
increases with the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. Mathematically:
dY w
d"
< 0, lim
N0!+1
dY 
d"
= 0, lim
N0!+1
dY f
d"
> 0.
The equilibrium total surplus is unchanged if the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
rises; with a fall in the workerssurplus exactly o¤setting a rise in the rms
surplus. The equilibrium workerssurplus declines as the ine¢ ciency rises
because the higher ine¢ ciency reduces the union size and hence the workers
bargaining power. The combination of an unchanged total surplus and the
lower bargaining power of workers leads to a rise in the rms surplus. This
result suggests that the constant elasticity bargaining function allows us to
study how the ine¢ ciency a¤ects the surplus allocation, rather than the size
of the surplus. In particular, this result suggests that the rm has incentives
to increase the ine¢ ciency of union workers. By doing so, workers leave the
union, reducing its bargaining power and increasing the size of the surplus
accrued by the rm. In contrast, workers prefer lower ine¢ ciency, so they
can produce more surplus and join the union to improve their bargaining
power.
As the elasticity of the bargaining power, , increases, the equilibrium
bargaining power of workers rises indirectly because the number of union
members, n, rises; dn=d > 0. However, the higher elasticity has a di-
rect negative e¤ect on the workersbargaining power. If unions can change
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their bargaining function, they need to consider both the direct and indi-
rect e¤ects. The direct e¤ect refers to the partial derivative @K=@, which
is negative. The net e¤ect can be positive or negative depending on the
exogenous parameters. For example, if " = 1=2 and N0 = 1000, then the
sign of the derivative is positive when  = 2=3 and negative when  = 1=2.
The indirect e¤ect refers to the product (dK=dn)(dn=d), which is always
positive. Mathematically, the change is given by the following derivative:
dK(n)
d
=
@K
@
+
dK
dn
dn
d
.
Example 1 Consider the constant elasticity bargaining function above and
let  = 1=2. In this case, solving equation (3.11) for the equilibrium union
size n results in:
n =
3
10
 
 1 +
s
1 +
20
9

N0(N0 + 1)
"
!
.
Moreover, all workers are unionized (n = N0) if and only if the ine¢ -
ciency is su¢ ciently small in the precise sense that:
"  N0 + 1
5N0 + 3
.
The remainder of this subsection is concerned with a numerical example,
as shown in Figures 3.1 through 3.5; the aim is to communicate the pattern
of model results in a di¤erent way to the equations used so far.
Figure 3.1 plots the bargaining power of workers, K(n), as a function of a
xed union density, n=N0, for various elasticities, . It shows that a smaller
elasticity has a direct positive e¤ect on the workersbargaining power for
any xed union density.
Figure 3.2 plots the equilibrium bargaining power, union density and
wage against the elasticity when the ine¢ ciency is xed (" = 2=3). In
this case the equilibrium bargaining power is decreasing in the elasticity,
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implying that the negative direct e¤ect from the higher elasticity is more
than o¤setting the positive indirect e¤ect (the positive indirect e¤ect refers
to the rising union density, which is also evident on the graph). When the
elasticity is one,  = 1, the union density and workersbargaining power are
the same. This is a result of the specication of the bargaining function; in
particular, when  = 1 the bargaining function becomes equal to the union
density, K(n) = n=N0. The equilibrium wage is falling in the elasticity
because of the falling bargaining power.
Figure 3.3 plots the equilibrium wage and union density against the inef-
ciency for two xed values of the elasticity ( = 1=3 and  = 2=3). As the
ine¢ ciency rises, equilibrium wages and the union density fall (the result of
Corollary 2). For any given ine¢ ciency, as the elasticity rises from  = 1=3
to  = 2=3, the equilibrium union density rises and wages fall (as discussed
in the description of Figure 3.2).
Figure 3.4 plots the equilibrium total surplus, rms surplus and workers
surplus. Reecting Corollary 4, the equilibrium total surplus is unchanged
if the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient rises; with a fall in the workerssurplus exactly
o¤setting a rise in the rms surplus. The equilibrium workers surplus
declines as the ine¢ ciency rises because the higher ine¢ ciency reduces the
union size and hence the workersbargaining power. The combination of an
unchanged total surplus and the lower bargaining power of workers leads to
a rise in the rms surplus.
Figure 3.5 plots the equilibrium wage and union density against the size
of the workforce for two xed values of the elasticity ( = 1=3 and  = 2=3).
As the workforce grows, the equilibrium wage increases linearly and the
union density is unchanged. In other words, the size of the union grows
at the same rate as the workforce in equilibrium. This is largely a result
of the workers bargaining power being a function of union density. For
any given workforce size, as the elasticity rises from  = 1=3 to  = 2=3,
the equilibrium wage falls and the union density rises (as discussed in the
description of Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.1: Direct E¤ect from Changes in the Elasticity on Bargaining Power
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Variables as Functions of the Elasticity
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium Variables as Functions of the Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cient
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium Surplus as Functions of the Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cient
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium Variables as Functions of the Workforce Size
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The next subsection analyzes the case where the workers bargaining
function increases at a constant rate for each new union member; that is,
the marginal bargaining power is constant. This would represent the limit
case, as  ! 1, of this subsection; yet function K(n) is no longer strictly
concave. In such a case, one would expect to observe relatively large unions
because the elasticity is relatively high, at least larger than in this example.
3.4 Linear Bargaining Power
Consider the class of bargaining power functions that are linearly increas-
ing with the number of union members. Studying this type of bargaining
function allows us to examine a case where there is no diminishing marginal
return to unionization. Mathematically, there is a constant c > 0 such that
the bargaining power is K(n) = cn, for every n 2 [0; N0]. This class of
bargaining power functions includes the special case where the bargaining
power is equal to the union density; that is, the case where c = 1=N0, so that
K(n) = n=N0. Because this function K(n) violates some of the previous as-
sumptions, equilibrium existence and its properties need to be established
separately here. The next result establishes that an equilibrium exists and
characterizes this equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Suppose K(n) = cn, for every n 2 [0; N0]. There exists an
interior solution, 0 < n < N0, for the unions problem if and only if the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient of the union is su¢ ciently large; specically, if
" >
1
3
N0(N0 + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)  13N0
:
If the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient is smaller than or equal to this, then all
workers join the union. If there is an interior solution, then the equilibrium
number of union members is:
n =  1
3
+
r
1
9
+
N0(N0 + 1)
3"
.
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As the size of the population of workers grows large, N0 ! +1, there is
an interior solution if " > 1=3. In this case, the limit of the equilibrium union
density, as the size of the population of workers grows large, N0 ! +1, is
given by:
lim
N0!+1
n
N0
=
1p
3"
. (3.15)
From equation (3.15), the equilibrium union density ranges from around
57% when " = 1 to 100% when " = 1=3. This is because, by construction, it
is favorable for the union to have a high density as there are no diminishing
returns from unionization. In contrast, the curvature in the previous sec-
tions led to decreasing marginal bargaining power as the size of the union
increased. The next corollary is concerned with the comparative statics.
In the limit, it is obvious that the surplus grows to innity as the most
productive worker grows to innity, but it is not clear what happens to the
equilibrium union density and, hence, wages. The next result provides some
insight on this. It is concerned with the comparative statistics and, in some
relevant cases, the comparative statics in the limit when the workforce size
grows large. The way to interpret the limit results is in the context of an
industry with a large number of workers; the model at innity will be an
approximation of this.1
Corollary 5 SupposeK(n) = cn, for every n 2 [0; N0], and " > 1=3, so that
the unions problem has an interior solution. In this case, the equilibrium
wage and number of union members are decreasing functions of the union
ine¢ ciency. Formally:
d
d"
< 0,
dn
d"
< 0.
The equilibrium wage and number of union members are increasing func-
1It is common in economics literature to have a population of continuous agents.
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tions of the total number of workers:
d
dN0
> 0,
dn
dN0
> 0.
As N0 grows large, the equilibrium union density, n=N0, is a constant.
Formally:
lim
N0!+1
d (n=N0)
dN0
= 0.
As N0 grows large, the equilibrium workerssurplus falls with the ine¢ -
ciency coe¢ cient, the rm surplus rises, and the total surplus is unchanged.
Formally:
lim
N0!+1
dY 
d"
= 0, lim
N0!+1
dY w
d"
< 0, lim
N0!+1
dY f
d"
> 0.
As the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient of the union rises, the equilibrium wage and
union density fall. This is because, as the union ine¢ ciency rises, workers in
the union face a choice between: (a) staying in the union and becoming less
e¢ cient, which reduces the size of the total surplus (that is, the "size of the
pie" is reduced); or (b) leaving the union, which reduces their bargaining
power (that is, the "share of the pie" is reduced). Under this specication
of the workersbargaining power, it is costlier to stay in the union, hence
workers leave the union and wages decline because of the resulting reduction
in bargaining power.
As the number of workers rises, so too does the equilibrium number of
union members. In equilibrium, the union size rises at the same rate as
the workforce size. In other words, the equilibrium union density is inde-
pendent of the workforce size. The equilibrium wage rises with the size of
the workforce, mainly reecting the increasing surplus as each new worker
brings more productivity.
The equilibrium total surplus is unchanged if the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
rises; with a fall in the workerssurplus exactly o¤setting a rise in the rms
surplus. The equilibrium workerssurplus declines as the ine¢ ciency rises
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because the higher ine¢ ciency reduces the union size and hence the workers
bargaining power. The combination of an unchanged total surplus and the
reduced bargaining power of workers leads to a rise in the rms surplus.
As in the previous sections, the rm has incentives to increase the ine¢ -
ciency of union workers, while union workers have incentives to be e¢ cient.
3.5 Summary
This chapter proposed the Constant Wage Model and used it to study the
strategic interaction between workers and a labor union. The chapter fo-
cused on studying the properties of an equilibrium where lower skilled work-
ers joined the labor union while higher skilled workers did not (as discussed
earlier, this thesis is concerned with studying the properties of such an equi-
librium because labor unions tend to be more popular amongst lower skilled
workers (Blanchower [5])). In the model, the output and skills of workers
were unobservable, each worker had a di¤erent skill level, and union mem-
bership decreased a workers output, but increased the bargaining power of
workers. The model was solved to nd expressions for the equilibrium wage,
workerssurplus, rm surplus, union size and the union density. Compara-
tive static results were also reported. The main results were:
 An equilibrium exists where lower skilled workers join a labor union
and higher skilled workers do not. This equilibrium is unique and ro-
bust to unilateral and coalitional deviations. Moreover, no equilibrium
exists where higher skilled workers join the union and lower skilled
workers do not (there were unilateral and coalitional deviations).
 All workers join the labor union if the cost of doing so (in terms of the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient) is su¢ ciently small and there is a benet from
joining (in terms of the workersbargaining power). The implication
is that there can exist fully unionized workforces even when the union
decreases the productivity of workers.
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 The labor union and the workers always have an incentive to reduce
the ine¢ ciency associated with union membership. In particular, labor
unions want their members to be as e¢ cient as if they had not joined
the union. The ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient always decreases wages and the
level of union membership.
 Situations exist where the rm prefers union workers to be less e¢ cient.
This is because workers exit the labor union when the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient increases. The smaller union size associated with the higher
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient reduces the bargaining power of workers and
increases the rms bargaining power.
 These incentives of the rm and union may be important to consider
during wage negotiations if the rm and union can inuence the inef-
ciency coe¢ cient.
This chapter also studied the Constant Wage Model with restrictions
on the bargaining function. The rst restriction was that the bargaining
function had a constant elasticity with respect to the union size. The main
results under this restriction were that:
 An increase in the elasticity has a negative direct e¤ect on workers
bargaining power and a positive indirect e¤ect (the positive indirect
e¤ect is from the larger union size). If labor unions can change the
elasticity of their bargaining function they need to consider both ef-
fects.
 A higher ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient did not change the total surplus in
equilibrium, only the allocation of the surplus. In particular, a higher
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient decreases the equilibrium workerssurplus and
increases the rms surplus. As a consequence, under the constant
elasticity bargaining function, the rm always prefers union workers
to be ine¢ cient. This is because a higher ine¢ ciency reduces the size
56
of the union and, hence, workers bargaining power. This in turn
increases the rms bargaining power.
The second restriction studied the class of bargaining functions that were
linearly increasing in the union size. The results under this restriction were
similar to the previous restriction and the general case. The main di¤erence
was that the equilibrium union size was relatively large because there were
no diminishing returns from unionization.
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Chapter 4
Wages Increase Linearly with
Skills
4.1 Model Setup
This chapter studies the strategic interaction between workers and a union
when the output of workers is observable or veriable. The model studied
in this chapter is almost the same as the model of Chapter 3. Assumptions
(3.1) to (3.5) hold and the union ine¢ ciency, ", is exogenously given as in
Chapter 3. The only di¤erence is that the output of workers is observable
and, hence, workers earn a wage that increases linearly in their productivity.
Let w(j) = j > 0 denote the wage for union worker j. The union bargains
with the rm over the rate  > 0. We name the parameter  a wage
rate, however, it is equivalent to a return to skill. This is because the wage
received by a union worker of skill level j is the product of  (the wage rate)
and j (their skill). Similarly, non-union workers also earn a wage linearly
increasing in their skill in the same fashion as for union workers. The wage
rate of non-union workers may be equal to or di¤erent from the wage rate
of union workers. As described in the following subsection, in equilibrium
these wage rates are the same because of the incentives of workers.
The proposed strategy prole is the same as the one described in Chapter
58
3; workers j 2 f1;    ; ng are union members, and all workers with skills
j > n are not in the union. The Budget Balance constraint of Chapter 3
also holds here; that is, wages in aggregate cannot exceed workerssurplus,
Yw. If all workers receive the same wage rate  this constraint can be written
as:
Yw =
N0X
j=1
j
=
N0(N0 + 1)
2
. (4.1)
Chapter 3 describes the total surplus, the surplus of union workers, and
the surplus of non-union workers. Similarly, a strategy prole is dened
exactly as in Chapter 3, except with the wage rate, , the choice variable of
the union rather than the constant wage, .
4.2 Equilibrium
The focus will be on an equilibrium where all workers earn the same wage
rate regardless of their unionization status; that is, the wage rate received by
non-union workers is the same as the wage rate of union workers, . There
is no equilibrium where the wage rates are not equal because such a scenario
would yield protable deviations for workers receiving the lower wage rate.
As described in Chapter 3, the rm chooses to pay non-unionized workers
because of the threat e¤ect.
The problem of the union is to maximize the wage rate, , of its mem-
bers subject to budget balance.1 The union anticipates the workersunion
membership decisions in the spirit of backward induction. In particular, it
knows for each wage rate the corresponding number of workers that will join.
1As described in Chapter 3, the assumption that the union is interested in maximizing
the wages of its members is generally not controversial.
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Mathematically, the unions problem is:
max
0nN0
 subject to equations (3.8) and (4.1).
The next result nds an expression for the wage rate  by combining
equations (3.8) and (4.1). The wage rate is a function of the union size, the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient, the size of the workforce and the bargaining power.
Lemma 2 The wage rate, , in terms of the workers bargaining power
function, ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient and union size is given by:
 = K(n)

1  " n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

. (4.2)
Let  denote the equilibrium wage rate of workers. By equation (4.2),
each possible wage rate  is a function of the number of union members, n.
It is straightforward to prove that the function taking n to (n) according
to equation (4.2) is strictly concave, and 0(0) > 0.
The proposed strategy prole is an equilibrium. Indeed, the union is
maximizing its utility by construction. Workers not in the union cannot
nd a protable deviation when all other players play their part in the
equilibrium; it does not matter if they stay out of the union or not; they
always obtain wage rate . As in Chapter 3, the only non-trivial incentive
condition is related to the incentives of union workers. If a union member
deviates and leaves the union, the bargaining power of workers falls from
K(n) to K(n   1), but the total surplus, Y , rises because the deviating
workers production increases by a fraction ". The next proposition proves
that this non-trivial incentive condition is satised. Union members do not
have incentives to deviate, so the proposed strategy prole is indeed an
equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Suppose that assumptions (3.1) through (3.5) are satised.
Then, there exists an equilibrium where the n workers of lowest skill, 0 
n  N0, join the union, and the N0   n workers of highest skill do not
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join the union. There is a unique number of workers in the union, n 2
[0; N0], solving the unions problem. This unique n is either the upper corner
solution n = N0 (all workers are in the union), or it is the interior solution
which is implicitly dened by the rst order condition:
dK(n)
dn
n
K(n)
=
"n (2n + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1) . (4.3)
The equilibrium union size, dened by condition (4.3), is the same as
the one given by equation (3.11) in Chapter 3, where skills were unobserv-
able and the wage was constant. Indeed, the observability of skill and the
structure of wages does not impact on the equilibrium size of the union.
As such, the results of Chapter 3 regarding the equilibrium union size are
true in this chapter. In particular, there is an interior solution to the unions
problem if the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient is su¢ ciently small, at least one worker
is always unionized regardless of the unions ine¢ ciency, and the equilibrium
union size falls as the ine¢ ciency rises. Moreover, because the union size
is the same as in Chapter 3, the equilibrium total surplus, workerssurplus
and the bargaining power are also the same as in Chapter 3. The next re-
sult establishes how the equilibrium wage rate changes with the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient.
Corollary 6 Suppose assumptions (3.1) through (3.6) are satised. In this
case, the equilibrium wage rate, , is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ -
cient, "; that is, as the union ine¢ ciency rises, the equilibrium wage rate
falls. Mathematically:
d
d"
< 0.
The result of Corollary 6 is implied by Corollary 2, which established
that d=d" < 0. This is because  is an increasing transformation of  (for
details, see the proof of Corollary 6).
Because the equilibrium union size is the same as in Chapter 3, and be-
cause the wage rate is an increasing transformation of the constant wage
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of Chapter 3, the comparative static results of Corollary 2 relating to the
equilibrium union size and surplus sizes are also true for this model. In
particular, the equilibrium workerssurplus is falling in the ine¢ ciency co-
e¢ cient.
A key di¤erence between the equilibrium of Chapter 3 (where output
was unobservable) and this model (where output is observable) is the size
of the workers surplus accrued by union workers compared to non-union
workers. One would expect that when output becomes observable, the more
productive non-unionized workers would accrue more in wages, while the
relatively less productive unionized workers would accrue less. This is indeed
the case, as the next result explains.
Remark 3 When output is observable and wages increase with productivity,
unionized workers earn, in aggregate, less in equilibrium compared to the case
where output is unobservable and all workers earn a constant wage. In other
words, union members earn less (in aggregate) in equilibrium in the model
setup of this chapter compared to the model setup of Chapter 3. In contrast,
non-unionized workers earn more in aggregate in equilibrium when output is
observable and wages increase with productivity. The only exception is when
all workers are unionized; in this case the amount of the workers surplus
accrued by unionized workers is unchanged between the models.
While the result of Remark 3 is expected, this comparison depends on
the characterization of the equilibrium in each model (in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4). The result suggests that, under the current model setup of
observable output, the union has incentives to hide the output of workers
or argue against performance-based pay. Indeed, by hiding or reducing the
observability of output it can increase the wages of its members. Union
campaigns against performance-based pay regularly appear in the media
(Buck and Green [15]).
As described earlier, the equilibrium workerssurplus, Y w , is unchanged
between the models of Chapters 3 and 4, and the wage was the same for all
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workers in Chapter 3 (where output was unobservable), but increases linearly
with skill in Chapter 4 (where output is observable). One implication of these
two factors is that the wage received by the worker with the median skill
(that is, the worker with skill nM = (N0+1)=2) is the same in both models.
Workers with a skill level below that of the median skilled worker (that is,
workers with skills j < nM) earn less when output is observable (Chapter
4) compared to when it is unobservable (Chapter 3). In contrast, workers
with a skill above that of the median skilled worker (that is, workers with
skills j > nM) earn more when output is observable. To put it another way,
the relationship between wage and skill level rotatesaround the median
skilled worker when output changes from unobservable (constant wage) to
observable (wages increase in skill).
If a "large" union exists in equilibrium, in the sense that the marginal
union member, n, has a greater skill level than the median skilled worker,
nM , then some union members (specically, those with skills between nM
and n) will receive a larger wage when output is observable compared to
when it is unobservable. However, as Corollary 3 explains, because the
union is primarily made up of lower skilled workers, the e¤ect of output
observability is to decrease the wages of union workers in aggregate (that
is, output observability decreases the workers surplus accrued by union
workers). The only exception is when all workers are unionized: when this
is the case, 50% of union workers are worse o¤ and 50% are better o¤ with
observable output and the total wage bill (and hence the amount of the
surplus accrued by union workers) is unchanged.
4.3 Summary
This chapter studied the strategic interaction between workers and a labor
union using a similar model to the one presented in Chapter 3; the only
di¤erence was that output was observable and wages increased linearly with
a workers productivity. As in Chapter 3, this chapter focused on studying
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the properties of an equilibrium where lower skilled workers joined the labor
union while higher skilled workers did not.
The equilibrium variables under this model were the same as the Chapter
3 model, where output was observable. In other words, the observability of
a workers output did not change the equilibrium variables. Other main
results were that:
 The equilibrium wage rate is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient.
 Unionized workers generally earn less in aggregate when output is ob-
servable compared to when it is unobservable. In other words, union-
ized workers generally earn less in aggregate in the model setup of this
chapter compared to the model setup of Chapter 3. This suggests that
unions may have incentives to limit output observability for workers
or oppose performance-based pay schemes.
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Chapter 5
Mixed Wage Schedules
5.1 Model Setup
This chapter studies the strategic interaction between workers and a union
when the output of non-unionized workers is observable and the output of
union workers is unobservable. The model studied in this chapter is almost
the same as the model in Chapter 3; the only di¤erence is the assumption on
output observability and, hence, the structure of wages. Assumptions (3.1)
to (3.5) hold and the union ine¢ ciency, ", is exogenously given.
As in the previous chapters, wages depend on the observability of output.
Union members receive a constant wage while non-union workers receive a
wage that increases with their skill. Let  > 0 be the wage of each union
member, and j > 0 be the wage for non-union worker j, for a constant
 > 0 to be determined in equilibrium.
This model is studied to gain insight into union and worker incentives
when the union can enable members to hide their output. To gain more
understanding of the unions preferences on performance-based pay, this
chapter also studies how the equilibrium variables of this model di¤er from
those in Chapters 3 and 4.
The proposed strategy prole is the same as the one described in Chapter
3; workers j 2 f1;    ; ng are union members, and all workers with skills j >
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n are not in the union. Also as in Chapter 3, GU andGN denote, respectively,
the total wage bill for all union and non-union workers. Mathematically:
GU = n,
GN = 
N0X
j=n+1
j = 
N0(N0 + 1)  n(n+ 1)
2
.
As in Chapter 3, the surplus received by workers is Yw = K(n)Y and
given by equation (3.8). Also as in Chapter 3, there is budget balance in
the sense that the surplus of workers is used to pay wages: Yw = GU +GN .
Therefore:
n = GU = Yw  GN .
Equivalently:
n =
K(n)[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]
2
  [N0(N0 + 1)  n(n+ 1)]
2
. (5.1)
5.2 Equilibrium
The focus will be on an equilibrium where the wage of union workers is equal
to the highest skilled union members wage had she not joined the union.
There is no equilibrium if this is not the case because of the incentives of
workers to choose the highest possible wage. This condition is:
 = n. (5.2)
To put it another way, if equilibrium condition (5.2) holds, then no non-
member k has an incentive to join as  < k, and no member j has an
incentive to leave because   j.
The problem of the union is to maximize the wage payment to each of
its members, by choosing their salary , subject to budget balance given
by equation (5.1) and the incentive condition (5.2). As in Chapters 3 and
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4, the union knows for each wage the number of workers that will join.
Mathematically, the unions problem is:
max
0
 subject to (5.1) and (5.2).
The next result establishes the wage rate of non-members, , by combining
equations (5.1) and (5.2). The wage rate is a function of the union size, the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient, the size of the workforce and the bargaining power.
Lemma 3 The wage rate of a non-unionized worker in terms of workers
bargaining power, ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient and union size is given by:
 = K(n)
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1) + n(n  1) . (5.3)
The next proposition proves that the proposed strategy prole is an equi-
librium, that the equilibrium is unique, and characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 7 Suppose that assumptions (3.1) through (3.5) are satised.
Then, there exists an equilibrium where the n workers of lowest skill, 0 
n  N0, join the union, and the N0   n workers of highest skill do not
join the union. There is a unique number of workers in the union, n 2
[0; N0], solving the unions problem. This unique n is either the upper corner
solution n = N0 (all workers are in the union), or it is the unique interior
solution, which is implicitly dened by the rst order condition:
d
dn
(n(n)) = 0 , (n) + nd(n)
dn
= 0.
Equivalently:
(n) =
"n
h
(3n + 2)N0(N0 + 1) + n(n
2   2n   1)
i
[N0(N0 + 1) + n(n   1)] [N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1)] (5.4)
  N0(N0 + 1)(N0(N0 + 1)  n
2)
[N0(N0 + 1) + n(n   1)] [N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1)] .
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In particular, n > 0; that is, there are always at least some workers in
the union, regardless of the unions ine¢ ciency. Moreover, all workers are
unionized (n = N0) if and only if the ine¢ ciency is su¢ ciently small in the
precise sense that:
"  (N0) +
1
2N0
(N0) +
1
2N0
+ 2N0+1
N0+1
. (5.5)
When not all workers are unionized, equation (5.4) states that the opti-
mal number of union members depends on the elasticity of the bargaining
function, the union ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient, and the size of the workforce. As
in Chapter 3, if the marginal bargaining power of workers decreases to zero
as union membership grows to 100% (that is, if (N0) = 0, or equivalently,
dK(N0)=dn = 0) then the unique solution n is interior.
All workers are unionized if and only if the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient is
su¢ ciently small, as given by inequality (5.5). The right-hand side of this
inequality is an increasing function of the elasticity of the workersbargaining
power with respect to the number of unionized workers, (N0). The larger
this elasticity, the more likely full union membership becomes. The right-
hand side of inequality (5.5) is a decreasing function of N0. This implies
that, for any xed ", as the population of workers increases, it becomes less
likely to nd full union membership. The next result nds the full union
membership condition when the workforce size grows large.
Corollary 7 Let 1 = limN0!+1 (N0). In the limit, as the population of
workers grows large, N0 ! +1, the full union membership condition (5.5)
converges to:
"  1
1 + 2
.
The full membership condition of Corollary 7 is the same as in equation
(3.13) of Chapter 3. Indeed, in a large workforce, the full union condition is
independent of whether the wage schedule is constant or increasing in skills,
it depends only on the elasticity of the bargaining function with respect
to the union size. This is because, at full union membership, the models
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become very similar. At full membership, all workers earn a constant wage
and the unions objective is equivalent to maximizing the workerssurplus
this is the same as in the model of Chapter 3.
The next corollary explains how the equilibrium union size changes when
the ine¢ ciency rises in the special case where the elasticity of the bargaining
function is constant. Denote R as the right-hand side of the equilibrium
condition (5.4).
Corollary 8 Suppose assumptions (3.1) through (3.6) are satised. The
equilibrium number of union members, n, is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient, ", when the following condition holds:
dn
d"
< 0 , @(n
)
@n
 @R(n
)
@n
. (5.6)
In other words, the equilibrium union size is always decreasing in the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient if the elasticity, (n), is constant or negative. When
the elasticity is positive, the equilibrium union size is decreasing in the inef-
ciency coe¢ cient so long as the elasticity does not rise too much with union
size, as given by the inequality in the right-hand side of condition (5.6).
The intuition behind Corollary 8 is similar to that of Corollary 2. In par-
ticular, when the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient rises, union workers have a choice
between: (a) joining (or remaining) in the union, which reduces their pro-
ductivity, but increases their bargaining power (or leaves it unchanged); or
(b) leaving the union, which increases their productivity, but reduces their
bargaining power. Under this model setup, a workers choice between these
two options depends on how the elasticity changes with the union size. For
example, if the elasticity increases quickly with union size, the marginal im-
pact on bargaining power from a worker joining the union may be large. In
this case, the equilibrium total surplus would be reduced from the higher
union size, but the surplus obtained by union workers (the variable to be
maximized) may increase because of the larger bargaining power. This ex-
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plains why, in some circumstances, a rise in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient can
increase the equilibrium union size.
As outlined in Chapter 3, the concept of an equilibrium centered on uni-
lateral deviations may not be the most relevant because unions are essentially
a collection or coalition of workers. For this reason, the next proposition
proves that the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 7 is robust to coalition
deviations; that is, no coalition of workers has a protable deviation from
this equilibrium.
Proposition 8 Suppose that assumptions (3.1) through (3.5) hold and con-
sider the equilibrium outlined in Proposition 7. In this equilibrium, no coali-
tion of workers has a protable deviation from the proposed strategy prole.
As described in Chapter 3, there are three possible types of coalitions:
(a) a coalition of entirely non-union workers, (b) a coalition of entirely union
workers, and (c) a coalition containing both union and non-union workers.
In equilibrium, no coalition that consists entirely of non-union workers has
a protable deviation because each of these workers obtains at least n
outside the union and  = n inside the union.
Similarly, no coalition that consists entirely of union workers has a prof-
itable deviation. If union workers leave the union, the impact on wages from
lower bargaining power more than o¤sets the benet of increased e¢ ciency.
No coalition containing both union and non-union workers has a prof-
itable deviation. If a non-union worker and union worker switch their mem-
bership status, the bargaining power remains unchanged, but output falls
by " times the absolute value of the di¤erence in skills between these two
workers.
Figure 5.1 plots the equilibrium wage received by workers against their
productivity. It shows that the lower skilled workers receive the union wage
and the higher skilled workers receive the wage that is increasing in skill.
Figure 5.2 plots the equilibrium wage rate and union density against the
size of the workforce. As the size of the workforce grows, the equilibrium
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wage rate and union density are unchanged. This implies that the equilib-
rium number of union workers is rising at the same rate as the workforce
and that the wage payments to the most skilled workers are increasing in
the workforce size.
Figure 5.3 plots the equilibrium wage rate and union density against the
ine¢ ciency. Both variables decline as the ine¢ ciency rises.
Figure 5.1: Equilibrium Wages as a Function of Productivity
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Figure 5.2: Equilibrium Variables as Functions of the Workforce Size
Figure 5.3: Equilibrium Variables as Functions of the Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cient
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5.3 Equilibrium Variables Compared to Pre-
vious Models
This section compares equilibrium variables across Chapters 3 through 5 to
gain insight into how the di¤erent assumptions on output observability and
the structure of wages a¤ect the strategic interaction between workers and
the union.
Let R be an auxiliary variable that is equal to the absolute value of the
elasticity of the total surplus with respect to the union size (that is, it is
equal to the right-hand side of condition 3.11 of Chapter 3 except that n
is replaced with n). Similarly, let R be an auxiliary variable representing
a negative adjusted elasticity of the total surplus; this auxiliary variable is
equal to the right-hand side of condition 5.4 of Chapter 5 except that n is
replaced with n. Mathematically:
R =
1
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1) ["n(2n+ 1)] ,
R =
"n [(3n+ 2)N0(N0 + 1) + n(n
2   2n  1)]
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)][N0(N0 + 1) + n(n  1)] (5.7)
  N0(N0 + 1)(N0(N0 + 1)  n
2)
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)][N0(N0 + 1) + n(n  1)] .
Remark 4 The auxiliary function R is equal to the absolute value of the
elasticity of the surplus with respect to the union size; that is, R =  EY;n.
The auxiliary function R is an adjusted or modied elasticity; specically
R =  EY;n   (N0(N0 + 1)  n2)=(N0(N0 + 1)  1 + n).
Denote the equilibrium union size in Chapters 3 and 4 as n and the
equilibrium union size in Chapter 5 as bn. In equilibrium, the auxiliary
functions are equal to the elasticity of the bargaining function calculated at
their respective union sizes (because of the equilibrium conditions 3.11 and
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5.4). Mathematically, in equilibrium:
(n) = R(n),
(bn) = R(bn).
The auxiliary functions R and R are increasing with the number of
union members, ceteris paribus. The next two results establish properties of
the auxiliary functions that help us to compare equilibrium variables across
the models. The rst lemma proves that the auxiliary functions are strictly
increasing in the union size, n.
Lemma 4 Fix a "large" workforce size, N0 > 0, and any ine¢ ciency co-
e¢ cient, 0 < " < 1. Then, the auxiliary functions R(n) and R(n) are
strictly increasing functions of the union size, n.
The next result establishes how the auxiliary functions R and R com-
pare with each other for any given union size. In particular, it proves that
the auxiliary function R, for any given workforce size, union size and ine¢ -
ciency coe¢ cient, is larger than the auxiliary function R.
Lemma 5 For every ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient " 2 (0; 1) and workforce size
N0 > 0, it turns out that R > R holds for every n 2 [0; N0].
To compare the equilibrium union size across models, the elasticity of the
bargaining function with respect to union size is assumed to be constant.
In particular, there is a constant 0 <  < 1 such that (n) = , for every
n 2 [0; N0]. This restriction helps with tractability; assessing the di¤erences
between models would be complex and cumbersome for the general cases.
As described earlier, the values of the auxiliary functions in equilibrium will
be equal to the elasticity:
R(n) = ,
R(bn) = .
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Because the auxiliary functions, R(n) and R(n), are strictly increasing
(by Lemma 4), the function that is lower for any given union size, namely
R(n) (by Lemma 5), achieves a given elasticity  > 0 at a larger equi-
librium union size. In other words, to reach a given constant elasticity, the
auxiliary function R(n) requires more union members than the auxiliary
function R(n). Moreover, both functions have inverses, which allows us to
write this condition as:
bn = R 1() > R 1() = n. (5.8)
The next result formalizes this idea.
Proposition 9 Suppose that the elasticity function (n) is constant. Com-
paring the equilibrium number of union members, the model that pays 
to union members and j to each non-unionized worker of skill j, for all
j > n, has more workers in the union, in equilibrium, than the models where
all workers have the same type of contract. Formally, bn > n.
Figure 5.4 plots the constant elasticity against the equilibrium union
density showing this result. In particular, for any given elasticity the aux-
iliary function R(n) has a higher union density than the auxiliary function
R(n).
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Figure 5.4: Elasticity as a Function of the Union Density
An implication of Proposition 9 is that the structure of wages can a¤ect
the equilibrium union size. This has implications for the equilibrium surplus,
workers surplus and the workers bargaining power. In particular, with
a higher union size in equilibrium, the model which o¤ers di¤erent wage
contracts to workers will have more workers a¤ected by the union ine¢ ciency
and, hence, have a lower total surplus in equilibrium compared to the model
which o¤ers workers the same wage contract. Furthermore, with more union
members in equilibrium, the workers in this model must have relatively more
bargaining power and, hence, a higher share (in terms of a percentage) of the
equilibrium total surplus. For this model, the net impact from the relatively
lower total surplus and the relatively higher bargaining power is a lower
equilibrium worker surplus compared to the model which o¤ers the same
wage contract to all workers. The next corollary formalizes this result. To
simplify the English, call the model of Chapter 3 the -model, the model of
Chapter 4 the -model and the model of Chapter 5 the -model.
Corollary 9 Suppose that the elasticity function, (n), is constant. The
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-model has a lower total surplus and workerssurplus in equilibrium than
the models where all workers have the same type of contract. On the other
hand, in the -model, workers have more bargaining power and a higher
share of the total surplus in equilibrium, compared to the other models. Be-
cause the total surplus is lower and the bargaining power of workers is higher,
the rm surplus is lower in the equilibrium of the -model.
The implication of Corollary 9 is that, if the union also cares about the
size of the workers surplus, then it prefers the models where all workers
face the same wage contract. On the other hand, if the union cares about
bargaining power (for example, for political reasons) or the percentage of
the surplus that workers obtain, then it prefers the model which o¤ers the
two separate wage contracts.1
The union may also care about the wage of its members, rather than
the wages of workers per se. The next result compares the constant wage
received by union workers in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.
Corollary 10 Union workers receive a higher wage, in aggregate, in equi-
librium in the model that pays  to all workers compared to the model which
pays  to union members and j to each non-unionized worker of skill j,
for all j > n.
The result of Corollary 10 is driven by two factors. First, the workers
surplus is lower in the model that o¤ers two wages contracts compared to
the model where all workers receive  (by Corollary 9). Second, in the model
which o¤ers two wage contracts, non-union workers earn more than union
workers. In contrast, in the model which o¤ers all workers the same wage,
union workers earn the same as non-union workers. Hence, in equilibrium,
union workers must earn less in aggregate in the model that o¤ers two wage
1In all models the union is assumed to maximize the wage of union members only;
that is, it does not consider other objectives, such as bargaining power. The discussion
in this subsection is concerned with what might drive the unions preferences over the
model types in this context.
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contracts than in the model that o¤ers all workers the same wage. The
implication of Corollary 10 is that, if the unions objective is to maximize
the wages of its members, it prefers all workers be o¤ered the constant wage.
To put another way, it prefers that output for all workers be unobservable.
5.4 Summary
This chapter studied the strategic interaction between workers and a labor
union using a similar model as in Chapters 3 and 4; the only di¤erence was
that output was unobservable for unionized workers and observable for non-
unionized workers. As such, wages were constant for unionized workers, but
increased with productivity for non-union workers. This setup was designed
to reect situations where a union had successfully opposed performance-
based pay for its members. It was designed to study further the unions
incentives on performance-based pay. As in Chapter 3, this chapter focused
on studying the properties of an equilibrium where lower skilled workers
joined the labor union while higher skilled workers did not.
The model was solved to nd expressions for the equilibrium wage, the
workerssurplus, the rms surplus, the union size and the union density.
Comparative static results were also reported. The equilibrium variables
were di¤erent from those computed in the previous two chapters. Therefore,
this chapter also studied the di¤erence in the equilibrium variables across
Chapters 3 through 5. The main results were:
 The proposed strategy prole is an equilibrium. Specically, there is
an equilibrium where unionized workers are lower skilled and earn a
constant wage while non-union members are higher skilled and earn a
wage that increases linearly in their productivity. This equilibrium is
unique and is robust to unilateral and coalitional deviations.
 All workers join the labor union if the cost from doing so (in terms of
the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient) is su¢ ciently small and there is a benet
from joining (in terms of the workersbargaining power).
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 The equilibrium union size is always decreasing in the ine¢ ciency co-
e¢ cient if the elasticity of the bargaining function is constant or neg-
ative. When the elasticity is positive, the equilibrium union size is
decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient so long as the elasticity is not
increasing too quickly with the union size.
The di¤erence in the equilibrium variables between the models in Chap-
ters 3 through 5 was studied by restricting the bargaining function. This
improved the tractability of the model. The restriction was that the bargain-
ing function had a constant elasticity with respect to the union size. The
results shed some light on the implications and possible incentives needed
for of the union to choose between the di¤erent wage structures. The main
results were that:
 The equilibrium size of the union is higher under the model that o¤ered
two wage schedules (Chapter 5) compared to the models which o¤ered
the same wage contract to all workers (Chapters 3 and 4).
 The equilibrium total surplus, workerssurplus and rm surplus are
lower under the model that o¤ered two wage schedules (Chapter 5)
compared to the models which o¤ered the same wage contract to all
workers (Chapters 3 and 4).
 Union workers earn more in aggregate in the model that o¤ers a con-
stant wage to all workers (Chapter 3) than any of the other models
(Chapters 4 or 5). This result held regardless of whether the bargain-
ing function had a constant elasticity or not.
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Chapter 6
Costly Firm Bargaining with
Constant Wages
This chapter studies the interaction between a union and a rm. The model
builds on the Constant Wage Model of Chapter 3 by allowing the rm to
inuence the bargaining power of workers by making costly e¤ort in the
bargaining process.
6.1 Model Setup
As in Chapter 3, output is unobservable or unveriable. The union ine¢ -
ciency, ", is exogenous, with 0 < "  1. The strategic players are the union
and the rm. The equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium of the simul-
taneous move game of complete information. Fix a workforce size N0 > 0.
The total surplus, Y (n), is dened in the same way as in equation (3.7) of
Chapter 3.
Let c  0 denote the amount of costly e¤ort that the rm chooses
to use in bargaining with the union. The relative bargaining power of
workers is a function K : [0;+1)  [0; N0] ! R, dened at every pair
(c; n) 2 [0;+1)  [0; N0]. Suppose further that K is a twice continuously
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di¤erentiable function of c and n such that:
K(c; n)  0 for all c  0 and 0  n < N0, (6.1)
K(c;N0)  1 for all c  0, (6.2)
@K
@n
(c; n) > 0, for all c  0 and 0  n < N0, (6.3)
@K
@n
(c;N0) = 0 for all c > 0, (6.4)
@K
@c
(c; n) < 0, for all c > 0 and all 0  n  N0, (6.5)
@2K
@n2
(c; n)  0, for all c > 0 and 0  n < N0, (6.6)
@2K
@c2
(c; n) > 0, for all c > 0 and all 0  n < N0. (6.7)
Assumptions (6.1) and (6.2) are similar to assumptions (3.1) and (3.2)
of Chapter 3; they ensure the value of the bargaining function is between
zero and one. Assumption (6.3) is similar to assumption (3.4) of Chapter 3;
it implies that an increase in the union size has a direct positive e¤ect on
the workersbargaining power. Assumption (6.5) implies that an increase
in bargaining e¤ort by the rm has a direct negative e¤ect on the workers
bargaining power. This assumption means that more e¤ort that a rmmakes
in bargaining leads to an increase in the share of the surplus it obtains.
Assumptions (6.6) and (6.4) are similar to assumptions (3.5) and (3.6) of
Chapter 3. They imply that the bargaining function is weakly concave in the
size of the union and that the marginal direct e¤ect from the most skilled
worker joining the union is zero. The function K : [0;+1) [0; N0]! R is
weakly concave in the union size by assumption (6.6). The function is weakly
convex in the bargaining e¤ort by assumption (6.7). This assumption would
be expected to hold in reality if there are diminishing marginal returns to
the rms e¤ort.
Dene the elasticity of the bargaining function with respect to the size
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of the union as n(c; n). Mathematically:
n(c; n) =
n
K(c; n)
@K(c; n)
@n
.
To prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium the following
assumptions are also required.
@K
@c
(0; n) <   1
Y (n)
for all n 2 [0; N0], (6.8)
lim
c!+1
@K
@c
(c; n) >   1
Y (n)
for all n 2 [0; N0], (6.9)
@K
@n
(c; 0) > "K(c; 0)
N0(N0 + 1)
for all c > 0. (6.10)
Assumption (6.8) is similar to assumption (6.5), but builds on it by
ensuring there is a minimum marginal direct benet (in terms of the rms
bargaining power) for the rm to choose a positive non-zero value for its
costly e¤ort. Assumption (6.9) is similar to assumption (6.7); it ensures that
as the costly e¤ort grows large, the marginal direct benet from increasing
the e¤ort (in terms of the impact on the rms bargaining power) declines
below a certain level. Assumption (6.10) is similar to assumption (6.3),
but builds on it by ensuring there is a minimum marginal direct benet (in
terms of the workersbargaining power) from having at least one worker in
the union.
As in the proposed strategy proles of the previous chapters, workers
j 2 f1;    ; ng are union members, and all workers with skills j > n are not
in the union. The surplus of the rm and the workers, respectively, are:
Yf (c; n) = [1 K(c; n)]Y (n);
Yw(c; n) = K(c; n)Y (n). (6.11)
The rm chooses the e¤ort, c, that maximizes its prot, denoted . The
rms prot is the di¤erence between the rms surplus and the amount of
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costly e¤ort it exerts in the bargaining process, formally:
(c; n) = Yf (c; n)  c
= [1 K(c; n)]Y (n)  c. (6.12)
6.2 Best Reply of the Firm
The rms best reply is the e¤ort that maximizes its prot given the unions
choice of size, n. Mathematically, the rms best reply is given by:
cBR(n) = argmax
c0
(c; n).
The next proposition proves that the best reply of the rm exists and is
unique for every union size. It also characterizes the best reply. It shows
that the rms best reply depends on the surplus, the partial derivative of
the bargaining function with respect to c, and the size of the union.
Proposition 10 Suppose assumptions (6.1) through (6.6) hold. The best
reply of the rm is the function that takes each n 2 [0; N0] and returns
c = cBR(n), the unique positive solution of the rst order condition of the
rms prot maximization problem:
 Y (n)@K
@c
(c; n) = 1. (6.13)
6.3 Wages and the Best Reply of the Union
As in Chapter 3, the amount of wages paid to workers is equal to the workers
surplus, Yw. If all workers receive a constant salary , then Yw = N0; this
equality is the same Budget Balance constraint as in Chapter 3 and it is
given by condition (3.10).
Remark 5 Although we are thinking of workers choosing to unionize, and
the union choosing the wage, Chapter 3 showed that this problem is equivalent
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to the union choosing the number of members. In this chapter, we simplify
this part of the modelling and assume that the union chooses the number of
members, n.
The problem of the union is to maximize the common wage, , by choos-
ing the number of union members, n, subject to budget balance, for each
choice of e¤ort that the rm makes. Mathematically:
nBR(c) = argmax
0nN0
(n) subject to Yw(c; n) = N0.
By substituting equation (6.11) for the workerssurplus, the constraint
N0 = Yw becomes:
N0 = Yw(c; n) = K(c; n)Y (n) =
K(c; n)
2
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]. (6.14)
The wage  is:
 =
K(c; n)
2N0
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)] . (6.15)
This wage equation is similar but not identical to equation (3.10),
which is the wage equation in Chapter 3. The only di¤erence is the bargain-
ing function, which in this chapter depends on the rms costly bargaining
e¤ort, c, as well as the union size, n.
The following proposition proves the best reply of the union exists, is
unique, and characterizes this best reply.
Proposition 11 Suppose assumptions (6.1) through (6.7) hold. In addi-
tion, suppose that assumption (6.10) holds. The best reply of the union is
the function that takes each c > 0 and returns a unique nBR(c). This best
reply always exists, and, depending on the parameters, is either the corner
solution nBR(c) = N0 (all workers are in the union), or an interior solution,
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nBR(c), implicitly dened by the rst order condition of the unions problem:
n(c; n
BR) =
"nBR(2nBR + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)  "nBR(nBR + 1) . (6.16)
Moreover, all workers are unionized (nBR = N0) if and only if the ine¢ -
ciency coe¢ cient is su¢ ciently small in the precise sense that:
"  (N0 + 1)n(c;N0)
(N0 + 1)n(c;N0) + 2N0 + 1
.
The best response of the union is analogous to equation (3.11) dening
the union size in Chapters 3 and 4; the only di¤erences are that K(c; n)
replaces K(n), and the partial derivative @K=@n replaces the derivative
dK=dn. Similarly, the condition for an interior solution to the unions prob-
lem is analogous to equation (3.12) of Chapter 3; the only di¤erence is that
the partial derivative @K=@n replaces the derivative dK=dn.
The following result helps us prove the uniqueness of the Nash equi-
librium. It essentially says that the best reply of one player is increasing
(decreasing) at a point where the other players best reply is decreasing (in-
creasing). Lemma 6 implicitly says that, in any equilibrium, the action of
the rm is either a strategic complement (substitute) to the union size, and
the union size is a strategic substitute (complement) to the rm e¤ort, in
the sense of Bulow [17].
Lemma 6 Suppose assumptions (6.1) through (6.7) hold. Then, for all
n 2 [0; N0]:
dcBR
dn
(n) =
Y (n)Kcn(c
BR(n); n) + Yn(n)Kc(c
BR(n); n)
 Y (n)Kcc(cBR(n); n) ,
and, for all c  0:
dnBR
dc
(c) =   Y (n
BR(c))Kcn(c; n
BR(c)) + Yn(n
BR(c))Kc(c; n
BR(c))
Yn(nBR(c))Kn(c; nBR(c)) + Y (nBR(c))Knn(c; nBR(c))
.
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Moreover, suppose that (c; n) 2 [0;+1) [0; N0] is a Nash equilibrium.
Then, exactly one of the following three cases is true at (c; n):
Case 1 :
dnBR
dc
(c)>0,
dcBR
dn
(n)<0 , Kcn(c; n)>  Yn(n
)Kc(c; n)
Y (n)
Case 2 :
dnBR
dc
(c)<0,
dcBR
dn
(n)> 0 , Kcn(c; n)<  Yn(n
)Kc(c; n)
Y (n)
Case 3 :
dnBR
dc
(c)=0,
dcBR
dn
(n) = 0 , Kcn(c; n)=  Yn(n
)Kc(c; n)
Y (n)
.
In all cases:
dnBR
dc
(c)
dcBR
dn
(n)  0.
The equilibrium conditions given by Lemma 6 imply that the stability
conditionutilized in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [38] is satised in
any equilibrium (see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [38], page 414). This
condition can be described as follows. Suppose the players are playing a
strategy prole that is closeto an equilibrium and consider the following
dynamic adjustment process. Start at any point (c0; n0) that is extremely
close to (c; n), but c0 6= c and n0 6= n. Player 1 (the rm) at t = 1 plays
a best reply against the action of Player 2 (the union). At t = 2, Player 2
plays their best response to the action of Player 1. For every k 2 f1; 2; 3; :::g,
at t = 2k + 1, Player 1 plays their best reply against Player 2 in period 2k.
At t = 2k + 2, Player 2 plays a best reply against the action of Player 1
in period t = 2k + 1. The stability condition requires that this dynamic
adjustment process converges to the Nash equilibrium.
Consider the following Jacobian matrix. 
nn nc
nc cc
!
The stability condition requires that the Jacobian determinant is posi-
tive, or equivalently nncc nccn > 0: In our case, it is clear that nn > 0
and cc > 0, but the signs of nc and cn depend on Kcn (Appendix C con-
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tains details of these partial derivatives). In equilibrium, one of the partial
cross derivatives, cn or nc, is negative and one is positive, or they are both
zero. In fact, in equilibrium this is the case:
Case 1 : Kcn(c; n) >
 Yn(n)Kc(c; n)
Y (n)
, nc > 0, cn < 0
Case 2 : Kcn(c; n) <
 Yn(n)Kc(c; n)
Y (n)
, nc < 0, cn > 0
Case 3 : Kcn(c; n) =
 Yn(n)Kc(c; n)
Y (n)
, nc = 0, cn = 0.
In all cases nccn  0. Hence, nncc   nccn > 0. The three cases
in Lemma 6 imply that, in any equilibrium, the determinant of the Jaco-
bian is positive and, hence, the stability condition must hold. Essentially,
Lemma 6 says that there is no equilibrium where the actions of both players
are strategic substitutes, or where the actions of both players are strategic
complements. Appendix C calculates the partial derivatives, nn, cc, nc
and cn, and shows that the stability condition holds in any equilibrium.
6.4 Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is the pair (c; n), where c is the best reply of the rm
when the union plays n, and n is a best reply of the union when the rm
plays c. The next proposition proves that a unique Nash equilibrium exists
and is unique.
Proposition 12 Suppose assumptions (6.1) through (6.10) hold. Then, a
Nash equilibrium (c; n) exists and is unique. The equilibrium (c; n) solves
the following system of equations:8>><>>:
n(c
; n) = "Yn(n
)
Y (n)
 @K
@c
(c; n) = 1
Y (n) .
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Remark 6 A standard result is that a Nash equilibrium is unique when the
derivatives of the best reply functions have opposite signs across their whole
domain. Proposition 12 does not use this standard result because we cannot
control the signs of these derivatives over their entire domain. Proposition
12 proves a stronger result; one in which we start with local conditions to nd
a global result. This is why we needed to obtain the stability of every Nash
equilibrium in Lemma 6. To put it another way, in the proof of Proposition
12 it is necessary to show that every Nash equilibrium will be stable. The
proof of Proposition 12 rst establishes existence, and then, argues that each
Nash equilibrium is stable. Finally, the proof makes an argument of why only
one Nash equilibrium can exist in this situation. See Part II of the proof of
Proposition 12 for more detail.
The following result explains the relationship between the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient and the marginal e¤ect of the rms e¤ort on prot. It also ex-
plains the relationship between the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient and the marginal
e¤ect of the union size on the wage.
Corollary 11 Suppose assumptions (6.1) through (6.10) hold. In this case,
an increase in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient reduces the direct marginal e¤ect
of union membership on the equilibrium wage. Similarly, an increase in the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient reduces the direct marginal e¤ect of the rms e¤ort
on equilibrium prot. Mathematically:
n" < 0
c" < 0:
So far it has been assumed that the bargaining function is generic. This
made derivation of explicit equilibrium conditions and properties di¢ cult.
The following subsection overcomes this limitation to some degree by re-
stricting the bargaining function. This allows us to gain additional insight
into the strategic interaction compared to the case when the bargaining
function is generic.
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6.5 Example: Particular Bargaining Function
Suppose in this example that the bargaining function is a ratio of the union
size to the rms costly e¤ort. In particular, the relative bargaining power
of workers is the function K : [0;+1)  [0; N0] ! R, dened at every pair
(c; n) 2 [0;+1) [0; N0] by:
K(c; n) =
n2
c+ n2
. (6.17)
This functional form was chosen for a number of reasons. First, this spec-
ication represents the ratio of the rm and union e¤ort; that is, it allows
for the (realistic) situation where an increase in the rms e¤ort increases its
bargaining power, and an increase in unionization increases the bargaining
power of workers. Second, the specication allows for all variables to be of
the same unit; that is, the function allows for the rms prot, surplus and
bargaining cost to be in terms of persons squared. Indeed, equation (6.12)
dening the rms prot suggests these variables should have the same unit,
and equation (3.8) dening the total surplus suggests this unit should be per-
sons squared (because the surplus is in terms of persons squared). Third,
this specication has an ambiguous sign of the cross derivative Kcn, which
makes it more comparable to the general case studied in the previous section
where Kcn was also ambiguous.1
The bargaining function, K, is decreasing convexly with the bargaining
cost, c, and increasing with the union size, n. The sign of the cross partial
derivative of the bargaining function (with respect to the rms costly e¤ort
and the union size) depends on the relative magnitudes of the rms costly
1In practice, the particular choice of specication is not of any practical relevance for
this subsection, so long as it behaves in a similar way to the general function studied in
the previous section. To put it another way, any specication of K with a reasonable
justication would have served the purpose for this subsection. This is because the point
of this subsection is to gain intuition by deriving closed form analytic solutions and
numeric results to communicate the pattern of results in a di¤erent way to the equations
of the previous section; this would not be expected to depend much on the exact choice
amongst functional forms with the same or very similar characteristics.
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e¤ort and the union size. Mathematically, the properties of this bargaining
function are:
@K
@c
=
 n2
(c+ n2)2
< 0, (6.18)
@2K
@c2
=
2n2
(c+ n2)3
> 0, (6.19)
@K
@n
=
2nc
(c+ n2)2
> 0, (6.20)
@2K
@n2
=
2c(c  3n2)
(c+ n2)3
, (6.21)
@2K
@c@n
=
2n(n2   c)
(c+ n2)3
, (6.22)
n =
n
K
@K
@n
=
2c
c+ n2
> 0. (6.23)
Equations (6.18), (6.19) and (6.20) are comparable to assumptions (6.5),
(6.7) and (6.3) of the previous section, respectively. In particular, the signs
of these partial derivatives and the partial second order derivative are the
same as those assumed in the previous section. The economic intuition for
these properties is provided in the previous section. Equation (6.21) implies
the sign of the second order partial derivative of the bargaining function
with respect to union size depends on the relative size of the union and the
rms costly e¤ort. This is di¤erent from assumption (6.6) of the previous
section, which implied this second order partial derivative was no greater
than zero.
The remainder of this subsection calculates the best responses of the
union and rm. The equilibrium characteristics and comparative statics are
also computed and analyzed. The following proposition outlines the rms
optimal choice of bargaining e¤ort.
Proposition 13 Suppose the bargaining function is given by equation (6.17).
The best reply of the rm is the function that takes each n  0 and returns
cBR(n), the unique positive solution of the rms rst order condition, given
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by:
cBR(n) = n
r
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
2
  n2. (6.24)
The best reply of the rm is decreasing in the union size if the cross
derivative Kcn is positive or, equivalently, if n2 > c. Formally:
dcBR
dn
< 0 , n2 > c:
Equation (6.24) characterizes the best reply of the rm against any choice
n of the union. The optimal bargaining cost depends on the size of the
workforce, the number of union members and the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient.
The next result nds an expression for the wage by using the bargaining
power function, the rms best response function and the budget constraint.
Lemma 7 Suppose the bargaining function is given by equation (6.17). Sub-
stituting c = cBR(n) of equation (6.24) and the bargaining power function
into equation (6.15) for the wage results in:
 =
p
2
2
n
N0
p
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1). (6.25)
As in Chapter 3, the wage depends on the size of the workforce, the
number of union members and the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient.
Dene c1 as the ratio of the rms costly e¤ort in equilibrium (in terms
of persons squared) to the size of the workforce squared when the workforce
size is large. Mathematically:
c1 = lim
N0!+1
c
N20
.
The variable c1 is a nite real number. In particular, divide equation (6.24)
by N20 and let n = n
 and cBR = c, yielding:
c
N20
=
n
N0
s
1
2

N0 (N0 + 1)
N20
  "n
 (n + 1)
N20

  n
2
N20
.
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Dene 1 = limN0!+1(n
=N0) as the equilibrium union density when the
workforce size is large. Taking the limit as the workforce size grows large,
N0 ! +1, on both sides of the above equation results in:
c1 =
1p
2
q
1  "21   
2
1.
Because the equilibrium union density is between zero and one, the variable
c1 is clearly a nite real number.
The following proposition proves the best reply of the union exists and
characterizes this best reply.
Proposition 14 Suppose the bargaining function is given by equation (6.17).
The best reply of the union is the function that takes each c > 0 and returns
a unique value of nBR(c). Depending on the parameters, the best reply is ei-
ther nBR = N0 (all workers are in the union) or the unique interior solution
implicitly dened by the rst order condition of the unions problem, given
by:
nBR[2nBR
3
+ nBR
2
+ 4cnBR + 3c]  2cN0(N0 + 1)
"
= 0. (6.26)
As the size of the workforce grows, full membership occurs if and only if the
ine¢ ciency, ", is su¢ ciently small, in the precise sense that:
"  c

1
1 + 2c1
.
The best reply of the union is increasing in the rms costly e¤ort:
dnBR
dc
> 0:
Equation (6.26) shows that the optimal number of union members de-
pends on the size of the workforce, the bargaining e¤ort of the rm and the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient.
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The next proposition proves that a Nash equilibrium of the game exists
and characterizes this equilibrium.
Proposition 15 Suppose the bargaining function is given by equation (6.17).
Then, a Nash equilibrium (c; n) exists and is unique when n2 > c. The
equilibrium (c; n) solves the following system:8>><>>:
c = n
q
N0(N0+1) "n(n+1)
2
  n2
n[2n
3
+ n
2
+ 4cn + 3c] = 2c
N0(N0+1)
"
:
The system of equations in Proposition 15 are the two best replies given
by equations (6.24) and (6.26), but with n replacing n and c replacing c.
This system does not appear to have a simple analytical solution. However, a
solution may be calculated in the limit, as the number of workers grow large,
N0 ! +1. Recall that 1 = limN0!+1(n=N0). The next proposition
computes the best replies of the rm and union and nds the equilibrium
union density as the workforce size grows large, N0 ! +1.
Proposition 16 Suppose the bargaining function is given by equation (6.17)
and that N0 ! +1. Further suppose that " > 0. The Nash equilibrium
(c; n) exists, is unique, and solves the system:
c1 =

4
1
" 1   221
, (6.27)
c1 =
1p
2
q
1  "21   
2
1. (6.28)
The rms choice of costly e¤ort is always positive in this equilibrium.
The union density is also positive and given by:
1 =

1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
 1=2
. (6.29)
This equilibrium always leads to an interior solution to the unions prob-
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lem; that is, n < N0.
Proposition 16 shows that, as the number of workers grows large, the
equilibrium union density and best replies of the rm and union depend
only on the exogenously given ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. It is clear from equa-
tion (6.29) that the equilibrium union density is declining in the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient. Proposition 16 also shows that complete unionization of the
workforce never occurs.
Figure 6.1 plots the equilibrium wage, union density and workersbar-
gaining power against the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. It shows that these vari-
ables are decreasing in the ine¢ ciency. This is because, as the ine¢ ciency
rises, union workers produce less (a direct negative e¤ect on the total surplus
and wage). Some workers leave the union when the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
rises so they can produce more e¢ ciently (as shown by the declining equi-
librium union density and bargaining power; a positive indirect e¤ect on the
total surplus and wage). The net impact from these two countering e¤ects
is to reduce the equilibrium wage.
Figure 6.2 plots the equilibrium workerssurplus, rm surplus and rms
bargaining e¤ort against the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. It shows that the equi-
librium workerssurplus is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient (for the
same reason the equilibrium wage is declining in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient,
as described for Figure 6.1). It also shows the rms equilibrium bargaining
e¤ort, surplus and prot are increasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. The
optimal bargaining e¤ort is increasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient because
the higher ine¢ ciency reduces the equilibrium union size and this increases
the marginal prot from bargaining. The increase in the rms relative bar-
gaining power leads to an increase in the rms equilibrium surplus and
prot.
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Figure 6.1: Equilibrium Variables as Functions of the Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cient
Figure 6.2: Equilibrium Surplus as Functions of the Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cient
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The next result explains how equilibrium variables respond to changes in
the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient and the size of the workforce when the elasticity
of the bargaining function with respect to union size is constant. As in
Chapter 3, we restrict our attention to the constant elasticity case to improve
tractability.
Corollary 12 Suppose the bargaining function is given by equation (6.17)
and that the bargaining elasticity, n(c; n), is constant. In this case, the
equilibrium number of union members and the rms bargaining e¤ort are
decreasing functions of the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. Formally:
dn
d"
< 0,
dc
d"
< 0.
As the workforce size, N0, grows large, the equilibrium wage is falling in
the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient if and only if the elasticity is su¢ ciently small.
Mathematically:
lim
N0!+1
d
d"
< 0 , n <
2
"

1 + " p1 + 2"

.
The equilibrium wage, number of union members and rm e¤ort are increas-
ing functions of the total number of workers:
d
dN0
> 0,
dn
dN0
> 0,
dc
dN0
> 0.
In equilibrium, and as the workforce size grows large, the union density is
constant. Formally:
lim
N0!+1
d (n=N0)
dN0
= 0.
As the size of the workforce grows large, the equilibrium total surplus, work-
erssurplus and rm surplus fall as the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient rises if and
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only if the elasticity n is su¢ ciently small. Formally:
lim
N0!+1
dY 
d"
< 0
lim
N0!+1
dY f
d"
< 0
lim
N0!+1
dY w
d"
< 0
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
, n <
2
"

1 + " p1 + 2"

.
As the size of the workforce grows large, the equilibrium prot of the rm
falls as the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient rises if and only if the elasticity n is
su¢ ciently small. Formally:
lim
N0!+1
d
d"
< 0 , "n
2
+
2n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n)) (1 + 2n)
< "2
q
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2".
The result that the equilibrium union size is falling in the ine¢ ciency co-
e¢ cient is similar to the results of previous chapters (for example, Corollary
2 of Chapter 3). As described in the earlier chapters, workers leave the union
when the union ine¢ ciency rises because it is essentially more protable for
workers to reduce their bargaining power and improve (aggregate) e¢ ciency.
Corollary 12 showed that when the bargaining function has a constant
elasticity, the optimal bargaining e¤ort of the rm is declining in the in-
e¢ ciency coe¢ cient. This is because the higher ine¢ ciency reduces the
equilibrium union size and this increases the relative bargaining power of
the rm. In response to this higher bargaining power, the rm reduces its
bargaining e¤ort.
Corollary 12 proves that an increase in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient can
increase or decrease the equilibrium wage, surplus and prot depending on
the relative magnitudes of the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient and the elasticity n.
For example, a rise in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient leads to a reduction in the
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union size. If the elasticity is su¢ ciently large, this puts su¢ cient upward
pressure on the rms bargaining power such that the rms best response
is to reduce its costly e¤ort. This in turn can increase the rms prot.
The comparative static results on the equilibrium union density and wage
are similar to the results of Corollary 5 of Chapter 3.
Corollary 12 also shows that the rms optimal bargaining e¤ort is in-
creasing in the workforce size. This is because a larger workforce size in-
creases the equilibrium size and bargaining power of the union. In response
to this reduction in its relative bargaining power, the rm increases its bar-
gaining e¤ort.
6.6 Summary
This chapter studied the interaction between workers, a union and a rm
using a similar model as Chapter 3; the only di¤erence was that the rm
could inuence the bargaining power of workers by making costly e¤ort in
the bargaining process. As in Chapter 3, output was unobservable and the
focus was on the properties of an equilibrium where lower skilled workers
joined the labor union while higher skilled workers did not.
The model was solved to nd expressions for the equilibrium wage, the
workerssurplus, the rms prot, the rms bargaining e¤ort, the union size
and the union density. Comparative static results were also reported. The
main results were:
 The best replies of the rm and union exist and are unique.
 All workers join the labor union if the cost from doing so (in terms of
the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient) is su¢ ciently small and there is a benet
from joining (in terms of the workers bargaining power). In some
cases, the union had to improve the productivity of its members before
all workers would unionize.
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 A unique equilibrium exists where the union and rm play their best
responses.
This chapter also studied the model under a restriction on the bargaining
function. This improved the tractability of the model and allowed equilib-
rium variables to be expressed in terms of the exogenous parameters only.
The restriction was that the bargaining function was a ratio of the union
size to the rms bargaining e¤ort. The main results under this restriction
were that:
 A higher ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient decreases the equilibrium union size
and the rms bargaining e¤ort. The equilibrium union size is de-
creasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient because a higher ine¢ ciency ef-
fectively increases the cost of unionization. The rms optimal bar-
gaining e¤ort is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient because the
union size, and hence workersbargaining power, decreases.
 A higher ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient decreases the equilibrium rm prot
if the elasticity of the bargaining function with respect to union size
is not too large. The result suggests that there are situations where a
higher union ine¢ ciency can increase the rms prot. For example,
a rise in the ine¢ ciency leads to a reduction in the union size. If the
elasticity is su¢ ciently large, this puts su¢ cient upward pressure on
the rms bargaining power such that the rms best response is to
reduce its costly e¤ort. This in turn can increase the rms prot.
This nding may be important for union and rm wage negotiations
if the ine¢ cient coe¢ cient can be inuenced.
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Chapter 7
Costly Firm Bargaining when
Wages Increase with Skill
7.1 Model Setup
This chapter studies the interaction between a union, rm and workers when
output is observable and wages increase with a workers skill. The model
studied in this chapter is similar to the model of Chapter 6; the only di¤er-
ence is that workers earn a wage that increases linearly in their productivity
(as in Chapter 4). This model is studied to gain insight into union and rm
preferences on performance-based pay and on the observability of output.
As in Chapter 6, the rms costly bargaining e¤ort is denoted by c  0,
the bargaining function is denoted K(c; n) and has the properties described
in Chapter 6. Assumptions (6.1) through (6.7) hold, and the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient, ", is exogenously given.
Let w(j) = j > 0 denote the wage for union worker j. The union
bargains with the rm over the rate  > 0. Similarly, non-union workers
also earn a wage linearly increasing in their skill in the same fashion as for
union workers. The wage rate of non-union workers may be equal to or
di¤erent from the wage rate of union workers. As explained in the following
subsection, in equilibrium these wage rates are the same because of the
100
incentives of workers.
The Budget Balance constraint of the previous chapters holds here; in
particular, wages in aggregate cannot exceed workers surplus, Yw. If all
workers receive the wage rate, , the constraint becomes:
Yw =
N0X
j=1
j =
N0(N0 + 1)
2
.
By substituting equation (6.11) for the workerssurplus, this constraint
becomes:
N0(N0 + 1)
2
= Yw = K(c; n)Y =
K(c; n)
2
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]. (7.1)
Solving this equation for the wage rate, , yields:
 = n
p
2
p
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1)
. (7.2)
This wage rate is similar to the one in Chapter 4 given by equation (4.2);
the only di¤erence is that the bargaining function depends on the rms
bargaining e¤ort in addition to the union size.
The problem of the union is to maximize the wage rate, , by choosing
the number of union members, n, subject to budget balance and the choice
of e¤ort that the rm makes. Mathematically:
max
0nN0
 subject to condition (7.1).
The problem of the rm is the same as in Chapter 6. In particular, for
every level of union membership, n, the rm chooses the e¤ort, c, that maxi-
mizes its prot, denoted as  and given by equation (6.12). Mathematically,
the rms best reply is given by:
cBR(n) = argmax
c0
(c; n).
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7.2 Nash Equilibrium
As in the other chapters, the focus will be on an equilibriumwhere all workers
earn the same wage rate regardless of their unionization status; that is, the
wage rate received by non-union workers is the same as the wage rate of
union workers, . As described in Chapter 4, this is because two di¤erent
wage rates would generate protable deviations for workers, and hence, such
a strategy prole would not be an equilibrium.
The best replies of the rm and union turn out to be the same as those
characterized by Proposition 10 and Proposition 11, respectively, in Chapter
6 (where output was unobservable). These best replies exist and are unique.
The best reply of the rm is the same as in Chapter 6 because it does not
depend on the wage structure. As for the unions best response, the rst
order condition of the wage rate with respect to the size of the union, n, is
@K
@n
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)] = K(c; n)"(2n+ 1),
which is the same rst order condition as in Proposition 11. Indeed, the
size of the union is robust to the structure of wages.
Because the best response functions for both the rm and union are the
same as in Chapter 6, so too is the equilibrium condition of Proposition 12.
The following subsection follows Chapter 6 by studying the game with a
restricted bargaining function.
7.3 Example: Particular Bargaining Function
Suppose in this example that the bargaining function is a ratio of the union
size to the rms costly e¤ort, as in the example used in Chapter 6 and
given by equation (6.17). In particular, the relative bargaining power of
workers is the function K : [0;+1)  [0; N0] ! R, dened at every pair
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(c; n) 2 [0;+1) [0; N0] by:
K(c; n) =
n2
c+ n2
.
The properties of this bargaining function are explained in the Chapter
6 example. The following result establishes the wage rate  as a function of
the number of union members, the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient and the size of the
workforce.
Lemma 8 Suppose the bargaining function is given by equation (6.17). The
wage rate, , is dened by:
 = n
p
2
p
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1)
.
The best reply of the rm is the same as in the Chapter 6 example,
given by equation (6.24) of Proposition 13. The best reply of the rm does
not depend on the wage structure (see proof of Proposition 13). The next
proposition proves the best reply of the union exists and characterizes this
best reply.
Lemma 9 Suppose the bargaining function is given by equation (6.17). The
best reply of the union is the function that takes each c > 0 and returns a
unique value of nBR(c). Depending on the parameters, the best reply is either
nBR = N0 (all workers are in the union) or the unique interior solution
implicitly dened by the rst order condition of the unions problem, given
by:
nBR[2nBR
3
+ nBR
2
+ 4cnBR + 3c]  2cN0(N0 + 1)
"
= 0.
The rst order condition of Lemma 9 and its unique positive solution
nBR are the same as in Proposition 14 of Chapter 6. Indeed, the best reply
of the union nBR does not depend on whether there is a constant wage or a
linearly increasing wage. This is because the solution to the problem is the
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same and, hence, the best response is the same. Proposition 14 of Chapter
6 studies the properties of this best reply in more detail.
Because the best replies of the rm and union are the same as in the
Chapter 6 example, the comparative static results of that chapter (in par-
ticular, those of Proposition 12) also hold here. The only new comparative
statics result in this section relates to the equilibrium wage rate, . The
following corollary studies this comparative static result.
Corollary 13 Suppose the bargaining function is given by equation (6.17)
and that bargaining elasticity, n, is constant. In this case, the equilibrium
wage rate is increasing in the size of the workforce. Formally:
d
dN0
> 0.
The equilibrium wage rate is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient if the
elasticity, n, is su¢ ciently small. Mathematically:
d
d"
< 0 , n <
2
"

1 + " p1 + 2"

.
Corollary 13 proves that an increase in the union ine¢ ciency can increase
or decrease the equilibrium wage rate depending on the relative magnitudes
of the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient and the elasticity n. This is similar to the
result of Corollary 12 which showed the equilibrium wage could increase
or decrease with the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. The intuition for this result is
explained in detail in that corollary. The result of Corollary 13 is implied
by Corollary 12, which established when d=d" < 0. This is because  is
an increasing transformation of  (for details, see the proof of Corollary 6).
7.4 Summary
This chapter studied the interaction between workers, a union and a rm
using a similar model as Chapter 6; the only di¤erence was that output was
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observable and wages increased linearly with a workers productivity. As
in Chapter 6, this chapter focused on studying the properties of an equilib-
rium where lower skilled workers joined the labor union while higher skilled
workers did not.
The equilibrium variables under this model were the same as the model
of Chapter 6, where output was observable. In other words, the observability
of a workers output did not change the equilibrium variables. We found that
the equilibrium wage rate is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient if the
elasticity of the bargaining function with respect to the union size is not too
large. The summary section of Chapter 4 explains the implications for the
unions preferences on performance pay.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis proposed and analyzed micro-theoretic models of the strategic
interaction between heterogeneous workers and a union, and that between
a rm and a union. It was assumed that joining the union increased the
bargaining power of workers, but a¤ected their productivity. The thesis tried
to use the simplest possible methods to capture the phenomenon. It also
went beyond a traditional unilateral equilibrium solution concept to check
whether coalitional deviations would make sense. The unions preferences on
performance-based pay were analyzed by studying the models under di¤erent
wage structures.
Two main models were analyzed. The rst was the ConstantWage Model
of Chapter 3, where the strategic players were the union and the workers.
The second was the Firm Choice Model of Chapter 6, where the strategic
players were the union and the rm. Chapters 4, 5 and 7 studied variations
of these baseline models by changing the assumptions on output observabil-
ity and by incorporating performance-based pay. They also compared the
equilibrium variables across the models.
All models assumed a nite number of heterogeneous workers, with each
worker deciding whether to join the union. The heterogeneity of workers
was in their skill; each worker had a di¤erent skill level. Workers and the
rm produced a surplus and the union bargained on behalf of workers for
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their share of the surplus (which we called their wage). Despite the fact a
specic functional form was used for the surplus, Y , most of the results were
qualitative in nature and may potentially work for some generic functions
of the surplus that are decreasing in the number of union workers.1 This is
because, in most cases, the proofs of the results were for a generic function
of the surplus Y (n) rather than for the specic functional form. The union
determined, and maximized, wages for its members, subject to budget bal-
ance; that is, union members shared equally what was left from the workers
surplus after salaries to non-members were paid.
This thesis focused on studying equilibria in which the least productive
workers joined the union and the most productive workers did not. Across
the models, we showed that this type of equilibrium exists, is unique, and is
robust to coalitional deviations. We found expressions for the equilibrium
union size, union density, the wage of union and non-union workers, the
surplus and prot of the rm and the bargaining power of workers and the
rm.
The most striking result that holds across all models is that the rms
surplus and prot can sometimes increase with the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
of the union (see Corollary 12). This suggests there can exist situations
where rms have a perverse incentive to make union workers less e¢ cient
compared to non-union workers. The intuition is that the reduced e¢ ciency
makes unionized workers want to exit the union and this improves the rms
bargaining power and the total surplus.
We also found that union membership and salaries decrease with the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient (see Corollary 2, 6 and 12). In other words, unionized
workers always prefer to be as e¢ cient as their non-unionized colleagues.
We found that union wages were generally lowest when they are linked to
a workers output (see Corollary 10). This suggests that unions may face
1Describing the results as qualitative in nature means that the model is designed to
provide intuition and insights on the strategic interactions of the players in the game; it
has not been calibrated with data which may be required to obtain results that are more
quantitative in nature.
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incentives to oppose performance-based pay for their members.
Other key ndings included:
 All workers join the labor union if the cost from doing so (in terms of
the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient) is su¢ ciently small and there is a benet
from joining (in terms of the workersbargaining power). See Proposi-
tions 1 and 7 and Corollary 1. In some cases, the union had to improve
the productivity of its members before all workers would unionize (see
Proposition 16).
 Some workers, particularly those with relatively low productivity, can
remain unionized even when doing so makes them very ine¢ cient. This
is because they benet from the improved bargaining power of the
union.
 In the model where the rm chooses its level of e¤ort in bargaining,
a higher ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient decreases the equilibrium union size
and the rms bargaining e¤ort (see Proposition 12). The equilibrium
union size is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient because a higher
ine¢ ciency e¤ectively increases the cost of unionization. The rms
optimal bargaining e¤ort is decreasing in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient
because the union size, and hence workersbargaining power, decrease.
 A higher ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient decreases the equilibrium rm prot
if the elasticity of the bargaining function with respect to union size
is not too large (see Proposition 12). The result suggests that there
are situations where a higher union ine¢ ciency can increase the rms
prot. For example, a rise in the ine¢ ciency leads to a reduction in
the union size. If the elasticity is su¢ ciently large, the size of the
union decreases a lot, the workersbargaining power decreases a lot,
and these factors lead to a rise in the surplus and the rms bargaining
power.
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Future Research
Future research may consider how the strategic interaction between unions,
workers and rms depends on governments and the legal and economic en-
vironment. This may be important because these factors can a¤ect the
relative bargaining power of workers and other aspects of the strategic in-
teraction. This thesis allowed for a generic bargaining function that could
be expanded to incorporate these factors, especially if it were clear how a
government would intervene in bargaining. For example, a pro-union gov-
ernment may implement policies that increase the bargaining power of the
union, all else constant. This may lead to a relatively lower union size in
equilibrium because the marginal benet from joining the union is reduced
while the cost remains the same. In contrast, an anti-union government
may implement policies that decrease the bargaining power of the union, all
else constant this may lead to relatively larger unions (and hence a larger
ine¢ ciency) as workers join the union to protect their bargaining power.
Future research may also consider how the strategic interaction depends
on the number and types of unions, in light of heterogenous workers and
union ine¢ ciency. This is because some unions represent workers in a partic-
ular industry and others may represent workers of a specic rm. Addition-
ally, some rms may bargain with multiple unions. For example, QANTAS
Airways (the ag carrier airline of Australia) bargains with multiple unions
over salaries. In 2011, workers of three unions (representing engineers, bag-
gage and catering sta¤, and long-haul pilots) undertook protected industrial
action which resulted in QANTAS grounding most of its eet (ABC [1]).
In this framework of multiple unions, timing may become a more relevant
factor. For example, unions may want to coordinate industrial action to
maximize their bargaining power.
Future research may also investigate how the strategic interaction de-
pends on the production technology. This thesis assumed a technology which
made workers perfect substitutes. For instance, if workers were not perfect
substitutes, a loss of e¢ ciency for one worker could cause ow-on e¤ects to
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other workers. In this case, the impact of any union ine¢ ciencies are mag-
nied; one might therefore expect relatively smaller levels of unionization in
this case.
Moreover, this thesis assumed full employment. As described earlier,
macroeconomic variables may change the bargaining power of the union.
Similarly, recent studies, such as Mitra [39], suggest that international trade
could be important for explaining the unionization rate amongst workers. It
may therefore be important for future research on labor unions to account
for this factor.
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Appendix A
Proofs
This Appendix contains all proofs. To help reduce the size of some equations
in this appendix, let x = N0(N0 + 1).
Proof of Lemma 1
To see that the function  = (n) in equation (3.10) is strictly concave,
rst express it as:
2N0 = K[x  "n(n+ 1)]:
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to n yields:
2N0
d
dn
= K[ "(2n+ 1)] + [x  "n(n+ 1)]dK
dn
=
dK
dn
[x  "n(n+ 1)]  "(2n+ 1)K:
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to n yields:
2N0
d2
dn2
=
dK
dn
[ "(2n+ 1)] + d
2K
dn2
[x  "n(n+ 1)]  "(2n+ 1)dK
dn
  2"K
= [x  "n(n+ 1)]d
2K
dn2
  2"(2n+ 1)dK
dn
  2"K:
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Re-arranging for d2=dn2 yields:
d2
dn2
=
[x  "n(n+ 1)]d2K
dn2
  2"(2n+ 1)dK
dn
  2"K
2N0
:
This second derivative is negative because d2K=dn2 < 0 (by assumption 3.5),
dK=dn > 0 (by assumption 3.4) and K > 0 (by assumption 3.1). Hence,
the function  = (n) in equation (3.10) is strictly concave.
Proof of Proposition 1
Take the rst and second derivatives of  with respect to n, in equation
(3.10), to obtain:
d
dn
=
1
2

N0 + 1  "n(n+ 1)
N0

dK
dn
  (2n+ 1)"K
2N0
,
d2
dn2
=
1
2

N0 + 1  "n(n+ 1)
N0

d2K
dn2
  "(2n+ 1)
N0
dK
dn
  "K
N0
< 0.
This second derivative is always negative because N0+1 "n(n+1)=N0 > 0,
with strict inequality holding if " < 1 or if n < N0. Hence, d=dn is a
decreasing function. Because 0  K(0)  1, then, by assumption (3.3), it
turns out that:
d(0)
dn
=
N0 + 1
2
dK
dn
(0)  "K(0)
2N0
> 0.
Because K(0)  0, N0 > 0, and dK=dn > 0, for every n such that 0 < n <
N0, then K(N0) > 0. If function (n) is always increasing on its domain,
then its unique maximal value is n = N0. On the other hand, if function
(n) is decreasing at n = N0, then the rst order condition establishes
the unique maximizer, by the Intermediate Value Theorem (which can be
applied because the objective function is continuous). With some algebra,
the interior solution n satises:
(N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1)) dK(n
)
dn
= "(2n + 1)K(n).
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Because K(n)=n > 0, and N0(N0 + 1) > "n(n + 1) for every n < N0,
then:
d(n)
dn
 0 ,
dK(n)
dn
K(n)=n
 "n
(2n + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1) .
At the upper corner n = N0:
d(N0)
dn
 0 , (N0) =
dK(N0)
dn
K(N0)=N0
 "N0(2N0 + 1)
(1  ")N0(N0 + 1) . (A.1)
Solving for " the inequality on the right-hand side of (A.1) leads to:
"  (N0)N0(N0 + 1)
(N0)N0(N0 + 1) +N0(2N0 + 1)
.
As x=N0 = N0 + 1, dividing by N0 all terms on the top and on the bottom
of the fraction on the right-hand side results in equation (3.12).
As discussed in the text, all non-union workers have the correct incentives
and the union is maximizing its utility by construction. The only possible
deviation is if a union member leaves the union. If this occurred, then n <
N0, so that there is an interior solution for the unions problem. Suppose a
worker with skill j  n considers leaving the union while all other players
are playing according to the prescribed equilibrium. The non-union surplus,
denoted GjN , would become:
GjN = K(n
   1)
 
"j + (1  ")
nX
i=1
i+
N0X
i=n+1
i
!
  (n   1)
=
K(n   1)
K(n)
Yw + "jK(n
 + 1)  (n   1).
As worker with skill j moves from inside to outside the union, the workers
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surplus has a net change of "jK(n   1). By denition (3.8), for n = n,
Yw
K(n)
= (1  ")
Xn
i=1
i+
XN0
i=n+1
i, or
Yw
K(n)
=
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1)
2
.
The non-union workers obtain all the surplus of the workers, except for a
wage of  to each union member, for a total payment of (n 1). Worker
with skill j has no incentive to deviate if and only if GjN=(N0 n+1)  ;
that is, if:
K(n   1)
K(n)
Yw + "jK(n
   1)  (n   1)  (N0   n + 1).
Dene z = x   "n(n + 1). Because Yw=K(n) = z=2, this inequality is
equivalent to:
K(n   1) [z + 2"j]  2N0.
Substituting  of equation (3.10), with n = n:
K(n   1) [z + 2"j]  2N0

K(n)z
2N0

.
This is equivalent to:
K(n   1)
K(n)
 z
z + 2"j
. (A.2)
Because (by assumption) the second derivative of function K(n) is non-
positive, function n 7! dK=dn is weakly decreasing, and then, dK(n0)=dn 
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dK(n)=dn, for every n0  n. By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus:
K(n   1) = K(n) 
nZ
n 1
dK(n0)
dn
dn0 (A.3)
 K(n) 
nZ
n 1
dK(n)
dn
dn0
= K(n)  dK(n
)
dn
nZ
n 1
dn0
= K(n)  dK(n
)
dn
.
Dividing both sides by K(n) results in:
K(n   1)
K(n)
 1 
dK(n)
dn
K(n)
. (A.4)
Using equation (3.11), this inequality becomes:
K(n   1)
K(n)
 1  "(2n
 + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1)
K(n   1)
K(n)
 z   "(2n
 + 1)
z
.
Hence, in order to prove that inequality (A.2) always holds, it su¢ ces to
prove that:
z   "(2n + 1)
z
 z
z + 2"j
.
After some algebra, this condition becomes simply:
[z   "(2n + 1)] [z + 2"j]  z2
z2 + 2"jz   2n"z   4"2jn   "z   2j"2  z2.
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This inequality holds because 2n"z > 2"jz, as n  j. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Corollary 1
By assumption (3.6), dK(N0)=dn = 0 and, hence, (N0) = 0. If " = 1,
then the equivalent conditions in inequality (A.1) must be violated. Suppose
" < 1. Because (N0) = 0 and (1   ")N0(N0 + 1) > 0, the equivalent
conditions in (A.1) become simply "N0(2N0 + 1)  0. The only possibility
for this to be true is " = 0, but, by assumption, " > 0. Hence, conditions
(A.1) are violated, and the objective function is decreasing at n = N0. By
the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is a unique solution n, which is
interior and implicitly dened by equation (3.11).
Proof of Proposition 2
Let the coalition be of two or more workers; jj  2. This coalition can
contain unionized and non-unionized workers, formally:
jU 2 ,
jN 2 .
In particular, there are three possible types of coalitions: (a) a coalition of
entirely non-union workers, (b) a coalition of entirely union workers, and (c)
a coalition containing both union and non-union workers.
First consider the case where the coalition consists of non-unionized
workers only, so that:
  fnon-unionized workersg.
In this case, none of these workers have an incentive to join the union,
because they receive  out of the union and  in the union.
Second, consider the case where the coalition consists of unionized work-
ers only. In particular, suppose there are a total of c union members in the
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coalition, where c  n, so that:
  funion membersg = fn; n   1; :::; n   cg
jj = c.
If this coalition leaves the union, the surplus accruing to non-union workers,
denoted GKN , becomes:
GKN = K(n
   c) Yw
K(n)
+K(n   c)"
 
nX
i=n c+1
i
!
  (n   c).
Because Yw=K(n) = z=2, this equation is equivalent to:
GKN = K(n
   c)z
2
+K(n   c)"(2n
   c+ 1)c
2
  n + c.
This coalition has no incentive to leave the union if the following incentive
condition holds:
GKN  N0   n + c:
This is equivalent to:
K(n   c)z
2
+K(n   c)"(2n
   c+ 1)c
2
 N0.
Substituting  of equation (3.10), with n = n:
K(n   c) [z + "(2n   c+ 1)c]  K(n)z:
With some algebra:
K(n   c)
K(n)
 z
z + "(2n   c+ 1)c . (A.5)
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From equation (A.3) in the proof of Proposition 1,
K(n) K(n   c)  cdK
dn
1  cdK=dn
K(n)
 K(n
   c)
K(n)
.
Substituting equation (3.11) for (dK=dn)=K(n) results in:
1  c"(2n
 + 1)
z
 K(n
   c)
K(n)
.
Hence, in order to prove that inequality (A.5) always holds, it su¢ ces to
prove that:
z   c"(2n + 1)
z
 z
z + "(2n   c+ 1)c .
After some algebra, this becomes:
0   zc"(2n + 1) + zc"(2n   c+ 1)  "2(2n   c+ 1)(2n + 1)c2.
This inequality holds because zc"(2n + 1) > zc"(2n   c+ 1).
Finally, consider the case where the coalition consists of both unionized
and non-unionized workers. In this case, if a non-unionized worker with
skill j > n joins the union and a unionized worker with skill j  n leaves
the union, the workersbargaining power is unchanged, but the surplus falls
and hence wages decline. Because this is true for all union and non-union
workers, there is no protable deviation for a coalition of this form.
Proof of Proposition 3
In this setup, the workerssurplus becomes:
Yw = (1  ")K(N0   n + 1)
N0X
n
j +K(N0   n + 1)
n 1X
1
j
=
K(N0   n + 1)
2
[(1  ")N0(N0 + 1) + "(n   1)n]:
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The wage is:
 =
K(N0   n + 1)
2N0
[(1  ")N0(N0 + 1) + "(n   1)n]: (A.6)
Non-union workers have a protable coalitional deviation with union
workers. For example, a non-union worker can switch their membership
status with a union worker. In this case, wages rise because the ine¢ ciency
is reduced and bargaining power is unchanged. However, non-union workers
have no protable deviation either unilaterally or in a coalition of other
non-union workers: they receive  outside the union and  inside the union.
As for union workers, they have protable deviations both unilaterally
and in coalitions. To see that a union worker has a unilateral deviation,
note that if a union worker leaves the union the workerssurplus has a net
change of "jK(N0   n). Worker with skill j has no incentive to deviate if
Gn=n
  . Substituting Gn from equation (3.8) yields:
K(N0   n)Yw
K(N0   n + 1) + "jK(N0   n
)  (N0   n)  n
K(N0   n)Yw
K(N0   n + 1) + "jK(N0   n
)  N0:
Substituting z = [(1  ")N0(N0 + 1) + "(n   1)n] yields:
K(N0   n)(z + 2"j)  2N0:
Substituting  from equation (A.6) yields:
K(N0   n)(z + 2"j)  K(N0   n + 1)z:
The remainder of the proof follows exactly as in Proposition 1 at equation
(A.2). Because each union worker has a protable unilateral deviation they
also have protable coalitional deviation.
Proof of Corollary 2
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I. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Union Size and the In-
e¢ ciency Coe¢ cient
The equilibrium condition (3.11) may be written as:
n
K
Kn =  n

Y
Yn:
Equivalently:
Y Kn =  KYn:
Taking the derivative of both sides of this equality with respect to the inef-
ciency coe¢ cient yields:
Y Knn
dn
d"
+Kn

Yn
dn
d"
+ Y"

=  YnKndn

d"
 K

Ynn
dn
d"
+ Yn"

:
Isolating dn=d" yields:
dn
d"
[Y Knn + 2KnYn + YnnK] =  KYn"  KnY"
dn
d"
=
 KYn"  KnY"
Y Knn + 2KnYn + YnnK
:
The denominator of the right-hand side is negative because Knn < 0 (by
assumption 3.5), KnYn < 0 (by assumption 3.4 and because Yn < 0 by
equation 3.7) and Ynn < 0 (by equation 3.7). The numerator is positive
because KYn" > 0 (by equation 3.7) and because KnY" > 0 (by assumption
3.4 and equation 3.7). Hence, the derivative dn=d" is negative.
In addition (and for use in later proofs), the expression for dn=d" for the
particular function Y assumed in this thesis is given by taking the implicit
derivative, with respect to ", in both sides of equation (3.11). Undertaking
this calculation and isolating dn=d", results in:
dn
d"
=
(2n + 1)K(n) + n(n + 1)dK(n
)
dn
[x  "n(n + 1)]d2K(n)
dn2
  2"(2n + 1)dK(n)
dn
  2"K(n)
. (A.7)
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This expression is negative because the numerator of the fraction on the
right-hand side is positive and the denominator is negative, as x  "n(n+
1) > 0, d2K(n)=dn2  0, 2"(2n + 1)dK(n)=dn > 0, and 2"K(n) > 0.
II. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Wage and the Ine¢ -
ciency Coe¢ cient
Because the workersbargaining power does not depend on the ine¢ -
ciency coe¢ cient directly, then @K=@" = 0. Hence:
dK(n)
d"
=
@K
@"
+
dK
dn
dn
d"
=
dK
dn
dn
d"
.
By assumption (3.6), the solution is interior, and equation (3.11) denes the
unique n. Taking the derivative, with respect to ", in both sides of equation
(3.10), results in:
2N0
d
d"
= [x  "n(n + 1)]dK(n
)
d"
 K(n)

"(2n + 1)
dn
d"
+ n(n + 1)

= [x  "n(n + 1)]dK
dn
dn
d"
 K(n)

"(2n + 1)
dn
d"
+ n(n + 1)

.
Thus, d=d" < 0 if and only if:
[x  "n(n + 1)]dn

d"
dK
dn
K(n)
< "(2n + 1)
dn
d"
+ n(n + 1).
By equation (3.11), this inequality is equivalent to:
[x  "n(n + 1)]dn

d"
"(2n + 1)
x  "n(n + 1) < "(2n
 + 1)
dn
d"
+ n(n + 1).
Cancelling the positive factor x  "n(n + 1) on the left-hand side yields:
"(2n + 1)
dn
d"
< "(2n + 1)
dn
d"
+ n(n + 1).
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This inequality always holds because n(n+1) > 0. Therefore, d=d" < 0.
III. Comparative Static Result for Equilibrium WorkersSurplus and In-
e¢ ciency Coe¢ cient
Because N0 is a positive constant, Y w = N0
 and d=d" < 0, then
dY w=d" < 0.
IV. Comparative Static Result for Equilibrium Total Surplus and Ine¢ -
ciency Coe¢ cient
Taking the derivative of the total surplus, given by equation (3.7), with
respect to the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient yields:
dY 
d"
=  "(2n
 + 1)dn

d"
+ n(n + 1)
2
:
Substituting equation (A.7) for dn=d" into this equation yields:
dY 
d"
=
  1
2
"(2n + 1)
"
(2n + 1)K(n) + n(n + 1)dK(n
)
dn
[x  "n(n + 1)]d2K(n)
dn2
  2"(2n + 1)dK(n)
dn
  2"K(n)
#
  1
2
n(n + 1).
The derivative is negative if the term on the right-hand side of the equality
is negative. This condition may be written as:
  1
2
"(2n + 1)
"
(2n + 1)K(n) + n(n + 1)dK(n
)
dn
[x  "n(n + 1)]d2K(n)
dn2
  2"(2n + 1)dK(n)
dn
  2"K(n)
#
  1
2
n(n + 1) < 0:
Multiplying the inequality by the denominator of dn=d" (the denominator
of dn=d" is negative, as described earlier in the proof), this condition may
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be written as:
  1
2
"(2n + 1)

(2n + 1)K(n) + n(n + 1)
dK(n)
dn

  1
2
n(n+1)

[x  "n(n + 1)]d
2K(n)
dn2
  2"(2n + 1)dK(n
)
dn
  2"K(n)

> 0.
Collecting the dK(n)=dn terms yields:
dK(n)
dn
[ n(n + 1)"(2n + 1) + n(n + 1)2"(2n + 1)]
 "(2n+1)2K(n) n(n+1)

[x  "n(n + 1)]d
2K(n)
dn2
  2"K(n)

> 0.
Dividing the inequality by "(2n + 1) yields:
dK(n)
dn
[n(n + 1)] +K(n) [ (2n + 1) + n]
  n
(n + 1)[x  "n(n + 1)]
"(2n + 1)
d2K(n)
dn2
> 0.
Equivalently:
dK(n)
dn
n(n + 1) >
n(n + 1)[x  "n(n + 1)]
"(2n + 1)
d2K(n)
dn2
+K(n) [(2n + 1)  n] :
Dividing both sides by n(n + 1) yields:
dK(n)
dn
>
d2K(n)
dn2
x  "n(n + 1)
"(2n + 1)
+K(n)
1
n
.
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After some algebra, this inequality becomes:
n
K(n)
dK(n)
dn
>
dK(n)
dn
dK(n)
dn
n
K(n)
d2K(n)
dn2
x  "n(n + 1)
"(2n + 1)
+ 1
(n) > 1 + EKn;n
dK(n)
dn
x  "n(n + 1)
"(2n + 1)K(n)
.
V. Comparative Static Result for Equilibrium Firm Surplus and Ine¢ -
ciency Coe¢ cient
Taking the derivative of the rm surplus, given by Y f = (1 K(n))Y ,
with respect to the ine¢ ciency yields:
dY f
d"
=
d(1 K(n))
d"
x  "n(n + 1)
2
  1 K(n
)
2

"(2n + 1)
dn
d"
+ n(n + 1)

.
This derivative is negative if the right-hand side of the equality is negative.
This condition may be written as:
d(1 K(n))
d"
x  "n(n + 1)
1 K(n)   n
(n + 1)  "(2n + 1)dn

d"
< 0.
Using dK=d" = (dK=dn) (dn=d") this inequality becomes:
 dK(n
)
dn
dn
d"
x  "n(n + 1)
1 K(n)   n
(n + 1)  "(2n + 1)dn

d"
< 0
 dn

d"

dK(n)
dn
x  "n(n + 1)
1 K(n) + "(2n
 + 1)

  n(n + 1) < 0.
As N0 grows large this becomes:
 
"
x  "n2
1 K(n) limN0!+1
dK(n)
dn
+ "2n
#
lim
N0!+1
dn
d"
  n2 < 0.
Taking the limit of dn=d", given by equation (A.7), as N0 grows large and
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substituting it into this inequality yields:
 

2nK(n) + n
2
lim
N0!+1
dK(n)
dn
 
x "n2
1 K(n) limN0!+1
dK(n)
dn
+ "2n

(x  "n2) lim
N0!+1
d2K(n)
dn2
  4"n lim
N0!+1
dK(n)
dn
  n2 < 0.
Multiplying the inequality by the denominator of limN0!+1 dn
=d" (this
denominator is negative, as described earlier in the proof), this condition
may be written as:
 

2nK(n) + n
2
lim
N0!+1
dK(n)
dn
"
x  "n2
1 K(n) limN0!+1
dK(n)
dn
+ 2"n
#
  n2

x  "n2

lim
N0!+1
d2K(n)
dn2
  4"n lim
N0!+1
dK(n)
dn

> 0.
Expanding the terms on the left-hand side of the inequality yields:
 
2nK(n)

x  "n2

1 K(n) limN0!+1
dK(n)
dn
  4"n2K(n)
  n2

lim
N0!+1
dK(n)
dn
2
x  "n2
1 K(n)   2"n
3 lim
N0!+1
dK(n)
dn
  n2

x  "n2

lim
N0!+1
d2K(n)
dn2
+ 4"n
3
lim
N0!+1
dK(n)
dn
> 0.
Collecting like terms yields:
 
0@2K(n)

x  "n2

1 K(n)   2"n
2
1A lim
N0!+1
dK(n)
dn
  4"nK(n)
  n

lim
N0!+1
dK(n)
dn
2
x  "n2
1 K(n) > n


x  "n2

lim
N0!+1
d2K(n)
dn2
.
Dividing by limN0!+1 (dK(n
)=dn)

x  "n2

, which allows the inequality
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to be expressed in terms of elasticities, yields:
  2K(n
)
1 K(n) +
2"n
2
x  "n2  
4"nK(n)
(x  "n2) lim
N0!+1
dK(n)=dn
+
n
1 K(n) limN0!+1
d(1 K(n))
dn
> n
lim
N0!+1
d2K(n)=dn2
lim
N0!+1
dK(n)=dn
.
Moving some terms on the left-hand side of the inequality to the right-hand
side yields:
n
1 K(n) limN0!+1
d(1 K(n))
dn
> n
lim
N0!+1
d2K(n)=dn2
lim
N0!+1
dK(n)=dn
+
2K(n)
1 K(n)  
2"n
2
x  "n2 +
4"nK(n)
(x  "n2) lim
N0!+1
dK(n)=dn
.
Hence:
 (n) > EKn;n +
2K(n)
1 K(n)  
2"n
2
x  "n2 +
4"nK(n)
(x  "n2) lim
N0!+1
dK(n)=dn
.
Dividing the numerator and denominator of the last term by N20 yields:
 (n) > EKn;n +
2K(n)
1 K(n)  
2"n
2
x  "n2 +
4" n

N20
K(n)
x "n2
N20

lim
N0!+1
dK(n)=dn
.
Because N0 is large, this inequality may be written as:
 (n) > EKn;n +
2K(n)
1 K(n)  
2"n
2
N20   "n2
.
Proof of Proposition 4
Substituting  = n(dK=dn)=K into the equilibrium equation (3.11) leads
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to the polynomial equation:
"( + 2)n2 + "( + 1)n  N0(N0 + 1) = 0.
The only positive solution to this polynomial equation is given by equation
(3.14).
Proof of Corollary 3
Substitute n = N0 into the equation "(+2)n2+"(+1)n N0(N0+1) =
0 and cancel a common factor N0 to nd:
"( + 2)N0 + "( + 1) = (N0 + 1).
Solving this equation for " leads to:
" =
(N0 + 1)
N0( + 2) + ( + 1)
=
 (N0 + 1)
( + 1)
h
N0

+2
+1

+ 1
i .
For ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients above this point the union prefers less than full
membership.
Proof of Corollary 4
By Corollary 2 the workerssurplus is always declining in the ine¢ ciency.
Hence, the equilibrium rm surplus is rising in the ine¢ ciency if the equi-
librium total surplus is unchanged in the ine¢ ciency. By Corollary 2, the
equilibrium total surplus is unchanged in the ine¢ ciency if the following
condition holds:
(n) = 1 + EKn;n
dK(n)
dn
x  "n(n + 1)
"(2n + 1)K(n)
.
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Using the denitions of the elasticities (n) and EKn;n yields:
n
K(n)
dK(n)
dn
=
dK(n)
dn
dK(n)
dn
n
K(n)
d2K(n)
dn2
x  "n(n + 1)
"(2n + 1)
+ 1.
Equivalently:
(n) =
(n)
dK(n)
dn
d2K(n)
dn2
x  "n(n + 1)
"(2n + 1)
+ 1.
Using dK(n)=dn = n
 1
=N0 and d
2K(n)=dn2 = (   1)n 2=N0 this
condition becomes:
 =
N0
n 1
(   1)n 2
N0
x  "n(n + 1)
"(2n + 1)
+ 1.
Thus:
   1 = (   1)
n
x  "n(n + 1)
"(2n + 1)
.
Hence:
1 =

n
x  "n(n + 1)
"(2n + 1)
.
With some algebra:
n"(2n + 1) =  (x  "n(n + 1)) .
Let  denote union density, that is  = n=N0. Dividing the above equality
by N20 and taking the limit as N0 grows large yields:
"
2

2

+ 1

= 1. (A.8)
To obtain  (so it can be substituted into the above equality) note that
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from equation (3.14) the equilibrium union size is:
n =
 + 1
2 + 4
 
 1 +
s
1 +
4N0(N0 + 1)( + 2)
"( + 1)2
!
:
Dividing by N0 yields:
 =
 + 1
N0 (2 + 4)
 
 1 +
s
1 +
4N0(N0 + 1)( + 2)
"( + 1)2
!
.
As N0 grows large this becomes:
 =
 + 1
N0 (2 + 4)
s
1 +
4N0(N0 + 1)( + 2)
"( + 1)2
.
Substituting this value for  into equation (A.8) yields:
"

 + 1
N0 (2 + 4)
2
1 +
4N0(N0 + 1)( + 2)
"( + 1)2

2

+ 1

= 1.
After some algebra and because N0 grows large this can be written as:
1
2 + 4
2
4( + 2)
1

2

+ 1

= 1.
Then:
4( + 2)2

1
2 + 4
2
= 1.
This can be written as:
1
42 + 16 + 16
=
1
4(2 + 4 + 4)
.
Because this equality is satised the proof is complete; the equilibrium total
surplus is unchanged in the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 5
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Substituting K(n) = cn and dK(n)=dn = c into equation (3.11) and
solving for n results in:
n =  1
3
+
r
1
9
+
x
3"
. (A.9)
To get the full unionization condition, let n = N0 in the above equation
and solve for ", yielding:
" >
1
3
x
x  1
3
N0
.
To see that " > 1=3 implies n < N0 when the workforce size grows large,
note that by equation (A.9) the inequality n < N0 is equivalent to:
 1
3
+
r
1
9
+
x
3"
< N0.
After some algebra, this last inequality becomes " > 1=3. Consequently, if
"  1=3, then all workers are unionized. The equilibrium union density is
given by dividing both sides of equation (A.9) by N0, resulting in:
n
N0
=   1
3N0
+
s
1
9N20
+
3(N0 + 1)
"N0
.
Taking the limit as N0 ! +1 proves the result. As discussed in the text,
all non-members have the correct incentives and the union is maximizing its
utility by construction. The only possible deviation is if a union member
leaves the union. If this occurs, then n < N0, so that there is an interior
solution for the unions problem. Suppose a worker with skill j < n con-
siders leaving the union while all other players are playing according to the
prescribed equilibrium. In this case, the proof is the same as in Proposition
1, however the analogous of equation (A.4) will hold with equality here.
Proof of Corollary 5
I. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Union Size and Ine¢ -
ciency Coe¢ cient
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To show dn=d" < 0, note that the expression for n in Proposition 5 is
clearly decreasing in the ine¢ ciency.
II. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Wage and Ine¢ ciency
Coe¢ cient
The proof for d=d" < 0 is the same as in Corollary 2.
III. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Union Size and Work-
force Size
To show dn=dN0 > 0 note that take the expression for n in Proposition
5 is clearly increasing in the workforce size.
IV. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Wage and Workforce
Size
To show d=dN0 > 0, note that because the union density remains
unchanged as N0 rises, so too does the bargaining power. As such, when the
workforce size rises, the share of the surplus going to workers is unchanged,
but the total surplus rises. Therefore, the wage must rise.
V. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Union Density and
Workforce Size
Note that dividing equation (3.11) by N0 and taking the derivative with
respect to N0 results in:
d (n=N0)
dN0
=
 
q
1
9
+ x
3"
+ N0(2N0+1)
6"
p
1
9
+ x
3"
+ 1
3
N20
.
This derivative is equal to zero if:r
1
9
+
x
3"
=
N0(2N0 + 1)
6"
q
1
9
+ x
3"
+
1
3
.
Equivalently:
1
9
+
x
3"
=
N0(2N0 + 1)
6"
+
1
3
r
1
9
+
x
3"
.
Dividing each side by N20 and taking the limit of this equality as N0 grows
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large yields:
1
3"
=
1
3"
.
Because the equality is satised the derivative is equal to zero and the equi-
librium union density does not change with the workforce size.
VI. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Total Surplus and the
Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cient
Note that from the proof of Corollary 2:
lim
N0!+1
dY 
d"
=  n2  

lim
N0!+1
dn
d"

"2n.
Substituting K(n) = cn and dK(n)=dn = c into the equation for dn=d"
in the proof of Corollary 2 and taking the limit as N0 grows large yields:
lim
N0!+1
dn
d"
=
2n
2
c+ n
2
c
 4n"  2n"c =
3n
2
c
 6n" =
 n
2"
.
Substituting this into limN0!+1 dY
=d" yields:
lim
N0!+1
dY 
d"
=  n2    n

2"
"2n = 0.
Because this derivative is equal to zero the equilibrium total surplus (when
the workforce size is large) does not change with the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient.
Proof of Lemma 2
Combining equation (3.8) for the workers surplus with equation (4.1)
for the Budget Balance constraint yields:

N0X
j=1
j =
K(n)
2
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)].
Solving this equation for the wage rate, , yields:
 = K(n)

1  " n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

.
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Proof of Proposition 6
I. Solution to the Unions Problem
The number of union members is dened by:
d(n)
dn
= 0, dK(n
)
dn

1  " n
(n + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

 K(n)" 2n
 + 1
N0(N0 + 1)
= 0.
Then:
dK(n)
dn
n
K(n)
=
"n (2n + 1)
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n + 1)] .
The next step is to check that this n is a maximum of the unions problem.
The rst and second derivatives are:
d
dn
=
dK
dn

1  " n
(n + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

 K" 2n
 + 1
N0(N0 + 1)
,
d2
dn2
=
d2K
dn2

1  " n
(n + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

  2dK
dn

"
2n + 1
N0(N0 + 1)

  2K"
N0(N0 + 1)
.
The second derivative is always negative because 1 "n(n+1)=N0(N0+1) >
0. Hence d=dn is a decreasing function. Because 0  K(0)  1, then, by
assumption (3.3) it turns out that:
d(0)
dn
=
dK(0)
dn

1  " n
(n + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

 K(0)" 2n
 + 1
N0(N0 + 1)
> 0:
Because K(0)  0, N0 > 0, and dK=dn > 0, for every n such that 0 < n <
N0, then K(N0) > 0. If function (n) is always increasing on its domain,
then its unique maximal value is n = N0. On the other hand, if function
(n) is decreasing at n = N0, then the rst order condition establishes
the unique maximizer, by the Intermediate Value Theorem (which can be
applied because the objective function is continuous). With some algebra,
the interior solution n satises:
[x  "n(n + 1)]dK(n
)
dn
= "(2n + 1)K(n).
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Because K(n)=n > 0, and x > "n(n + 1) for every n < N0, then:
d(n)
dn
 0 , dK(n
)
dn
n
K(n)
 "n
(2n + 1)
x  "n(n + 1) . (A.10)
At the upper corner n = N0:
d(N0)
dn
 0 , dK(N0)
dn
N0
K(N0)
 "N0(2N0 + 1)
(1  ")x .
Solving for " the inequality on the right-hand side leads to:
"  (N0)x
(N0)x+N0(2N0 + 1)
.
Because x=N0 = N0 + 1, dividing by N0 all terms on the denominator and
numerator on the right-hand side results in:
"  (N0 + 1)(N0)
(N0 + 1)(N0) + 2N0 + 1
.
II. Individual Deviations
The next step is to check the incentives of workers. For a non-union
member earning (n)j, her outside option is to join the union and also earn
(n)j, so she has no protable deviation. The only non-trivial incentive to
check is that of union workers, j  n. We want to show that her earnings
inside the union (n)j are greater than or equal to her earnings if she left
the union, (n   1)j. Mathematically we want to show that:
K(n)

1  " n
(n + 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

j  K(n   1)

1  " n
(n   1)
N0(N0 + 1)

j
x  "n(n + 1)
x  "n(n   1) 
K(n   1)
K(n)
:
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Dene z = x  "n(n+ 1), then:
z
z + 2"n
 K(n
   1)
K(n)
: (A.11)
Because (by assumption 3.5) the second derivative of function K(n) is non-
positive, function n 7! dK=dn is weakly decreasing, and then, dK(n0)=dn 
dK(n)=dn, for every n0  n. By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus:
K(n   1) = K(n) 
nZ
n 1
dK(n0)
dn
dn0
 K(n) 
nZ
n 1
dK(n)
dn
dn0
= K(n)  dK(n
)
dn
nZ
n 1
dn0
= K(n)  dK(n
)
dn
.
Dividing both sides by K(n) results in:
K(n   1)
K(n)
 1 
dK(n)
dn
K(n)
.
Using equation (A.10), this inequality becomes:
K(n   1)
K(n)
 1  "(2n
 + 1)
x  "n(n + 1)
K(n   1)
K(n)
 z   "(2n
 + 1)
z
Hence, in order to prove that inequality (A.11) always holds, it su¢ ces to
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prove that:
z   "(2n + 1)
z
 z
z + 2"n
 4"2n2   "z   2n"2  0.
Because this inequality is clearly satised, this completes the proof that
union workers have no protable deviation.
Proof of Corollary 6
The result is implied by Corollary 2, which established that d=d" < 0.
This is because  is an increasing transformation of . Because N0 = Yw =
N0(N0 + 1)=2, then the wage rate, , can be written as  = 2=(N0 + 1).
Proof of Corollary 3
To see that union members earn less in aggregate in the equilibrium of
Chapter 4 (where output is observable) than Chapter 3 (where output is
unobservable) note the following two facts. First, the equilibrium workers
surplus is unchanged between the chapters because the equilibrium union
size and hence the workersbargaining power is unchanged. Second, wages
in Chapter 4 are increasing with skill whereas in Chapter 3 wages are con-
stant; in other words, in Chapter 4 the wage of higher skilled non-union
workers is more than the wage of lower skilled union workers. These two
factors together prove the result. The only exception is when all workers are
unionized in equilibrium. In that case, the union workers accrue all of the
workerssurplus (which, as described, is unchanged between the chapters).
Proof of Lemma 3
Combining equations (5.1) and (5.2) yields:
n2 = n =
K(n)[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]
2
  [N0(N0 + 1)  n(n+ 1)]
2
.
Solving this equation for  establishes the wage rate of non-members. After
some algebra the above equality becomes:
2n2 = K(n)N0(N0 + 1) K(n)"n(n+ 1)  N0(N0 + 1) + n2 + n
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
n2   n+N0(N0 + 1)

= K(n) [N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]
 =
K(n) [N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]
N0(N0 + 1) + n(n+ 1)
.
Proof of Proposition 7
Take the rst derivative of  = n with respect to n, in equation (4.2),
to obtain:
d
dn
=  + n
d(n)
dn
= 0.
By equation (5.3), this rst order condition becomes:
K(n)
x  "n(n + 1)
x+ n(n   1) + n
dK(n
)
dn
x  "n(n + 1)
x+ n(n   1)
  nK(n)

2n"+ "
x+ n(n   1) +
(2n   1)(x  "n(n + 1)
(x+ n(n   1))2

= 0.
Isolating K(n)= (dK(n)=dn) yields the condition (5.4). If  is always in-
creasing on its domain, then its unique maximal value is n = N0. On
the other hand, if  is decreasing at n = N0, then the rst order condi-
tion establishes the unique maximizer, by the Intermediate Value Theorem
(which can be applied because the objective function is continuous). Because
K(n)=n > 0, and x > "n(n + 1) for every n < N0, then:
d
dn
 0 ,
dK(n)
dn
K(n)=n

"n
h
(3n + 2)x+ n(n
2   2n   1)
i
  x

x  n2

n [x+ n(n   1)] [x  "n(n + 1)] .
At the upper corner n = N0:
d
dn
 0 ,
(N0) =
dK(N0)
dn
K(N0)=N0
 "N0 [(3N0 + 2)x+N0(N
2
0   2N0   1)]  x (x N20 )
n [x+N0(N0   1)] [x  "N0(N0 + 1)] :
Solving for " the inequality on the right-hand side of the above equation
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leads to:
"  2N0(N0) + 1
2N0(N0) + 1 +
2N0(2N0+1)
N0+1
.
As discussed in the text, all non-union workers have the correct incentives
and the union is maximizing its utility by construction. The only possible
deviation is if a union member leaves the union. Of course, if this occurred,
then n < N0, so that there is an interior solution for the unions problem.
Suppose a worker with skill j < n considers leaving the union while all
other players are playing according to the prescribed equilibrium.
As worker with skill j moves from inside to outside the union, the workers
surplus has a net change of "jK(n 1). Worker with skill j has no incentive
to deviate if and only if j  .
Substituting  of equation (5.2), with n = n and  of equation (4.2),
with n = n   1:
  K(n   1)

N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n   1)
N0(N0 + 1) + (n   1)(n   2)

j.
If this inequality holds for the largest possible j in the union, then it holds
for all j < n. This highest possible j is the marginal union member, n.
Substituting j = n and  = n with  of equation (4.2) using n = n
results in:
K(n)

x  "n(n + 1)
x+ n(n   1)

n  K(n   1)

x  "n(n   1)
x+ n2   3n + 2

n.
After some algebra, this inequality becomes simply:
K(n)
K(n   1)   1

(xn
2   nx) + K(n
)
K(n   1) ( 2n
x+ 2x)+
+
K(n)
h
3"n
2
(n + 1)  2"n(n + 1)  "n(n + 1)x  "n3(n + 1)
i
K(n   1) 
  x"n2 + x"n   "n3 + "n2.
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The right-hand side of this inequality is negative, because  x"n2 < x"n
and  "n3 < "n2. This implies the inequality will hold if the right-hand
side is set to zero. For simplicity, this is how we proceed. The inequality
therefore becomes:
K(n)
K(n   1)   1

(xn
2 nx)+ K(n
)
K(n   1) ( 2n
x+ 2x)+
+
K(n)
h
3"n
2
(n + 1)  2"n(n + 1)  "n(n + 1)x  "n3(n + 1)
i
K(n   1) 0.
After some algebra, this inequality becomes:
(2  2n)
(n2   n)  
"n(n + 1)x+ "n
3
(n + 1)
x(n2   n) +
+
3"n
2
(n + 1)  2"n(n + 1)
x(n2   n)   1 +
K(n   1)
K(n)
:
Thus:
K(n)
K(n   1) >
(n
2   n)
(2  2n) +
+
x(n
2   n)
[ "n(n + 1)x  "n3(n + 1) + 3"n2(n + 1)  2"n(n + 1)] + 1:
The rst two terms of the inequality are negative because 2   2n < 0
and  "n3(n + 1) < 3"n2(n + 1). As a result, the left-hand side is less
than one. The right-hand side of the inequality is greater than one because
K(n   1) < K(n) by assumption (3.4). This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 7
Take the limit of condition (5.5) as the population of workers grows large,
N0 ! +1.
Proof of Corollary 8
Denote R as the right-hand side of the equilibrium condition (5.4)
and recall that n is the equilibrium union size. Re-writing this equilibrium
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condition yields 0 = (n)   R(n). To calculate the sign of dn=d",
take the partial derivative of this equilibrium condition with respect to ",
yielding:
0 =
@(n)
@n
dn
d"
  @R(n
)
@n
dn
d"
  @R(n
)
@"
,
and
@R(n
)
@"
=
@(n)
@n
dn
d"
  @R(n
)
@n
dn
d"
=
dn
d"

@(n)
@n
  @R(n
)
@n

.
From equation (5.4) it is clear that @R=@" > 0; in other words, both
sides of the above equality are positive. Therefore, on the right-hand side
of the above equality, dn=d" < 0 if and only if the term in the square
brackets is negative. Because @R(n)=@n > 0, (by Lemma 4) the term
in the square brackets is negative when @(n)=@n  @R(n)=@n: We do
not know @(n)=@n; if the elasticity is constant or decreasing in union size,
then dn=d" < 0. And if it is increasing in the union size, then dn=d" < 0
will still hold so long as the inequality described holds; that is, so long as
@(n)=@n  @R(n)=@n. We took the derivative of equation (5.4) to
n to gain more insight into the right-hand side of this inequality, but this
derivative turned out to be large and not intuitive.
Proof of Proposition 8
Let the coalition be of two or more workers; jj  2. This coalition can
contain unionized and non-unionized workers, formally:
jU 2 ,
jN 2 .
In particular, there are three possible types of coalitions: (a) a coalition of
entirely non-union workers, (b) a coalition of entirely union workers, and (c)
a coalition containing both union and non-union workers.
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First, consider the case where the coalition consists of non-unionized
workers only, so that:
  fnon-unionized workersg.
In this case, none of these workers have incentives to join the union, because
they receive at least n out of the union and  = n in the union.
Second, consider the case where the coalition consists of unionized work-
ers only. In particular, suppose there are a total of c union members in the
coalition, where c  n, so that:
  funion membersg = fn; n   1; :::; n   cg
jj = c.
If this coalition leaves the union, the highest paid worker of the coalition
will be the highest skilled, since the wage rate out of the union is increasing
linearly with skill. Consequently, only the incentive condition of the marginal
union member requires checking. Specically, worker with skill n has no
incentive to deviate with any coalition of union members if and only if n 
.
Substituting  of equation (5.2), with n = n and  of equation (4.2),
with n = n   1 leads to:
  K(n   c)

x  "(n   c)((n + 1  c)
x+ (n   c)(n   c  1)

n.
Substituting  = n with  of equation (4.2) using n = n results in:
K(n)

x  "n(n + 1)
x+ n(n   1)

n  K(n   c)

x  "(n   c)(n + 1  c)
x+ (n   c)(n   c  1)

n.
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After some algebra, this inequality becomes:
K(n)[x2 + xn2   xn  2ncx+ cx+ xc2 + "( n(n + 1)x  n3(n + 1))]
K(n   c) +
+
K(n)"[n2(n + 1) + 2cn2(n + 1)  n(n + 1)c  n(n + 1)c2]
K(n   c) 
 x2 + xn(n   1)+
+ "[ xn2   xn + x2nc+ xc  xc2   n3(n   1)]+
+ "[ n2(n   1) + 2cn2(n   1) + n(n   1)c  c2n(n   1)].
Equivalently:
K(n)
K(n   c)   1

x2 + xn
2   xn

+
K(n)
K(n   c)
  2ncx+ cx+ xc2+
+
K(n)"
h
 n(n + 1)x  n3(n + 1) + n2(n + 1)
i
K(n   c) +
+
K(n)"
h
2cn
2
(n + 1)  n(n + 1)c  n(n + 1)c2
i
K(n   c) 
 "

 xn2   xn + x2nc+ xc  xc2   n3(n   1)

+
+ "[ n2(n   1) + 2cn2(n   1) + n(n   1)c  c2n(n   1)].
The right-hand side of this inequality is negative because x2nc < xn
2
,
xc < xn
2
, 2cn
2
(n   1) < n3(n   1) and n(n   1)c < c2n(n   1).
Because the right-hand side of this inequality is negative we proceed by
setting it to zero and checking whether the inequality holds. Of course, if
the inequality holds with a right-hand side of zero, it holds when the right-
hand side is negative. Dene auxiliary variables:
bT1 =  n(n + 1)x  n3(n + 1) + n2(n + 1),bT2 = 2cn2(n + 1)  n(n + 1)c  n(n + 1)c2.
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Mathematically, we check:
K(n)
K(n   c)   1

x2 + xn
2   xn

+
K(n)
K(n   c)
  2ncx+ cx+ xc2+
+
K(n)
K(n   c)"
bT1 + bT2  0.
After some algebra, this becomes:
 2ncx+ cx+ xc2 + "[bT1 + bT2]  K(n   c)
K(n)
  1

x2 + xn
2   xn

.
Thus:
x2 + xn
2   xn
 2ncx+ cx+ xc2 + "(bT1 + bT2) + 1  K(n
)
K(n   c) .
Because the right-hand side of this inequality is greater than one, this in-
equality holds if the rst term on the left-hand side is negative. Mathemat-
ically, we require that  2ncx+ cx+ xc2 + "T < 0, where:
T = bT1 + bT2.
To see that inequality  2ncx+cx+xc2+"T < 0 holds, note that  2ncx+
cx+xc2 < 0, as 2n+1+c < 0, and T < 0, because n3(n+1) > n2(n+1)
and 2cn
2
(n + 1) < n(n + 1)x.
Finally, consider the case where the coalition consists of both unionized
and non-unionized workers. In this case, if a non-unionized worker with skill
j > n joins the union and a unionized worker with skill j  n leaves the
union, the workersbargaining power is unchanged, but total surplus falls
and hence wages of non-union workers decline. Hence, there is no protable
coalitional deviation of this form.
Proof of Remark 4
To see that R =  EY;n, note that from equation (3.7) the surplus, Y ,
may be written as:
Y =
x  "n(n+ 1)
2
:
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Taking the derivative of this equation with respect to n yields:
dY
dn
=  "n  "
2
:
Multiplying dY=dn by n=Y yields the right-hand side of auxiliary function R
and is clearly the elasticity  EY;n. To see that R =  EY;n  (x n2)=(x+
n(n  1)), rst note that the unions rst order condition (from Proposition
7) can be written as:
  = nd
dn
:
Multiplying both sides of this equality by [x+ n(n  1)]2 yields:
 [x+ n(n  1)]2 = [x+ n2   n]2nd
dn
:
In the next step, we substitute  from equation (5.1) and d=dn, which is:
d
dn
= 2
[x+ n(n  1)] [KYn +KnY ] KY [2n  1]
[x+ n(n  1)]2 :
Making these substitutions into the equality yields:
 2KY [x+ n2   n] = 2n [(x+ n(n  1))(KYn +KnY ) KY (2n  1)] :
After some algebra:
KY
  x  n2 + n+KY  2n2   n = n(x+ n(n  1))(KYn +KnY )
KY
  x+ n2 = n(x+ n(n  1))(KYn +KnY )
n2   x = n(x+ n(n  1))

Yn
Y
+
Kn
K

:
Re-writing in terms of the elasticity yields:
EK;n + EY;n =
n2   x
x+ n(n  1) :
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This proves the remark.
Proof of Lemma 4
The numerator of R (given by equation 3.11) is "n(2n+1), which clearly
increases with n. The denominator of R is x  "n(n+ 1), which clearly de-
creases with n. Hence, it is easy to conclude that R(n) is a strictly increasing
function. Dene bR by:
bR = "n [(3n+ 2)x+ n(n2   2n  1)]  x (x  n2)
x+ n(n  1)
=
"n4   2"n3 + [3"x  "+ x]n2 + 2"xn  x2
n2   n+ x :
Then, we claim that bR is increasing with n. This implies that R =bR[x  "n(n+1)] 1 is the product of two strictly increasing functions of n;
and thus, must also be a strictly increasing function of n. The derivative ofbR with respect to n is positive if and only if:
(n2   n+ x)(4"n3   6"n2 + [6"x  2"+ 2x]n+ 2"x) 
(2n  1)("n4   2"n3 + [3"x  "+ x]n2 + 2"xn  x2).
Equivalently:
[2n  5] "n4 + [4"n  (1 + 5")]xn2 + [6x  2] "xn+
+ [4n  1]x2   "(4n3 + n2 + 2x2).
For su¢ ciently large N0 the left-hand side of the inequality is positive and
the right-hand side negative.
Proof of Lemma 5
Some algebra indicates that:
R
R
=
"n [(3n+ 2)x+ n(n2   2n  1)]  x (x  n2)
"n(2n+ 1) [x+ n(n  1)] .
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Hence, R > R if and only if:
"n

(3n+ 2)x+ n(n2   2n  1)  x(x  n2) < "n(2n+ 1)[x+ n(n  1)] .
Equivalently:
N0(N0 + 1) > "n(n+ 1).
Because n  N0, this last inequality holds for every " < 1, proving this
lemma.
Proof of Proposition 9
This is implied by inequality (5.8).
Proof of Corollary 9
The model with more union members (which by Proposition 9 is the
model which o¤ers di¤erent wage contracts to union versus non-union work-
ers) will have more workers a¤ected by the union ine¢ ciency and, hence,
have a lower total surplus.
Furthermore, with relatively more union members, the workers in this
model have higher bargaining power because of the assumption that dK=dn >
0. Hence, workers in this model will gain a greater share of the total surplus
compared to the other models.
To see that the workerssurplus is lower in the model which o¤ers two
di¤erent wage schedules, note that in the models which o¤er the same wage
schedule to all workers, the union is maximizing the workers surplus by
essentially choosing the union size. In other words, the union size in the
models which o¤er the same wage schedule to all workers is the union size
that maximizes the workerssurplus. Because the union size in the model
that o¤ers two wage schedules is di¤erent to this, the workerssurplus must
be lower.
Proof of Corollary 10
Corollary 10 is proven by combining two results established earlier. First,
the equilibrium workerssurplus is relatively lower in the model that o¤ers
two wage schedules compared to the model where all workers receive  (see
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Corollary 9). Second, in the model that o¤ers two wage schedules, non-union
workers earn more than union workers (by construction); this compares to
the model of Chapter 3 where all workers receive a constant wage. These
two factors together imply that union workers must earn less in equilibrium
in the model that o¤ers two wage schedules (Chapter 5) compared to the
model which o¤ers  to all workers (Chapter 3).
Proof of Proposition 10
The rm maximizes its prot function, given by equation (6.12), by
choosing the amount of costly bargaining e¤ort, c. The rst and second
partial derivatives of this prot function with respect to the costly e¤ort
are, respectively:
@
@c
=  Y (n)@K
@c
(c; n)  1,
@2
@c2
=  Y (n)@
2K
@c2
(c; n).
The second derivative is always negative because of assumption (6.7) that
@2K=@c2 > 0. The rst order condition is @=@c = 0. Then:
 Y (n)@K
@c
(c; n)  1 = 0
@K
@c
(c; n) =
 1
Y (n)
.
By combining this rst order condition with assumption (6.8), it is clear
that @=@c > 0, if c = 0 (because the assumption is that @K(0; n)=@c <
 1=Y (n)).
Similarly, we need to show that for su¢ ciently large c; @=@c < 0. By
assumption (6.9) we know there will be a su¢ ciently large c0 such that
@K(c0; n)=@c >  1=Y (n), but this is equivalent to Y (n)(@K=@c) >  1 ,
 Y (n)(@K=@c)   1 < 0, which implies @=@c < 0. By the Intermediate
Value Theorem, which can be applied because the function taking each c
into @K(c; n)=@c+1=Y (n) is continuous, there exists a unique cBR = cBR(n)
such that @K(cBR; n)=@c =  1=Y (n). The point cBR maximizes the prot
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and satises the rst order condition @=@c(cBR; n) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 11
Equation (6.16) which denes the best reply of the union, can be written
as:
K(c; n) =
x  "n(n+ 1)
"(2n+ 1)
@K
@n
(c; n). (A.12)
To prove nBR exists and is unique we show that (a) the left-hand side of
equation (A.12) is increasing with n, (b) the right-hand side of equation
(A.12) is decreasing in n, and (c) there is an intersection of the right and
left-hand sides of equation (A.12).
For any xed c, the left-hand side of equation (A.12) is increasing with
n because of assumption (6.3) that @K(c; n0)=@n > 0. The right-hand
side of equation (A.12) is decreasing in n because of assumption (6.6) that
@2K(c; n0)=@n2 6 0 (this ensures @K(c; n)=@n is decreasing in n).
Now that we know the left-hand side of equation (A.12) is increasing in
n and the right-hand side is decreasing in n, we prove there exists a unique
n by showing these functions intersect. We do this by showing that, when n
is su¢ ciently low, the left-hand side of equation (A.12) (which is increasing
with n) is below the right-hand side of equation (A.12) (which is decreasing
in n). Similarly, we show that the opposite is true when n is large; that is,
when n is su¢ ciently large, the left-hand side of equation (A.12) is above the
right-hand side of equation (A.12). Mathematically, we prove the following
two inequalities hold:
K(c; 0) <
x
"
@K
@n
(c; 0), (A.13)
K(c;N0) >
(1  ")x
"(2N0 + 1)
@K
@n
(c;N0). (A.14)
These inequalities are satised because inequality (A.13) is the same as
assumption (6.10) and inequality (A.14) is implied by assumption (6.4).
Proof of Lemma 6
I. Calculating dnBR=dc
We know that N0 = K(c; n)Y (n). The rst order condition of the
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unions problem, for each xed c  0, leads to the optimal number of workers
in the union, denoted nBR = nBR(c):
Kn(c; n
BR(c))Y (nBR(c)) =  K(c; nBR(c))Yn(nBR(c)). (A.15)
Taking the derivative with respect to c of both sides of equation (A.15)
yields:
Y (nBR)Kcn(c; n
BR) + Y (nBR)Knn(c; n
BR)
dnBR
dc
(c)
=  Yn(nBR)

Kc(c; n
BR) +Kn(c; n
BR)
dnBR
dc
(c)

.
With some algebra:
Y (nBR)Kcn(c; n
BR) + Yn(n
BR)Kc(c; n
BR)
=  Yn(nBR)Kn(c; nBR)dn
BR
dc
(c)  Y (nBR)Knn(c; nBR)dn
BR
dc
(c).
Solving for the dnBR=dc yields:
dnBR
dc
(c) =   Y (n
BR)Kcn(c; n
BR) + Yn(n
BR)Kc(c; n
BR)
Yn(nBR)Kn(c; nBR) + Y (nBR)Knn(c; nBR)
.
II. Calculating dcBR=dn
Fix n 2 [0; N0] and consider the best reply of the rm, cBR = cBR(n).
Take the best reply of the rm given by equation (6.13) and re-arrange for
Y (n)Kc(c
BR; n) =  1. Taking the derivative of both sides of this equation
with respect to n yields:
Y (n)

Kcc(c
BR; n)
dcBR
dn
(n) +Kcn

+ Yn(n)Kc(c
BR; n) = 0,
or equivalently:
Y (n)Kcc(c
BR; n)
dcBR
dn
(n) + Y (n)Kcn(c
BR; n) =  Yn(n)Kc(cBR; n):
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Solving this last equation for dcBR=dn yields:
dcBR
dn
(n) =
Y (n)Kcn(c
BR; n) + Yn(n)Kc(c
BR; n)
 Y (n)Kcc(cBR; n) .
III. Result that dnBR=dc and dcBR=dn have Di¤erent Signs at Nash Equi-
libria
Now, suppose (c; n) is a Nash equilibrium. This means that c =
cBR(n) and n = nBR(c).
From the previous calculations, it is clear that dnBR(c)=dc = 0 if and
only if Y (nBR)Kcn(c; nBR) + Yn(nBR)Kc(c; nBR) = 0, while dcBR(n)=dn = 0
if and only if Y (n)Kcn(cBR; n)+Yn(n)Kc(cBR; n) = 0. Applying these results
in the Nash equilibrium (c; n) results in the following equivalences:
dnBR
dc
(c) = 0 , Kcn(c; n) =  Yn(n
)Kc(c; n)
Y (n)
, dc
BR
dn
(n) = 0.
Next, suppose that Y (n)Kcn(c; n) 6=  Yn(n)Kc(c; n). To see that
dnBR(c)=dc and dcBR(n)=dn always have opposite signs, multiply these
derivatives to nd:
dnBR
dc
(c)
dcBR
dn
(n) =
[Y (n)Kcn(c; n) + Yn(n)Kc(c; n)]2
Y (n)Kcc(c; n)[Yn(n)Kn(c; n) + Y (n)Knn(c; n)]
.
(A.16)
As Y (n)Kcn(c; n)+Yn(n)Kc(c; n) 6= 0, the numerator of the fraction
on the right-hand side of equation (A.16) is positive. By assumption, Y > 0,
Kcc > 0, by assumption (6.7). Also, Yn < 0, Kn > 0, by (6.3), and Knn < 0,
by assumption (6.6). Hence, Y (n)Kcc(c; n) > 0 and Yn(n)Kn(c; n) +
Y (n)Knn(c; n) < 0. Thus:
Y (n)Kcc(c; n)[Yn(n)Kn(c; n) + Y (n)Knn(c; n)] < 0,
making the denominator of the fraction on the right-hand side of equation
(A.16) to be negative. Hence, if Y (n)Kcn(c; n) 6=  Yn(n)Kc(c; n), then
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dnBR(c)=dc and dcBR(n)=dn have opposite signs:
dnBR
dc
(c)
dcBR
dn
(n) < 0.
Moreover, the sign of the common numerator of each dnBR(c)=dc and
dcBR(n)=dn depends on the cross derivative Kcn(c; n). For example, the
common numerator will be positive if the cross derivative is su¢ ciently
large Kcn(c; n) >  Yn(n)Kc(c; n)=Y (n), and negative if Kcn(c; n) <
 Yn(n)Kc(c; n)=Y (n). Thus:
dnBR
dc
(c) > 0 , Kcn(c; n) >  Yn(n
)Kc(c; n)
Y (n)
, dc
BR
dn
(n) < 0
dnBR
dc
(c) < 0 , Kcn(c; n) <  Yn(n
)Kc(c; n)
Y (n)
, dc
BR
dn
(n) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 12
I. Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
The argument for existence uses the Intermediate Value Theorem (IVT).
Dene an auxiliary function A : [0; N0]! R as follows. For each n 2 [0; N0],
let A(n) = nBR(cBR(n))  n. This auxiliary function is continuous because
both best replies are continuous. Also, A(0)  0 and A(N0)  0. We
claim that there is some n 2 [0; N0] such that A(n) = 0. If A(0) = 0
or A(N0) = 0, then we are done. Suppose that A(0) > 0 and A(N0) < 0.
In this case, by the IVT, there is some n 2 (0; N0) such that A(n) = 0;
that is, nBR(cBR(n)) = n. Clearly, n 2 (0; N0) implies n 2 [0; N0]. Let
c = cBR(n). Then, nBR(c) = nBR(cBR(n)) = n. Because c = cBR(n)
and nBR(c) = n, then (c; n) is a Nash equilibrium.
II. Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium
The best replies are continuously di¤erentiable functions. Clearly, we
can restrict the domain of nBR to the closed and bounded interval:
[0;maxfcBR(n)j0  n  N0g].
151
There can be no Nash equilibrium (c; n) with c > maxfcBR(n)j0  n 
N0g. With this small technical modication, both best replies have closed
and bounded domains. As best replies are dened in a closed and bounded
domain, their derivatives are bounded, what mathematicians call Lipschitz
continuous functions. There is a positive, globally minimum distance be-
tween any two di¤erent Nash equilibria. This implies that there are only
nitely many Nash equilibria.
Suppose that there are two di¤erent Nash equilibria, (c1; n

1) 6= (c2; n2).
We claim that c1 6= c2. If we had c1 = c2, then n1 = nBR(c1) = nBR(c2) = n2,
and then, (c1; n

1) = (c

2; n

2), contradicting (c

1; n

1) 6= (c2; n2). Similarly, we
claim that n1 6= n2. This must be true, otherwise c1 = cBR(n1) = cBR(n2) =
c2, which is clearly a contradiction, as c

1 6= c2.
Assume, without loss of generality, that there is no other Nash equilib-
rium with n-coordinate between n1 and n

2, and n

1 < n

2. This is possible
because there are at most nitely many Nash equilibria. Restrict the do-
main of the auxiliary function A(n) = nBR(cBR(n)) n to the closed interval
[n1+; n

2 ] for some positive  > 0 which is su¢ ciently small. By the pre-
vious lemma, the derivative of function A, calculated at a Nash equilibrium
(cBR(n); n), denoted A0(n), is negative:
A0(n) =
dnBR
dc
(cBR(n))
dcBR
dn
(n)  1   1 < 0.
Then, the rst order Taylor approximations of A a little above n1 and a little
below n2 are: A(n

1+)  A(n1)+A0(n1) and A(n2 )  A(n2) A0(n2).
When  > 0 the inequality A0 < 0 implies that A(n1) + A
0(n1) < A(n

1)
and A(n2)   A0(n2) > A(n2). Pick  > 0 su¢ ciently small such that
A(n1 + ) < A(n

1) and A(n

2   ) > A(n2). Because (c1; n1) and (c2; n2)
are Nash equilibria, then A(n1) = 0 and A(n

2) = 0. Thus, A(n

1 + ) < 0
and A(n2   ) > 0. Because function A is continuous, A(n1 + ) < 0 and
A(n2   ) > 0, then it is possible to apply again the IVT to the restriction
of function A to [n1+ ; n

2  ] to nd a number bn, with n1+  < bn < n2  
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and A(bn) = 0; that is, nBR(cBR(bn)) = bn. Let bc = cBR(bn). Clearly, nBR(bc) =
nBR(cBR(bn)) = bn. Hence, (bc; bn) is a Nash equilibrium that is di¤erent from
both (c1; n

1) and (c

2; n

2). Because n

1 < bn < n2, the existence of such a Nash
equilibrium contradicts the fact that there is no other Nash equilibrium with
n-coordinate between n1 and n

2. This contradiction proves the uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 11
To calculate n", take the partial derivative of the unions best reply with
respect to the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient to obtain:
n" =  
1
2N0
(Knn
(n + 1) +K(2n + 1)) :
It is clear that n" < 0 because Kn > 0 by assumption 6.3. To calculate
c", take the partial derivative of the rms best reply with respect to the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient to obtain:
c" = Kc
n(n + 1)
2N0
  1:
It is clear that c" < 0 because Kc < 0 by assumption 6.5.
Proof of Proposition 13
I. There Exists a Unique Best Reply for the Firm
Taking the partial derivative of equation (6.12) with respect to the rms
bargaining cost, c, (to get the marginal prot with respect to the bargaining
cost) yields:
@
@c
=  Y (n)@K
@c
(c; n)  1.
Substituting @K=@c yields:
@
@c
=
n2
(c+ n2)2
Y (n)  1.
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The second order partial derivative is:
@2
@c2
=
 2n2
(c+ n2)3
Y (n) < 0:
Hence, for every xed n, the prot is a concave function of c. Hence, the
following rst order condition gives us the unique maximizer cBR(n):
n2
(c+ n2)2
Y (n) = 1.
Equivalently:
n
p
Y (n) = c+ n2.
Substituting Y (n) = [N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]=2 into this equation yields:
n
r
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
2
= c+ n2.
Solving this inequality for c yields:
c = n
r
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
2
  n2.
The rms prot is increasing at c = 0. To see this, suppose that limN0!+1 n=N0 <
1 and N0 is su¢ ciently large. When c = 0, the objective function  is strictly
increasing: r
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
2
> n.
Equivalently:
N0(N0 + 1)
n2
  "

n+ 1
n

> 2.
Because the function taking the bargaining cost c into the prot function
 is strictly concave, and is strictly increasing when c = 0, the Intermedi-
ate Value Theorem ensures there exists a unique cBR that solves the rms
problem (that is, there exists a unique cBR such that the rst order partial
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derivative of the rms prot function, with respect to c, equals zero).
II. The Best Reply of the Firm Decreases with Union Size when n2> c
From Lemma 6, the best reply of the rm is:
dcBR
dn
=
Y Kcn +KcYn
 Y Kcc .
Because the denominator Y Kcc is negative (by assumption (6.7) that Kcc >
0), this derivative is negative if the numerator is positive; that is, if Y Kcn+
KcYn  0. This clearly occurs if the cross derivative is su¢ ciently large (or
equivalently, when n2> c).
Proof of Lemma 7
Substituting the bargaining power function into the equation for the wage
(equation 6.15) results in:
 =
n2
2N0(c+ n2)
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)] . (A.17)
Substituting the value of c = cBR given by equation (6.24), this equation
becomes:
 =
n2
2N0n
q
N0(N0+1) "n(n+1)
2
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]
=
p
2
2
n
N0
p
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1).
Proof of Proposition 14
I. Union Size
Taking the partial derivative with respect to n in equation (A.17), we
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nd:
@
@n
=
n2
2N0(c+ n2)
[ "(2n+ 1)] + 2nc
2N0(c+ n2)2
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]
=
 "n2(2n+ 1)(c+ n2)
2N0(c+ n2)2
+
2nc[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]
2N0(c+ n2)2
=
2ncN0(N0 + 1)  "n2[(2n+ 1)(c+ n2) + 2c(n+ 1)]
2N0(c+ n2)2
. (A.18)
This marginal rate is non-negative if and only if:
2cN0(N0 + 1)  "n[(2n+ 1)(c+ n2) + 2c(n+ 1)].
Equivalently:
2cN0(N0 + 1)
"
 n[2n3 + n2 + 4cn+ 3c].
The best reply of the union is the function that takes each c > 0 and returns
N0 if nBR  N0, or nBR, the unique positive solution of the rst order
condition:
nBR[2nBR
3
+ nBR
2
+ 4cnBR + 3c]  2cN0(N0 + 1)
"
= 0.
Moreover, @=@n is clearly decreasing in nBR (from equation A.18); that is,
@2=@n2 < 0.
II. To Show that dnBR=dc > 0
The result is clear after writing the equation dening the best reply of
the union (equation 6.26), as:
nBR[2nBR
3
+ nBR
2
]
2N0(N0+1)
"
  nBR(3 + 4nBR)
= c.
The numerator on the left-hand side is increasing in nBR and the denomina-
tor is decreasing in nBR. Hence, if c rises so too must nBR for the equality
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above to hold.
III. Full Membership
Full membership occurs if and only if " is su¢ ciently small. To nd how
small, suppose that equation (6.26) holds at n = N0, mathematically:
2N40 +N
3
0 + 4cN
2
0 + 3cN0 =
2cN0(N0 + 1)
"
.
After some algebra, this becomes:
" =
2cN0 + 2c
2N30 +N
2
0 + 4cN0 + 3c
=
2c
N20
+ 2c
N30
2 + 1
N0
+ 4c
N20
+ 3c
N30
.
Letting c = c and taking the limit as N0 grows large yields:
lim
N0!+1
" =
c1
1 + 2c1
.
Proof of Proposition 15
This is implied by Proposition 12; the proof of Proposition 12 did not
depend on the bargaining function. The proof of Proposition 12 relied on
the fact that
 
dnBR=dc
  
dcBR=dn
  0. This is also true in this particular
case when n2 > c. This is because Proposition 14 proved that dnBR=dc > 0
and Proposition 13 proved that dcBR=dn < 0 when the cross derivative Kcn
was positive, or equivalently when n2 > c. It also showed that dcBR=dn < 0
when N0 was large.
Proof of Proposition 16
I. Equilibrium Condition
The best reply of the union, given by equation (6.26), can be rewritten
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as:
nBR
N0
"
2

nBR
N0
3
+
1
N0

nBR
N0
2
+4

c
N20

nBR
N0
+
3
N0
c
N20
#
=
=
2
"

c
N20

N0 + 1
N0

.
Letting c = c and nBR = n and taking the limit as the workforce size
grows large, N0 ! +1, on both sides of the previous equation results in:
1
h
2
3
1 + 4c

1

1
i
=
2c1
"
.
Solving this equation for c1 results in:
2
4
1 =
2c1
"
  4c211.
Or, equivalently, as given by equation (6.27):
c1 =

4
1
" 1   21
.
The reply of the rm, given by equation (6.24), can be rewritten as:
cBR
N20
=
1p
2
n
N0
r
N0 + 1
N0
  " n
N0
n+ 1
N0
 

n
N0
2
.
Letting cBR = c and n = n and taking the limit as the workforce size
grows large, N0 ! +1, on both sides of this equation results in equation
(6.28):
c1 =
1p
2
q
1  "21   
2
1.
Combining equations (6.27) and (6.28) yields:

4
1
" 1   221
=
1p
2
q
1  "21   
2
1:
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Thus:
" 11
q
1  "21  
p
2" 1
2
1   2
3
1
q
1  "21 + 2
p
2
4
1 =
p
2
4
1
"
4
1   
2
1 +
1
2 + 4"
= 0.
Let z = 2. Then:
"z2   z + 1
2 + 4"
= 0.
The roots of this quadratic are:
z+ =
1 +
q
1  2"
1+2"
2"
, z  =
1 
q
1  2"
1+2"
2"
.
It is easy to prove that z+ > 1, and so this root cannot correspond to a
solution because 2 < 1. After some algebra, it is possible to prove that:
z  =
1 
q
1
1+2"
2"

1 +
q
1
1+2"
1 +
q
1
1+2"
,
z  =

1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
 1
.
Hence:
1 =
p
z 
=

1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
 1=2
.
III. The Firms Costly E¤ort is Positive in Equilibrium
The ratio of the rms costly e¤ort to the workforce size is given by
equation (6.28) (copied below):
c1 =
1p
2
q
1  "21   
2
1:
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Hence, the rms costly e¤ort is positive if:
1p
2
q
1  "21 > 
2
1
q
1  "21 >
p
21
1  "21 > 2
2
1
1 > 
2
1 (2 + ")
1
2 + "
> 
2
1:
Substituting the value of 1 from equation (6.29) results in:
1
2 + "
>
1
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2" > 2 + "
p
1 + 2" > 1  ":
This inequality is clearly satised, hence the rms costly e¤ort is always
positive.
III. Full Union Membership
The solution for  given by the two best replies in Proposition (16) are:
c1 =

4
1
" 1   21
=
1p
2
q
1  "21   
2
1.
We solve for the maximum ine¢ ciency for which all workers would be union-
ized (that is, if the ine¢ ciency were more than this value, there would not
be full unionization). If all workers are unionized, then  = 1, and the above
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equality becomes:
1
" 1   2 =
r
1  "
2
  1
"
1  2" +
1  2"
1  2" =
r
1  "
2
1  "
1  2" =
r
1  "
2
.
Simplifying: p
1  "
p
2 = 1  2".
Squaring both sides helps us to nd the solution, but it also introduces one
extra (wrong) solution. More precisely, not all solutions of the following are
actually solutions of the previous equation. Squaring both sides leads to:
2(1  ") = (1  2")2
2  2" = 1  4"+ 4"2
4"2   2"  1 = 0.
This quadratic has two roots, which are dened by:
" =
1p5
4
.
The negative of the two roots, that is,  0:31, is the only one of the two
roots that satises the best replies in Proposition 16 (given that a positive
value for " leads to equation (6.28) taking the root of a negative number).
The positive root does not satisfy the equation
p
1  "p2 = 1   2", as the
right-hand side becomes negative when " = (1+
p
5)=4. Because " > 0, this
result implies that there is never complete unionization of the workforce.
Proof of Corollary 12
I. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Union Size and Costly
Bargaining E¤ort with respect to the Ine¢ ciency Coe¢ cient
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It is straightforward to see that n and c are decreasing in " after es-
tablishing they both move in the same direction all the time. To see that n
and c move in the same direction, note that the bargaining elasticity can
be written as:
n
K(c; n)
@K
@n
= n(c
; n)
n
n
2
n2 + c
=
2nc
(n2 + c)2
n
c =
nn
2
2  n
. (A.19)
Because n is constant, this equality shows that c
 and n are increasing
functions of each other. To see that n and c are decreasing in ", note that
the equilibrium condition given by equation (6.26) in Proposition 14 can be
written as:
" =
2x n
1 n
2n3 + n2

1 + 4 n
1 n

+ 3n n
1 n
.
Clearly, because n is constant, as " rises, n
 must fall (because the denom-
inator is clearly increasing in n). Because c moves in the same direction,
so too must c.
II. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Wage and Ine¢ ciency
Coe¢ cient
First note that the bargaining function is a constant when the elasticity is
constant. To see this, simply substitute equation (A.19) into the bargaining
function as follows:
K =
n
2
n2 + c
=
n
2
n2

1 + n
2 n

=
1
1 + n
2 n
. (A.20)
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Next, taking the derivative of the wage  = K(c; n)Y=(2N0) with respect
to " and substituting the expression for Y results in:
2N0
d
d"
= [x  "n(n + 1)]dK(c
; n)
d"
 K(c; n)

"(2n + 1)
dn
d"
+ n(n + 1)

.
Because the bargaining function is a constant and dK(c; n)=d" = 0 by
equation (A.20) this equality becomes:
2N0
K(c; n)
d
d"
=  "(2n + 1)dn

d"
  n(n + 1). (A.21)
Next, we substitute dn=d" into this equation. To derive an expression for
dn=d", rst substitute equation (A.19) into equation (6.26), yielding:
n
4

2 + 4
n
2  n

+ n
3

1 + 3
n
2  n

=
2n
2
x
"
n
2  n
.
Taking the derivative of this equation with respect to " yields:
4n
3 dn
d"

2 + 4
n
2  n

+ 3n
2 dn
d"

1 + 3
n
2  n

=
=
4nx
"
dn
d"
n
2  n
  2n
2x
"2
n
2  n
.
Solving this equation for dn=d" yields:
dn
d"
=
 2n2x n
2 nh
4n3

2 + 4 n
2 n

+ 3n2

1 + 3 n
2 n

  4xn n
"(2 n)
i
"2
. (A.22)
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Substituting this expression for dn=d" into equation (A.21) yields:
2N0
K(c; n)
d
d"
=
=
"(2n + 1)
2n
2
xn
2  nh
4n3

2 + 4 n
2 n

+ 3n2

1 + 3 n
2 n

  4xn n
"(2 n)
i
"2
  n(n + 1).
The derivative d=d" will be negative if:
"(2n + 1)
 
2n
2
xn
2  n
!
h
4n3

2 + 4 n
2 n

+ 3n2

1 + 3 n
2 n

  4xn n
"(2 n)
i
"2
< n(n + 1).
Multiplying by the denominator of dn=d" (this denominator is positive
because dn=d" < 0 and its numerator is negative) yields:
"(2n + 1)(2n
2
xn)
2  n
<
< "2n(n + 1)

4n
3

2 +
4n
2  n

+ 3n
2

1 +
3n
2  n

  4xn
n
" (2  n)

.
Dividing both sides by "N50 yields:

2n + 1
N0
"
2
n
2
N20
x
N20
n
2  n
#
<
<
"n
N0

n
N0
+
1
N0
"
4n
3
N30

2+
4n
2 n

+
3n
2
N30

1+
3n
2 n

  4x
N20
n
N0
n
" (2 n)
#
.
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Taking the limit as N0 grows large yields:
4

n
N0

n
2  n

< "
"
4

n
N0
3
2 + 4
n
2  n

  4 n

N0
n
" (2  n)
#

n
2  n

< "
"
n
N0
2
2 + 4
n
2  n

  n
" (2  n)
#
.
Substituting equation (6.29) for n=N0 yields:
n
2  n

< "

1
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"

2 + 4
n
2  n

  n
" (2  n)


n
2  n

<
"
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"

2 + 4
n
2  n

  n
(2  n)
n
2  n
<
"
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"

1 + 2

n
2  n

.
After some algebra this can be written as:
1 <
"
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
 
1
n
2 n
+ 2
!
2  n
n
+ 2 >
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
"
2
n
+ 1 >
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
"
n <
2
"

1 + " p1 + 2"

:
III. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Union Size and Firm
E¤ort with respect to Workforce Size
To see that n and c are increasing in N0, note that the equilibrium
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condition given by equation (6.26) in Proposition 14 can be written as:
N0(N0 + 1) = "

n(2n + 1)
n
+ n(n + 1)

.
Clearly, if N0 rises so too does n. Because n is rising with N0, so too is
c (by the result earlier in this proof that n and c are increasing functions
of each other).
IV. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Union Density and
Workforce Size
To see that limN0!+1 d(n
=N0)=dN0 = 0, note that 1 = limN0!+1(n
=N0) =
(1+2"+
p
1 + 2") 1=2 (from Proposition 16). This expression for 1 depends
only on ". This proves the result.
V. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Surplus and Ine¢ -
ciency Coe¢ cient
Because K(c; n) is constant (a result established earlier in this proof),
the ratios Y w=Y
 and Y f =Y
 must be constant, because they are referring
to shares of the surplus. Also, note that the wage is falling in the ine¢ -
ciency if the elasticity is su¢ ciently small (a result established earlier in the
proof). Because of the Budget Balance constraint (aggregate wages equal
the workerssurplus), when wages fall, Y w falls. If a rise in the ine¢ ciency
causes Y w to fall, then Y
 must fall because the ratio Y w=Y
 is a constant.
The same is true for the rm surplus; if a rise in the ine¢ ciency causes Y 
to fall, then Y f must fall because the ratio Y

f =Y
 is a constant.
VI. Comparative Static Result for the Equilibrium Firm Prot and Inef-
ciency Coe¢ cient
The rm prot is given by  = (1 K(c; n))Y (n)  c. Substituting
equation (A.19) into this equality yields:
 = (1 K(c; n))Y (n)  n2

n
2  n

:
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Taking the derivative of this equation with respect to the ine¢ ciency yields:
d
d"
=  (1 K(c
; n))
2

"(2n + 1)
dn
d"
+ n(n + 1)

 2ndn

d"

n
2  n

2
(1 K(c; n))
d
d"
=  "

2n + 1 +
4nn

(2  n) (1 K(c; n))"

dn
d"
 n(n + 1):
Substituting dn=d" (from equation A.22) into this equation allows us to
write the right-hand side as follows (the denominator of dn=d" is positive
because dn=d" < 0, and its numerator is negative; also K is a constant as
described earlier in the proof):
  "

2n + 1 +
4nn

(2  n) (1 K(c; n))"

0@  2n2x n2 n
"2

4n3

2 + 4 n
2 n

+ 3n2

1 + 3 n
2 n

  4xn n
"(2 n)

1A
  n(n + 1).
We are interested when this right-hand term is negative. Hence, moving the
 n(n+ 1) term to the right of an inequality and multiplying everything by
the denominator of the second term (which is positive as described above)
yields:
"

2n + 1 +
4nn

(2  n) (1 K(c; n))"

2n
2
xn
2  n
<
< n(n+1)"2

4n
3

2 +
4n
2  n

+ 3n
2

1 +
3n
2  n

  4xn
n
" (2  n)

.
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Dividing all terms by n2N30 yields:
"

2
n
N0
+
1
N0
+
4nn

N0 (2  n) (1 K(c; n))"

2x
N20
n
2  n
<
<

1 +
1
n

"2
 
4n
3
N30

2+
4n
2 n

+
3n
2
N30

1+
3n
2 n

  4x
N20
n
N0
n
" (2 n)
!
.
As N0 grows large this becomes:
"

2 +
4n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n))"

n
N0
2n
2  n
<
< "2

4

2 + 4
n
2  n

  4n

N0
n
" (2  n)

.
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by (2  n) =" gives:
2 +
4n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n))"

2nn

N0
< 4"

2 + 4n  
n
N0
n
"

.
Gathering like terms yields:
2n
n
N0

2 +
4n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n))"
+ 4n

< 4"(2 + 4n)
n
n
N0

1 +
2n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n))"
+ 2n

< "(2 + 4n)
n
n
N0

1 +
2n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n))"
+ 2n

< 2"+ 4n".
Substituting limN0!+1 n
=N0 from equation (6.29) yields:
n

1 +
2n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n))"
+ 2n

< " (2 + 4n)
q
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
" (1 + 2n) +
2n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n))
<
(2 + 4n)
n
"2
q
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
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"+
2n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n)) (1 + 2n)
<
(2 + 4n)
n (1 + 2n)
"2
q
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
"+
2n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n)) (1 + 2n)
<
2
n
"2 + 2"+
q
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2"
"n
2
+
2n
(2  n) (1 K(c; n)) (1 + 2n)
< "2
q
1 + 2"+
p
1 + 2".
The expression for K given by equation (A.20) is decreasing in n. Hence,
the left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in n. The right-hand side
of the inequality is increasing in ". If this inequality holds (that is, if n
is small relative to "), then the equilibrium rm prot is decreasing in the
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient.
Proof of Lemma 8
Substituting the bargaining power function into the wage rate, , results
in:
 = K(c; n)

1  " n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

=
n2
c+ n2

N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

.
Substituting the value of c = c (from equation 7.2), this equation becomes:
 =
n2
n
q
N0(N0+1) "n(n+1)
2

N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

.
After some algebra, this becomes:
 =
p
2
n
p
N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1)
.
Proof of Lemma 9
Taking the derivative of equation (7.2) with respect to the size of the
union, n, (to calculate the marginal wage rate with respect to the number
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of union members) yields:
@
@n
=
n2
c+ n2

 " 2n+ 1
N0(N0 + 1)

+
2nc
(c+ n2)2

1  " n(n+ 1)
N0(N0 + 1)

=
 "n2(2n+ 1)(c+ n2)
N0(N0 + 1)(c+ n2)2
+
2nc[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)]
N0(N0 + 1)(c+ n2)2
=
2ncN0(N0 + 1)  "n2[(2n+ 1)(c+ n2) + 2c(n+ 1)]
N0(N0 + 1)(c+ n2)2
.
This marginal rate is non-negative if and only if:
2cN0(N0 + 1)  "n[(2n+ 1)(c+ n2) + 2c(n+ 1)]
Equivalently:
2cN0(N0 + 1)
"
 n  2n3 + n2 + 4cn+ 3c .
This condition and its unique positive solution nBR are the same as in Propo-
sition 14.
Proof of Corollary 13
The result is implied by Corollary 12, which established when d=d" <
0. This is because  is an increasing transformation of  (for details, see the
proof of Corollary 6).
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Appendix B
Endogenous Union Ine¢ ciency
Model
B.1 Model Setup
This appendix extends the Constant Wage Model of Chapter 3 by endoge-
nizing the union ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. This more realistic model is com-
plicated to solve analytically because the number of endogenous variables is
large. For this reason, this appendix focuses only on the key properties of
the model and its equilibrium conditions. As in Chapter 3, output is unob-
servable or unveriable and assumptions (3.1) through (3.5) hold. The only
di¤erence from Chapter 3 is that the union chooses the ine¢ ciency coe¢ -
cient in addition to the union wage. In particular, suppose union members
always incur some minimal level of ine¢ ciency, denoted "0 > 0, which we
call the xed ine¢ ciency. The xed ine¢ ciency does not give union mem-
bers any additional benet, and this parameter is not under the control of
any player.
Suppose the union can increase the ine¢ ciency to higher levels by choos-
ing the variable ine¢ ciency, denoted "1 (it can also decrease the ine¢ ciency
if it wishes). Assume that the ine¢ ciency is the sum " = "0 + "1, and
0  "  1. This means that the union can select any level "1 for the variable
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ine¢ ciency such that 0  "1  1  "0.1
The utility function of union members incorporates better working con-
ditions (only available to union members) that is increasing in the variable
ine¢ ciency, "1. This may include, for example, freedom to take protected
industrial action, better leave entitlements, fewer hours worked, adjustments
to the exibility of hours worked or the pace of work, smaller production tar-
gets, increased protection from job losses, increased training, or some form
of on-work leisure. Let  > 0 be a constant measuring the intensity of the
utility for the better working conditions. Let L : [0; 1  "0]! R, dened at
every "1 2 [0; 1   "0] by L("1) = p"1, represent the extra benet for each
union member of the better working conditions when variable ine¢ ciency is
"1. The term L("1) is added to the utility of union members.
There will be two wage levels in equilibrium. Union members earn wage
 and non-members earn  + L("1). The term L("1) is a compensation
premium that non-members obtain because they do not benet from the
same (relatively more pleasant) working conditions as union members do.
Workers not in the union do not have incentives to join the union because
if they do, their utility remains the same; they lose the premium on their
wage, but benet from better working conditions. The rm is willing to pay
the compensation premium to non-unionized workers because of the threat
e¤ect (as described in Chapter 3).
In this model, the union anticipates for each variable ine¢ ciency, "1,
and union wage level, , the equilibrium number of workers, n. The
proposed strategy prole is the same as in Chapter 3; workers with skills
j 2 f1;    ; ng are union members, and workers with skills j > n are not in
the union. As in Chapter 3, the workerssurplus is Yw = GU + GN , where
the shares to union members and non-members are, respectively:
GU = n, (B.1)
1We use a di¤erent notation for each ine¢ ciency type in order to make Appendix B
and the proofs easier to follow, and also because it is intuitive to think of the ine¢ ciency
to be xed or variable.
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GN = [+ L("1)](N0   n). (B.2)
B.2 Equilibrium
The focus will be on an equilibrium where union workers receive the wage 
and non-union workers earn +L("1). The rst result derives an expression
for the union wage by combining equations (3.8), (B.1) and (B.2).
Lemma 10 The wage of a unionized worker, in terms of the workersbar-
gaining power, ine¢ ciency coe¢ cients, union size and working conditions
parameter, is given by:
 = K(n)
[N0(N0 + 1)  ("0 + "1)n(n+ 1)]
2N0
  
p
"1(N0   n)
N0
.
The problem of the union is to maximize the utility of its members by
choosing their salary, , and the variable ine¢ ciency, "1, subject to budget
balance. Mathematically:
max
0, 0"11
+ L("1) subject to equations (3.8), (B.1) and (B.2).
Dene the auxiliary variable  by:
 =


(n+ 1)K(n)
2
[n(n+ 1)K 0(n) K(n)] .
In the case where the equilibrium variable ine¢ ciency is zero (when "1 =
0 and, hence, the right hand side of equation B.3 is zero,  = 0 and " = "0)
the formula for the equilibrium union size (given by equation B.4 of the
following proposition) reverts back to equation (3.11) of Chapter 3. This
clearly occurs when the working conditions parameter is zero,  = 0. In
this sense,  is the di¤erence between the models. Let "1 be the variable
ine¢ ciency that solves the unions problem. The next proposition outlines
the conditions for the equilibrium.
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Proposition 17 Suppose assumptions (3.1) through (3.5) are satised. In
addition, suppose that the elasticity of the bargaining function is not too
large relative to the union size, precisely,  < (2n   1)n=(n + 1). Then,
there exists variable ine¢ ciency, "1, that solves the unions problem. This
ine¢ ciency is given by:
"1 =


(n + 1)K(n)
2
. (B.3)
To obtain "1 < 1   "0, there must be su¢ ciently many union members in
the sense that =
p
1  "0 < (n + 1)K(n). Assuming this condition holds,
the union size n that solves the unions problem is either the upper corner
solution, n = N0, or an interior solution implicitly dened by:
K 0(n)
K(n)
=
"0(2n
 + 1) +  =K(n)
N0(N0 + 1)  "0n(n + 1) . (B.4)
Or equivalently:
K 0(n)
K(n)
=
"0(2n
 + 1) + "1[n
(n + 1)K 0(n) K(n)]=K(n)
N0(N0 + 1)  "0n(n + 1) .
The equilibrium number of union members depends on the bargaining
function, K(n), and on the parameters for the workforce size, the exogenous
ine¢ ciency and working conditions. If  = 0, then  = 0 and equations
(3.11) and (B.4), which implicitly dene the equilibrium size of the union,
become equivalent, as " = "0. In this sense, the model is a generalization of
the model with the exogenous ine¢ ciency only. If "0 = 0, then the model is
one of variable ine¢ ciency only.
Proposition 17 shows that the equilibrium variable ine¢ ciency depends
on the working conditions parameter, , the equilibrium size of the union,
n, and the workersbargaining power, K(n).
The model so far has considered a general bargaining function, K(n).
The next subsection restricts the bargaining function to increase the tractabil-
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ity of the model. This allows us to obtain more insight into the equilibrium
variables.
B.3 Bargaining with Constant Elasticity
This subsection studies the endogenous ine¢ ciency model under an assump-
tion that the elasticity of the bargaining function, with respect to union size,
is constant. Without this restriction, the model would be cumbersome to
solve analytically. In this sense, the endogenous ine¢ ciency model presented
here is not so much a generalization of the exogenous ine¢ ciency model
(which restricted the ine¢ ciency), but a di¤erent restriction.
Suppose throughout this subsection that the bargaining function is given
by K(n) = n=N0 , for all n 2 [0; N0], and some constant 0 <  < 1. The
parameter  represents the bargaining elasticity. Then, K 0(n)=K(n) = =n.
The next proposition outlines the equilibrium condition.
Proposition 18 Suppose the bargaining function is given byK(n) = n=N0 .
The equilibrium union size, n, is either the upper corner solution n = N0
(all workers are unionized) or it is the interior solution which is implicitly
dened by the rst order condition:
N0(N0 + 1) = "0n
[(2 + )n + (1 + )] + 2N20
n +    1
n2 1(n + 1)2
. (B.5)
Proposition 18 shows that the equilibrium level of union membership
depends on the workforce size, N0, exogenous ine¢ ciency, "0, elasticity, ,
and the desire for improved working conditions, .
If  = 1=2, equation (B.5) becomes a polynomial of degree four in the
variable n. If  is generic, but  = 0, then it becomes a polynomial of degree
two in variable n, and its unique positive solution n is the same as the one
obtained in equation (3.14) when " = "0.
Even with this restriction on the bargaining function it is cumbersome to
solve analytically, so we restrict our attention to the case when the workforce
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size, N0, is large. The next result provides su¢ cient conditions for an interior
solution to the unions problem; that is, for when n < N0.
Proposition 19 Suppose the bargaining function is given by K(n) = n=N0
and that the workforce size grows large without bound, N0 ! +1. Then,
there exists an interior solution (n < N0) for the unions problem if and
only if the ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient or desire for improved working conditions
are su¢ ciently large. Mathematically, an interior solution exists if:
lim
N0!+1
 > N0
s
1  "0

1 +
2


or
lim
N0!+1
"0 >

2 + 
.
If there is an interior solution, then the limit of the union density, as the
size of the workforce grows large, N0 ! +1, is given by:
lim
N0!+1
n
N0
=
r

"0(2 + )
. (B.6)
Proposition 19 proves that all workers will be unionized if the ine¢ ciency
coe¢ cient is su¢ ciently small. This is consistent with the result of Proposi-
tion 1. The intuition is that workers are better o¤ in the union when there is
no ine¢ ciency, because it increases their bargaining power. It is only when
the ine¢ ciency is su¢ ciently large that it becomes protable for workers to
leave the union.
The result of Proposition 19 requires the xed ine¢ ciency to be positive,
"0 > 0, because "0 appears in the denominator of equation (B.6).
Proposition 19 also shows that the desire for good working conditions, ,
must be su¢ ciently large for some workers not to unionize. This is because
the variable ine¢ ciency, "1, is increasing in the working conditions parameter
, and a higher variable ine¢ ciency reduces the size of the surplus.
Proposition 19 also shows that the equilibrium union density is decreas-
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ing in the xed ine¢ ciency; a result that is consistent with Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 explains the intuition for this result.
The next result studies the equilibrium variable ine¢ ciency and wages
when the workforce size grows large.
Proposition 20 Suppose the bargaining function is given byK(n) = n=N0 .
As the workforce size grows large, the equilibrium variable ine¢ ciency falls
to zero and the union and non-union wages converge. Mathematically:
lim
N0!+1
"1 = 0,
lim
N0!+1

 + 
p
"1

= lim
N0!+1
.
The results of Proposition 20 partly reect the assumption on the skill
distribution. In particular, as the workforce size grows, so too does the skill
of the average worker and, hence, their level of production. With a higher
average skill in the union, it makes it increasingly costly to provide improved
working conditions to workers, so the union reduces the variable ine¢ ciency
to zero as the workforce grows innitely large. Proposition 20 also shows that
equilibrium wages of union and non-union workers converge as the workforce
grows large. This is because the equilibrium variable ine¢ ciency declines to
zero and, hence, non-union workers do not need a compensation premium
for di¤erences in working conditions. Given the result of Proposition 20
(that is, when the workforce size grows large, the variable ine¢ ciency is zero
and the union and non-union wages converge), the model studied in this
subsection is largely the same as the Constant Wage Model of Chapter 3, at
least when the workforce size grows large.
B.4 Summary
This appendix studied an extension to Chapter 3 that endogenized the union
ine¢ ciency coe¢ cient. As in Chapter 3, output was unobservable and the
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focus was on the properties of an equilibrium where lower skilled workers
joined the labor union while higher skilled workers did not. The model
was solved to nd properties of the equilibrium variables. This appendix
also studied the model under a restriction on the bargaining function. This
improved the tractability of the model to some degree. A key nding under
this restriction was that, as the workforce size grows large, the variable
ine¢ ciency converged to zero and the union and non-union wages converge.
B.5 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 10
Combining equations (3.8) and (B.1) with equation (B.2) results in:
n+(+ L("1)) (N0 n) = GU+GN = Yw = K(n)
2
[N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)] .
Because " = "0 + "1 and L("1) = 
p
"1, then:
N0 + 
p
"1(N0   n) = K(n)
2
[N0(N0 + 1)  ("0 + "1)n(n+ 1)] .
Equivalently:
2N0(+
p
"1) = 2
p
"1n "1n(n+1)K(n)+N0(N0+1)K(n) "0n(n+1)K(n).
(B.7)
Solving for  completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 17
The equilibrium variable ine¢ ciency and equation implicitly dening the
size of the union are calculated as follows. Because of equation (B.7) and
because 2N0 > 0, to maximize  + L("1), it su¢ ces to maximize the right-
hand side of equation (B.7). Then:
argmax
0, 0"11
+ L("1)= argmax
0, 0"11
+ 
p
"1
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= argmax
0nN0, 0"11
2
p
"1n  ("0 + "1)n(n+ 1)K(n) +N0(N0 + 1)K(n).
The partial derivatives of this equation with respect to n and "1, set to zero,
are equivalent to (respectively):
2
p
"1+N0(N0+1)K
0(n) = ("0+"1)[(2n+1)K(n)+n(n+1)K 0(n)], (B.8)
p
"1
= (n+ 1)K(n). (B.9)
Let "1 be the solution of this last equation. Then:
"1 =
2
[(n+ 1)K(n)]2
.
To obtain "1 < 1   "0, there must be su¢ ciently many union members in
the sense that =
p
1  "0 < (n + 1)K(n). Assuming this condition holds,
and substituting "1 into equation (B.8) leads to:
22
(n+ 1)K(n)
+N0(N0 + 1)K
0(n) (B.10)
=
2[(2n+ 1)K(n) + n(n+ 1)K 0(n)]
[(n+ 1)K(n)]2
+ "0(2n+ 1)K(n) + "0n(n+ 1)K
0(n).
Dene the auxiliary variable  by:
 =
2[(2n+ 1)K(n) + n(n+ 1)K 0(n)]
[(n+ 1)K(n)]2
  2
2
(n+ 1)K(n)
=
2
[(n+ 1)K(n)]2
[n(n+ 1)K 0(n) K(n)] .
Substituting this auxiliary variable into equation (B.10) yields:
N0(N0 + 1)K
0(n) = "0(2n+ 1)K(n) + "0n(n+ 1)K 0(n) +  .
Dividing both sides byK(n)[N0(N0+1) "0n(n+1)] and after some algebra,
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this equality becomes:
N0(N0 + 1)
K 0(n)
K(n)
= "0(2n+ 1) + "0n(n+ 1)
K 0(n)
K(n)
+
 
K(n)
.
Therefore:
K 0(n)
K(n)
=
"0(2n+ 1) +  =K(n)
N0(N0 + 1)  "0n(n+ 1) .
This equation implicitly denes the equilibrium size of the union which solves
the unions problem. To see the solution is indeed a maximum of the unions
problem, consider the following second order partial derivative test. The rst
order partial derivatives of the union wage with respect to n and "1 were cal-
culated previously and are given by equations (B.8) and (B.9), respectively.
The second order partial derivative with respect to n is:
@2 [+ L("1)]
@n2
= N0(N0 + 1)K
00(n)
  ("0 + "1) [(2n+ 1)K 0(n) + 2K(n) + n(n+ 1)K 00(n) + (2n+ 1)K 0(n)] :
Simplifying yields:
@2 [+ L("1)]
@n2
= xK 00(n) ("0+"1)[2(2n+1)K 0(n)+2K(n)+n(n+1)K 00(n)].
This equation is negative because, by assumptions (3.1) through (3.5),K 00(n) <
0;K 0(n) > 0;K(n) > 0, which means that all terms in this equation are neg-
ative except for  ("0+"1)n(n+1)K 00(n); however the term N0(N0+1)K 00(n)
(which is negative) more than o¤sets that term because N0 > n. The other
second order partial derivative, and the cross derivative, are, respectively:
@2 [+ L("1)]
@"21
=
 
2"1:51
and
@2 [+ L("1)]
@n@"1
=  K(n)  (n+ 1)K 0(n).
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For the solution to maximize the unions problem we require:
@2 [+ L("1)]
@n2
@2 [+ L("1)]
@"21
 

@2 [+ L("1)]
@n@"1
2
> 0,
and
@2 [+ L("1)]
@n2
< 0, or
@2 [+ L("1)]
@"21
< 0.
Note that both @2 [+ L("1)] =@n2 < 0 and @2 [+ L("1)] =@"21 < 0 (as de-
scribed earlier in the proof) so the second requirement is satised. As re-
gards the rst requirement, the rst term in the requirement will be positive
because both @2 [+ L("1)] =@n2 and @2 [+ L("1)] =@"21 are negative. The
second term is a negative number squared, which is positive. Therefore, for
the rst requirement to be met the following condition must hold:
@ [+ L("1)]
2
@n2
@ [+ L("1)]
2
@"21
>

@2 [+ L("1)]
@n@"1
2
:
Equivalently:
[xK 00(n)  ("0 + "1) (2(2n+ 1)K 0(n) + 2K(n) + n(n+ 1)K 00(n))]  
2"1:51
> [ K(n)  (n+ 1)K 0(n)]2 .
Substituting equation (B.9) for  into this inequality and re-arranging yields:
  (n+ 1)K(n)
2
[xK 00(n)  ("0 + "1)]
  (n+ 1)K(n)
2
[(2(2n+ 1)K 0(n) + 2K(n) + n(n+ 1)K 00(n))]
> "1 [ K(n)  (n+ 1)K 0(n)]2 :
On the left-hand side of this inequality, the terms with K 00(n) are a net
positive (that is,  xK 00(n) > ("0+ "1)n(n+1)K 00(n) because K 00(n) < 0 by
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assumption 3.5). Using this fact, the above inequality will be true if:
(n+ 1)K(n)("0 + "1)
2
(2(2n+ 1)K 0(n) + 2K(n))
> "1 [ K(n)  (n+ 1)K 0(n)]2 :
After a little simplication on the left-hand side of the inequality and ex-
panding the right-hand side we obtain:
(n+ 1)K(n)("0 + "1) [(2n+ 1)K
0(n) +K(n)]
> "1

K(n)2 + 2K(n)K 0(n)(n+ 1) + (n+ 1)2K 0(n)2

:
Dividing both sides of this inequality by K(n)(n+ 1)("0 + "1) yields:
(2n+ 1)K 0(n) +K(n) >
"1
("0 + "1)

K(n)
(n+ 1)
+ 2K 0(n) + (n+ 1)
K 0(n)2
K(n)

:
Because "1=(("0 + "1)) < 1, this inequality holds if:
(2n+ 1)K 0(n) +K(n) >
K(n)
(n+ 1)
+ 2K 0(n) + (n+ 1)
K 0(n)2
K(n)
:
Consolidating the K 0(n) and K(n) terms yields:
K 0(n)(2n  1) +K(n)

1  1
n+ 1

> (n+ 1)
K 0(n)2
K(n)
:
Multiplying both sides of the inequality byK(n) and consolidating theK 0(n)
and K(n) terms yields:
K 0(n) [(2n  1)K(n)  (n+ 1)K 0(n)] +K(n)2

1  1
n+ 1

> 0:
The term K(n)2 (1  1=(n+ 1)) > 0 is clearly positive. Because of this, and
becauseK 0(n) > 0 by assumption (3.4), the above inequality will be satised
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if:
(2n  1)K(n) > (n+ 1)K 0(n):
Equivalently:
2n  1
n+ 1
>
K 0(n)
K(n)
2n  1
n+ 1
n >
K 0(n)
K(n)
n
2n  1
n+ 1
n > :
This inequality is assumed to hold at the beginning of Proposition 17.
Proof of Proposition 18
Suppose that K(n) = n=N0 , for all n 2 [0; N0], and some constant
0 <  < 1. Then, K 0(n)=K(n) = =n, and equation (B.4) becomes:
N0(N0 + 1)  "0n(n+ 1) = "0n(2n+ 1) + n 
K(n)
.
Substituting  we obtain:
N0(N0 + 1)  "0n(n+ 1) = "0n(2n+ 1) + n
2 [n(n+ 1)K 0(n) K(n)]
(n+ 1)2K(n)3
.
Substituting the formulas for K(n) and K 0(n), and after some algebra, this
becomes:
N0(N0 + 1) = "0n[(2 + )n+ (1 + )] + 
2N20
n+    1
n2 1(n+ 1)2
.
Proof of Proposition 19
I. Condition for Interior Solution in terms of the Fixed Ine¢ ciency
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Re-writing equation (B.5) yields:
"0

n2+4(2 + ) + n2+3(3 + )  n2+2   n2+1(1 + )
  n2N20 (1  ) + n22N20
= n2+2x+ n2+12x+ n2x.
We are interested in the case where the exogenous ine¢ ciency is su¢ ciently
large, so consider:
"0

N2+40 (2 + ) +N
2+3
0 (3 + ) N2+20   N2+10 (1 + )

 N02N20 (1  ) +N202N20
> N2+20 x+N
2+1
0 2x+N
2
0 x.
Solving for "0 and simplifying yields:
"0 >
N0x+ 2x+  (N0 + 1) +N0   2 + 2(1  )
N30 (2 + ) +N
2
0 (3 + ) N0   (1 + )
.
Taking the limit as N0 grows yields:
lim
N0!+1
"0 >

2 + 
.
II. Condition for Interior Solution in terms of the Working Conditions
Parameter
Re-writing equation (B.5) yields:
  n2+3 ["0(2 + )]  n2+2 ["0(3 + )] + n2+1 [(x+ "0)]
+ n2 [2x+ "0(1 + )] + n
2 1x  2 nN20  N20 (1  ) = 0.
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Because we are interested in the case where  is su¢ ciently large, consider:
 N2+30 ["0(2 + )] N2+20 ["0(3 + )] +N2+10 [(x+ "0)]
+N20 [2x+ "0(1 + )] +N
2 1
0 x < 
2

N0N
2
0  N20 (1  )

.
Dividing by N20 and solving for  yields:
 N20 ["0(2 + )] N0 ["0(3 + )]
  

1 
N0
 +
+
(x+ "0) + 2(N0 + 1) +
"0(1+)
N0
  

1 + 1
N0

  

1 
N0
 < 2.
Taking the limit as N0 grows large yields:
lim
N0!+1
2 >
N20 [(1  "0)  2"0] N0 [ (2 + "0) + 3"0]

.
Then:
lim
N0!+1
 > N0
s
1  "0

1 +
2


:
III. Union Density
Re-writing equation (B.5) yields:

x  "0n2(2 + ) + "0n(1 + )
 
n2+1 + 2n2 + n2 1

= 2N20 [n+    1] .
Expanding and simplifying the left-hand side of this equality allows for the
left-hand side to be written as:
xn2+1   "0(2 + )n2+3 + "0(1 + )n2+2 + x2n2   "0(2 + )2n2+2
+ "0(1 + )2n
2+1 + xn2 1   "0(2 + )n2+1 + "0(1 + )n2.
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Substituting this expansion into the equality and simplifying both sides of
the equality yields:
  n2+3"0(2 + ) + n2+2 ["0(1 + )  "0(2 + )2]
+ n2+1 [x+ "0(1 + )2  "0(2 + )] + n2 [x2 + "0(1 + )]
+ xn2 1 = 2N20 (n+    1) .
Dividing all terms by N2+40 , and after some algebra, we obtain:
n2+4
 "0(2 + )
N2+40

+ n2+3
 "0(3 + )
N2+40

+ n2+2

(x+ "0)
N2+40

+ n2+1

2x+ "0(1 + )
N2+40

+ n2

x
N2+40

+ n2
 2N20
N2+40

+ n

2N20 (1  )
N2+40

= 0.
Taking the limit as N0 grows large yields:
lim
N0!+1
n2+4
 "0(2 + )
N2+40

+ n2+2

x
N2+40

= 0.
Thus:
lim
N0!+1
n
N0
=
r

"0(2 + )
.
Proof of Proposition 20
I. Variable Ine¢ ciency Falls to Zero as N0 Grows
SubstitutingK(n) = n=N0 into the equation for the variable ine¢ ciency
(given by equation B.3) yields:
"1 =
 

(n + 1) n

N0
!2
.
This clearly converges to zero asN0 grows large because (a) the elasticity and
working condition parameter are constant, and (b) the result of Proposition
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19 that the union density is constant as N0 grows large.
II. The Union and Non-Union Wages Converge as N0 Grows
The union wage is:
 =
K(n) [N0(N0 + 1)  ("0 + "1)n(n+ 1)]
2N0
  
p
"1(N0   n)
N0
.
Taking the limit as the workforce size grows large, N0 ! +1, in both sides
of this equation yields:
lim
N0!+1
 =
n [N20   ("0 + "1)n2]
2N+10
.
The non-union wage is:
+ 
p
"1 =
n
N0
[N0(N0 + 1)  ("0 + "1)n(n+ 1)]
2N0
  
p
"1(N0   n)
N0
+ 
p
"1.
Taking the limit as the workforce size grows large, N0 ! +1, in both sides
of the equation results in:
lim
N0!+1
(+ 
p
"1) =
n [N20   ("0 + "1)n2]
2N+10
.
Clearly, lim
N0!+1
 
+ 
p
"1

= lim
N0!+1
. This completes the proof.
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Appendix C
A Note on Equilibrium
Stability
This appendix studies the stability condition described in Chapter 6. For
the purpose of this appendix, x a particular Nash equilibrium, (c, n)
such that c > 0 and 0 < n < N0. All the equations and conditions of this
appendix should be read as if they are evaluated at this Nash equilibrium.
By an abuse of notation, we may not explicitly say this in the equations and
conditions that follow.
The three possible situations that hold in equilibrium (c, n), as de-
scribed in Lemma 6, are:
Case 1 : Kcn >
 YnKc
Y
, nc > 0, cn < 0
Case 2 : Kcn <
 YnKc
Y
, nc < 0, cn > 0
Case 3 : Kcn =
 YnKc
Y
, nc = 0, cn = 0.
This appendix calculates the partial derivatives discussed in Section 6.3
and shows that the stability condition (also discussed in Section 6.3) holds
in equilibrium. The stability condition requires that nncc   ncnc > 0.
First, to see that nn < 0, take the second order partial derivative of
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equation (6.15) with respect to n, which yields:
nn =
1
2N0
(Knn(N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1))  2Kn"(2n+ 1)  2K"):
This is negative because Knn 6 0 (by assumption 6.6) and Kn > 0 (by
assumption 6.3). This proves that nn < 0.
Second, to see that cc < 0, take the second order partial derivative
of equation (6.12) with respect to c, which yields cc =  KccY . This is
negative because Kcc > 0 (by assumption 6.7).
As nn < 0 and cc < 0, to achieve nncc   ncnc > 0 (the stability
condition described in Section 6.3), it su¢ ces to prove that the product of
the cross partial derivatives must be zero or negative, ncnc 6 0. This is
indeed the case in an equilibrium. We claim that:
C.1 if Knc > 0, then nc > 0 and nc < 0:
C.2 if Knc < 0, then:
C.2.1 nc > 0 and cn < 0 if Case 1 of Lemma 6 holds
C.2.2 nc < 0 and cn > 0 if Case 2 of Lemma 6 holds
C.2.3 nc = 0 and cn = 0 if Case 3 of Lemma 6 holds.
To prove the claims C.1 through C.2.3 hold, we need to calculate the
partial cross derivatives nc and cn rst. These are:
nc =
1
2N0
(Knc(N0(N0 + 1)  "n(n+ 1)) Kc"(2n+ 1)) = KncY +KcYn
N0
cn =  KcnY +Kc "(2n+ 1)
2
=  KcnY  KcYn:
Equivalently:
cn =  N0nc.
To see that C.1 holds, suppose Knc > 0: In this case, it is clear that
nc > 0 and cn < 0 (using the fact that Kc < 0 by assumption 6.5), and
Yn < 0.
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To see that C.2.1 through C.2.3 hold, suppose Knc < 0: In this case,
nc < 0 and cn > 0 if  KcnY > KcYn, or equivalently if Kcn <  KcYn=Y .
This is the same inequality as in Case 2 of Lemma 6. (To see that cases
C.2.1 and C.2.3 hold, simply change the relevant inequalities).
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